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Editor’s Preface
The Journal of Retracing Africa (JORA) is honored to publish the second
volume dedicated to some of the issues surrounding Africa’s socio-political
and economic development. The attitude in the West over the last three
decades has been to exaggerate and generalize problems in Africa and ignore many
positive news that typify modern Africa. This unreliable approach has continued to
becloud proper understanding of the problems African countries face, the domestic
and external forces that created them, and the efforts Africans h a v e m a d e
to address them. The impression that Africa remains a lost continent persists
in the minds of many in the Weste in spite of the fact that six out of the
thirteen fastest-growing economies in the world are located in Africa: Rwanda,
Tanzania, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Ethiopia.1 As the World Bank’s June 2015 Global Economic Prospects reveals, these
African countries possess the highest projected Compound Annual Growth Rate
(CAGR) from 2014 through 2017.2 JORA publishes articles that provide a much
more balanced and comprehensive analysis of the complex and challenging social,
economic and political transformation in Africa since the precolonial period.
We witnessed a significant increase this year in submissions. This second
volume of JORA includes three articles and 18 book reviews. In “Leadership and
African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty Africa,” Chikwendu Christian
Ukaegbu examines the remarkable progress made in Africa fifty years since
independence, the obstacles that threatened to hinder the development of African
economies, and the strategies to facilitate rapid economic development fifty
years ahead. He argues that Africa’s future promises to be bright if political
leaders in their various countries place “local human resources or domestic
agency” at the epicenter of developmental process, abandon their “fixation on
extractive economies,” and embrace a policy that “sees development as the primary
responsibility of endogenous agency.”3 Emphasizing the importance of leadership
as a critical agent of change, the author concludes that “Only countries that have
transformational leadership embodied in a developmental state can achieve such a
change in the highly competitive global economy.”4
The role played by the Aro sub-cultural Igbo group in the social, political,
and economic development of Eastern Nigeria since the precolonial period has not
World Bank Group, June 2015 Global Economic Prospects: The Global Economy in Transition
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015).
2
Ibid.
3
Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu, “Leadership and African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty
Africa,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 1.
4
Ibid., 26.
1
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been fully studied. In “The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History:
An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade,” Ndu Life Njoku argues that the
Aro were at the center of the transformative (though controversial) activities that
shaped the history of precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial eastern region of
Nigeria. As Njoku shows, “the negative and positive experiences that neighboring
Igbo communities had of the Aro since the fifteenth century helped to evoke
hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand and wonder, awe, and admiration on
the other.”5 The author concludes t h a t that the contemporary perception of the
Aro had roots in the dominant role they played during the era of the Atlantic Slave
Trade and the assertive manner they confronted British administrators during
the colonial rule. The British attitude to the Aro people was a mixture of reluctant
admiration and mild resentment. As one official puts it, “Thirty- five years ago the
country was opened up and we knew little about the natives, but we did realize
that the Aro were very different from the other tribes in those parts.”6 Similarly,
another official wrote that the Aro established “their relatively great intelligence,
as compared with other native tribes.”7 On the other hand, the people’s use of
that intelligence to outwit British colonial officials earned them a bad reputation.
As one colonial official puts it, the Aro “have done a lot of harm as if they
are sent to bring the mail they levy blackmail.”8 Njoku’s article offers a priceless
insight into how dominant ethnic groups in Africa such as the Aro engaged with
colonial rule and sometimes thrived economically despite the dictatorship that
characterized colonial rule.
One of the major obstacles to the economic development of Africa,
especially since the 1990s, is the relentless waves of terrorist attacks across the
continent and the resultant sense of insecurity. Nowhere i n Africa is this
threat potentially more consequential than in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy.
In “Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the Imperative
of National Consensus,” Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa shows how Nigeria’s social,
economic, and political order has been increasingly challenged by the Boko
Haram terrorist organization. Placing political variables at the center of his
analysis, Alozieuwa argues that the “outburst” of the sect derived from the “sense of
exclusion by some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country.”9
Ndu Life Njoku, “The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their
Role in the Slave Trade,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 29.
6
Rhodes House, Oxford MSS., Afr. S. 375 (3), The Resurrection of the Long Juju, 1908, 2.
7
Cd. 1768-10, Colonial Reports—Annual, no. 405, Southern Nigeria Report for 1902.
8
National Archive Enugu, CSE 1/86/43, 3rd Political Report, Major H. Trenchard, Ababaliki, March
17, 1908.
9
Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the
Imperative of National Consensus,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015):51.
5
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The author shows that Boko Haram has reshaped Nigeria’s political and security
landscape, especially since 2002.10 It reveals that the activities of the sect have
continued to create havoc across many northern states, threaten southern states,
and scare foreign and local investors and workers. The sect has become more or less
a criminal enterprise bent on irrational killings of innocent civilians in Nigeria,
the highlights of which was the kidnapping of more than 200 young Muslim and
Christian students at gunpoint while they were sleeping in their dormitories at
the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno state on April 14,
2014. This article reminds us that the violence and destructiveness of Boko Haram
poses a formidable threat to Nigeria’s attempts to construct a united, modern, and
prosperous country.
The eighteen book reviews published in this volume capture the rich and
complex experience that define modern Africa. They cover a wide range
of periods, regions, and topics such as Middle Eastern immigrants in French
colonial West Africa, dance and music in Malawi, war on drugs in modern
Africa, agriculture and the challenge of food security, Africa’s foreign relations,
healthcare and survival, imperialism and decolonization, postcolonial migration,
identity crisis, the Cold War politics, women issues, and economic challenges.
Our book reviewers brought their expertise to help our readers understand the
diversity and richness of Africa’s histories, peoples, cultures, and societies. The
articles together with the book reviews will certainly make for a fascinating read.
Special thanks are due to o u r a uthors and book reviewers for their
dedication, and for trusting us with their manuscripts. Many thanks to our readers
for revising the manuscripts with care and intelligence. Without the dedication of
members of the editorial team, this volume would not have appeared. Thank
you. I am especially indebted to Drs. Tiffany F. Jones and Tamba M’bayo for
accepting more than their fair share of responsibilities to ensure that this volume is
published. This volume, more importantly, benefited from the unrelenting support
of Berkeley Electronic Press, Eastern Kentucky University Libraries, University
Programs at Eastern Kentucky University, the African/African-American Studies
program and the Department of History at Eastern Kentucky University. I appreciate
them.
Ogechi E. Anyanwu
Editor-in-Chief.

10
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Leadership and African Agency for
Development in Post-Fifty Africa
Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu
University of Wyoming and Dominican University
Abstract: The year 2010 was a model year for the celebration of fifty years of
political independence among African countries. Assessments of the human
condition in Africa show that the continent, especially sub-Saharan Africa,
has lagged behind other regions of the world in terms of development.
Based on the analysis of the constants of development, this paper argues that
effective development is fundamentally driven by the maximum deployment
of organized endogenous human agency defined as the capacity of individuals
or groups to think, act, and impact their social environments. Because African
agency was not properly shepherded in the first fifty years of independence,
transformational leadership through the instrumentality of the developmental
state is the path to effective development in post- fifty Africa. This requires
three key development strategies namely, inserting local human resources
or domestic agency to the center of development activity; exit from fixation
on extractive economies to a deliberate policy of value-added production
embodied in industrialization; and a paradigm of development knowledge that
sees development as the primary responsibility of endogenous agency.
Keywords: Transformational, Leadership, Development, State, Agency,
African,
Infrastructure,
Governance,
Transactional,
Value-added,
Industrialization, Endogenous

Introduction
Seventeen African countries celebrated fifty years of independence in 2010. Many
more march towards that milestone each passing year. Fifty years of independence
from colonialism is worth celebrating. But sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has lagged
behind other regions in the march to development whether defined as better quality
of life, provision of basic needs, productive capacity, global competitiveness, or
degree of technological advancement. At independence, this lag in development
was attributed to the lack of qualified human resource; an absence of finance and
technological capital; a postcolonial state that fanned the embers of antagonistic
parochialidentities; and a peripheral participation in a world economy dominated
by the great powers. These factors have become enduring aspects of Africa’s
socioeconomic structure where structure is sociologically defined as enduring
patterns of roles, positions, power, resources, and relationships that inhibit or
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
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facilitate human agency.1 Agency refers to the thoughts and actions that individuals
and/or groups deploy to impact their own lives, the lives of others, and the social
institutions of their societies.2
The constraining effects of the structural factors mentioned above still
manifest in one form or another to inhibit development in the region. However,
continuing to blame them suggests that Africans are passive to structures from
which they cannot free themselves. Africans are not slaves to structural conditions.
Rather, domestic agency in each country awaits transformational leadership to
lead citizens to unleash their hidden and untapped capabilities. The call for
infusion of endogenous or domestic agency in development recognizes that
humans are not blind and dull objects that carry out whatever is predetermined by
structure; rather, they are active beings who individually or collectively use their
knowledge and resources of their natural and social environments to transform their
social institutions.3 Africans are hard working. They exert tremendous physical
and mental energy as they incessantly struggle to keep body and soul together.
That the investment of human resource in the last fifty years has not resulted in a
better life for the majority means that African agency has not been channeled in
an organized way.
In the context of national development, organized human agency, henceforth
known as organized agency, occurs when the political leaders of a country
consciously channel the motives, ideas, skills, and capabilities of their citizens
toward assuming primary responsibility for transforming their societies. Organized
agency is primarily endogenous or domestic, it exists and is harnessed within each
country. But potentially useful exogenous or external agency can be borrowed when
necessary. Organized agency derives from the sense of readiness to act that leaders
inspire their citizens through development-oriented policies and plans, investment
in physical and social infrastructure, support of domestic entrepreneurship and a
conscious effort to place the citizens at the center of the development process.
Martin Meredith’s rigorous and dispassionate chronicle of lostopportunities
in Africa’s first fifty years of independence corroborates the thrust of this paper
that African agency was disorganized and wasted in the first five decades following

Richard Munch, Sociological Theory: From the 1850s to the Present (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1994).
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1984); Anthony Giddens, “Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production of
Culture,” in Social Theory Today, eds. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1987), 195-223.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
1
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independence.4 The gross domestic products per capita (GDP/capita) of Ghana,
Namibia, Gabon, and Cote d’Ivoire were higher than South Korea’s in 1960.5 By
2008, South Korea’s GDP/capita had skyrocketed; the figures for Gabon and
Cote d’Ivoire dropped from their 1960 levels while Ghana and Namibia posted
infinitesimal increases.6 The United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Asha-Rose
Migiro provided a reflexive perspective on Africa’s development dilemma saying:
as we celebrate Africa’s achievements, opportunities and potential, we
must also honestly address the realities and challenges that confront the
continent. Too many babies still die in infancy, too few children find
places in school, too many farmers cannot get their crops to market, and
too many factories lie idle for lack of spare parts, skills or investment.7
To effectively mobilize and deploy organized domestic agency, leaders of postfifty Africa should in a more direct way conceptualize the popular indicators of
development as part of drivers of development. Popular indicators of development
refer to generic factors exemplified by the indicators of human development
reported in the United Nation’s annual Human Development Reports (HDR).
The early measures which included life expectancy, literacy, and gross national
income (GNP, now GNI) per capita8 have expanded to include measures such as
gender empowerment, poverty, inequality, personal freedom, and so on.9 These
measures are often interpreted as outcomes rather than causes of development
because they appear as ends not as the means to development.
By contrast, there are indicators which catch the eye as the real drivers of
development but are not given the attention they deserve in the discourse,
policy, and practice of African development. These include the status of a country
on technological inventions and innovations, the degree of creative destruction in
the economy, technical competitiveness, investment in research and development,
rate of value-added production, the degree of backward and forward integration in
the national economy, the degree of industrial research and development, and the
volume of value-added exports.
Scholarly attention to Africa’s development often centers on the generic
Meredith Martin, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty years of Independence (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2011).
5
Angus Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy GDP and Per Capita GDP: 1-2008
AD,” accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm.
6
Ibid.
7
Ernest Harsch, “Weighing a Half Century of Independence: Beyond Hey Days and Sobering Reality
Lies Untapped Potential,” Africa Renewal, August 2010, accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.
un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence.
8
UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
9
UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4
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measures. These real drivers of development in modern society are treated as if they
are not reachable by Africans. Yet the latter were central to the transformation of
the societies that are now known as developed nations. Indicators such as life
expectancy, education, and GNI per capita indeed act as promoters of development
because they help to build efficient human capital, the elements of agency, which
help to drive the development process. The problem is that development theory
and practice, including the human development reports, often treats these human
development measures as dependent variables.
The highly anticipated Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is a case
in point. Will the status of a developing nation change to that of a developed
country if it meets all the expectations of MDG by 2015? What if the said country
remains an extractive economy, possesses little or no value-added production,
occupies a marginal place in global competitiveness and innovation, and remains
captive to the vagaries of global commodity prices? As in previous cases of
national development, whether in the Western nations or in latecomer nations,
Africans must take primary responsibility for operating and expanding these
drivers of development for societal transformation if the next fifty years are to
be significantly better than the first half century of missed opportunities.
Cognizant of the centrality of organized domestic agency to national
development, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation emphasized that development
is an endogenous and a self-reliant endeavor.10 It should stem from the heart of
each society which in sovereignty defines its values and vision for the future,
relies primarily on its members’ energies, its natural and cultural environment,
and encourages participation by all.11 These insightful principles of development
corroborate the history of ancient civilizations. They are consistent with the
process of industrial development in Western societies. And they are verifiable
from the experiences of successful latecomers to development from the first half
of the 20th century to the present.
Drawing from the precepts of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, embedded
in the centrality of endogenous agency, this paper states that given the long history
of national development in different countries at different epochs, the successful
paths or what can be called the constants of national development are now
well known in development theory and practice. It argues that a transformational
leadership within a developmental state is the appropriate framework through
which to shepherd citizens for the emergence and deployment of an organized
Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, “What Now: Another Development,” (Uppsala, 1975), accessed
May 15, 2012, http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/75_what_now.pdf.
11
Sheila Coronel and Kunda Dixit, “Setting the Context: The Development Debate Thirty Years After
What Now Development,” Dialogue 47 (June 2006): 13-27.
10
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domestic agency for national development. National development, here, refers
to the ability of citizens who under the leadership of a developmental state apply
their mental and physical energies to transform their natural resources and social
and economic environments for individual and national self-actualization.

The Centrality of Organized Endogenous Agency
Development has never been a gift from one developed nation to an underdeveloped
other. There is hardly a case in history where the people of one society developed
another society and altruistically handed it over to the latter as a gesture of
goodwill. Foreigners who through colonization transformed the economies of
other societies either decided to settle in the area and where settlement was
not possible, they established intensive and extensive extractive mechanisms
to transfer as much as possible the resources of the colony to the metropole.12
Leaders and citizens or individual societies, therefore, have always been the
prime movers of national development. That is why foreign aid is different
from national development. Leaders of aid receiving countries decide whether to
put aid to fruitful use or misuse it due to incompetence or corruption or both.13 Or
still, leaders can become so complacent with or dependent on aid that they lose the
motivation to aggressively pursue positive institutional change.14
Another endogenous agency-related constant is that development cannot
be outsourced or offshored. A country where leaders are complacent with hiring
outsiders to build and maintain their national infrastructure stands on the façade
of development.15 Many natural-resource-rich countries that use their money
to buy most of their basic needs and luxuries from other countries still have the
characteristics of Third World countries. Therefore, heavy dependence on foreign
skills inhibits development because national development is about what the people
can do for themselves by themselves rather than what foreigners can do for them.
A country is defined as developed not only because it has high gross national
income per capitam generated from the luck of having abundant natural resource
a country is developed because it has the capability, through the skills and
creativity of its people, to produce its needs of primary and value added products.
12
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 13691401.
13
William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Effort to Aid the Rest of the World
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Robert Calderisi, The
Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid is Not Working (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
14
Dambisa Moyo, Why Aid is Not Working and Why There is a Better Way for Africa (New York:
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).
15
Harold Kerbo, World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2006).
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Almost all countries classified as developed nations or core countries exhibit this
characteristic. They import their needs as a matter of choice based on their
calculations of the economic gains of importation over domestic production.
But when import-penetration threatens their economy they apply their human and
natural resources to produce in order to continue meeting their needs. Here, we
see development as primarily the national capability and capacity to produce rather
than as improvement in the quality of life of citizens only. The World Bank
put it succinctly; resource-rich countries may have substantial foreign exchange
earnings, but this wealth may not translate into a country’s competitiveness or
employment creation.16
By contrast, countries classified as developing have limited capability
to produce value-added goods or to import them by choice. Importation of
manufactured goods is a major component of their national budgets. The result
is that high import penetration causes the structural distortionof the economy.17
That is why Obafemi Awolowo observed that an underdeveloped country is one in
which natural and human resources are partly unutilized, partly underutilized, and
partly misutilized, and in which there is a gross deficiency in the quality of three
production agents namely labor, capital, and organization.18
That development cannot be a gift from one developed country to a less
developed other, nor can it be outsourced to people of other countries, is consistent
with the principles prescribed by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.
Development is therefore an endogenous and self-reliant endeavor. But
supranational agencies undertake many projects designed to provide basic needs
such as food, water, healthcare, education, and electricity in many sub-Saharan
African countries. These are factors of foreign assistance for daily survival,
not national development for self- actualization. The Tap Project launched in
2007 by the United Nations Children’s Educational Fund (UNICEF) worked
to provide clean water in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mauritania, and
Togo, one among a string of projects in Africa dating back to 1952.19 There are
also those projects undertaken by international non-governmental organizations
such as Africare, which has been working on economic development, women
World Bank, World Development Report 2012-13: Jobs (Washington, D.C.: 2013).
Harold Kerbo, World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2006).
18
Obafemi Awolowo, “The Path to Economic Freedom in Developing Countries,” A Lecture
Delivered at the University of Lagos, March 15, 1968, accessed May 16, 2012, usaafricadialogue@
googlegroups.com.
19
UNICEF TAP Project, http://www.unicefusa.org/mission/survival/water/tap-project; UNICEF
History, Milestones, 1946 -1955, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.unicef.org/about/history/
index_milestones_46_55.html.
16
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engagement, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene across Africa since 1970.20
Therefore Africa has been receiving international assistance on basic needs from
pre-independence to more than half a century after independence, yet the continent
remains poor and underdeveloped.
The social disruption, human misery, and deaths that occurred in the Horn of
Africa in 2011, especially Ethiopia and Somalia, due to drought in that year had
been recurrent phenomena for many previous decades.21 John Dollar’s visual image
of hunger in Ethiopia due to drought and famine in the time of Emperor Haile
Selassie is not different from the situation which occurred in the same country in
2011.22 Imagine that the countries in the Horn of Africa were located in Western
Europe, Japan, or the region of the miracle economies of East Asia, the effects
of drought in that region would long have been stably ameliorated using relevant
technology, and organizational and managerial efficiency, to anticipate and control
the situation.
Donor countries and supranational agencies continue to intervene across
Africa to control age-old diseases such as malaria, polio, measles, and cholera.
Lawrence O’Donnell, MSNBC’s anchor of The Last Word in the United States, in
collaboration with UNICEF, established the Kids In Need of Desks (K.I.N.D.)
project in 2010 to solicit funds for desks for Malawian school children.23 It procured
40, 000 desks for school children in Malawi at the cost of $3 million in its first year.24
The project provided tens of thousands of desks to Malawian school children
and their teachers for a better learning and teaching experience. The project also
provided jobs and therefore was a source of livelihood for Malawians who built
the desks.25 This great humanitarian accomplishment brought invaluable joy and
enthusiasm to the school children as they enthusiastically offloaded their desks
as the MSNBC camera beamed on their happy faces. O’Donnell, UNICEF, and
donors from the United States and other countries deserve appreciation for their
benevolence.
However, this magnanimous project underscores the marginal status of
organized domestic agency in the development process in Africa. Was the lack
Africare, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.africare.org/africares-approach/.
Gabe Joselow, “World Bank Drought Plan Focuses on Ethiopia, Kenya,” accessed June 10,
2012, www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/World-Bank-Drough--; IRIN, “Ethiopia:
Somalis Living from Drought to Drought,” accessed May 15, 2012, www.Irinnews.org/report.
aspx?ReportId=93200.
22
“The Emperor’s Birthday,” DVD, Directed by John Dollar (New York: Filmmakers Library, 1992).
23
L. O. Donnell, “Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund, One Year Later” (December 15, 2011), accessed May 25,
2012, www.thelastword.msn.com/_news/2011/12/15/9451755-last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.
24
Ibid.
25
S. Muller. “Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund One Year Later,” accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.
msnbc.com/msnbc/last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.
20
21
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of chairs in schools because of nonchalance on the part of the government,
leadership deficit, bad management on the part of public bureaucrats, or was it that
the Malawian nation really lacked $3 million with which to provide 40,000 chairs
for school children? Desk-deficit schools abound in Sub-Saharan Africa including
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, South Africa, and more, with more deficits in rural
than urban areas.26 No amount of donations will ensure sustainability of school
supplies until Africans regularly make or buy the supplies by themselves.
An American physician was perturbed, indeed shocked, when she observed
Nigerian physicians perform an emergency cesarean section without light due to
lack of electricity.27 She quickly arranged for solar powered kits to be supplied
free of charge to hospitals. But the reality of that country is that once the first set
of supplies are out of order, they may neither be replaced nor be repaired. Hence
the status quo ante of surgeries in lightless conditions will return. However,
performing surgery in the dark would not be typical of hospitals in Nigeria
given that installation of power generators as back up for the unsteady supply
of electricity from the national grid has become a permanent feature of
institutions and organizations. But it is also commonplace for power generators
to breakdown and remain unrepaired for a considerable length of time. In such
cases, organizations may work without electricity until the equipment is repaired
or replaced.
With much reliance on formal and informal foreign aid, leaders of African
countries are yet to live up to the examples of newly developed countries such
as those of East Asia and some parts of South Asia. Endogeneity suggests that
‘development stem from the heart of each society as it defines its values and visions
of its future while primarily relying on its own strength and resources in terms of
human and natural resources’.28
It does not mean that countries should reject external assistance especially in
times of emergency. Rather, leaders of African countries erroneously perceive
external assistance as a permanent component of national development. Recent
development successes in Asia occurred without significant foreign aid as a
26
Abibatu. Kamara, “First Lady Receives 4000 Lap Desk for School Children,” accessed May 21,
2012, http://awoko.org/2011/05/02/first-lady-receives-4000-lap-desk-for-school- children/; Yanhong
Zhang, “Urban-Rural Literacy Gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Roles of Socioeconomic Status and
School Quality”, Comparative Education Review (November 200 Christie O’ Riley, “Solar Suitcase’
Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth,” CNN, February 28, 2013, accessed March 18, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solar-power.6): 581-602.
27
Christie O’ Riley, “Solar Suitcase’ Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth,” CNN, February 28,
2013, accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solarpower.
28
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proportion of the recipient country’s income.29
William Easterly further noted that the West itself achieved gradual success
through market and democratic reforms over many centuries, not through top-down
‘big plans’ offered by outsiders.30
The pursuit and acceptance of foreign assistance, including basic needs,
as normal and regular aspects of a country’s political economy and development
strategy sideline endogenous agency from playing a central role in the development
process. It perpetuates national psychological dependence on outsiders and
prevents effective development from taking place. Endogenous agency, amongst
other things, entails that countries deploy their human and natural resources to
expand and deepen the productive sector especially in agriculture and industry,
thereby expanding the store of resources and creating more wealth with which to
provide for the needs of their people.
Another common characteristic of developmentally successful countries is
that they combine import substitution and export-oriented industrialization. The
history of development suggests that national wealth is not and should not be
based on the extraction and marketing of natural resources alone. But African
leaders have been fixated on extraction of natural resources. A monocultural
economy is structurally incoherent because it lacks backward and forward linkages
and the resulting multiplier effects that diversify and strengthen the economy.31
In Nigeria where oil exploration started in 1958, the country has been unable to
develop a robust capability for a sustainable backward linkage in the oil sector
through domestic refining of crude oil for domestic use. Instead, it spends a lot of
foreign currency on importation of petroleum products and depends on expertise
from advanced countries to build its new refineries or maintain existing ones. The
same is true of other African countries that boast of varieties of natural resources
but whose leaders lack the knowledge of policies, or the courage to enact policies,
that transform and upgrade those natural resources in the value chain.
Africa’s weak performance in value-added production was well captured in
a recent conference announcement by the World Institute for Development
Economics Research of the United Nations University. The conference held in
June 2013, fifty-three years after the modal year of independence among African
countries regretfully stated:
New evidence shows that between 1975 and 2005 the diversity and
29
William. Easterly, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time by Jeffrey D. Sachs
Washington Post, Sunday, March 13, 2005, accessed May 17, 2012, http://www. washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A25562-2005Mar10.
30
Ibid.
31
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sophistication of industrial production and exports declined in most
African economies. Today, Africa’s industrial sector is in many ways
less advanced than in the first decade following
independence.32
The industrial infrastructure established by former colonial masters in some
countries may have sustained Africa’s industrial sector in the first decade
but that industrial foundation was not sustained by post- independence political
leadership. The United Nations Industrial Organization (UNIDO) cited by Jomo
Sundaram, Oliver Schwank and Rodiger von Arnim observed that immediate
post-independence Africa gained ground in labor intensive manufacturing until
premature trade liberalization of the 1980s exposed African infant industries
to global competition for which they were unprepared; the policy preference
was simply to abandon existing industrial capacity thereby precipitating deindustrialization.33 Regardless of what the obstacles are, and no matter how much
natural resources African countries have, the living conditions of the majority
will not change for the better without economic diversification through the
expansion of value-added production. Put another way, Africa must industrialize
in order to achieve sustainable development. That is the story of the majority of
developmentally successful countries. The primary sector, agriculture and other
extractive activities, however, should not be neglected. Rather, and as in the
case of South East Asia, agriculture and the entire extractive sector should be
developed to full capacity to provide national food security and raw material to
support value-added production for economic transactions in the global capitalist
system.34 That brings up another truism about developmentally successful countries
namely, countries, past and present, have attained development through active
participation in the global capitalist system.
Even the former Soviet Union, a world power, with an economic system
different from the world capitalist system had a partial attachment to the
latter. Industrial development in Russia benefitted from Western capitalist
entrepreneurship, technology, and management style before and immediately after
the October Revolution of 1917 and the resultant establishment of a communist
32
United Nations University. “Call for Papers, Learning to Compete: Industrial Policy in Africa”,
(Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 2013), accessed May 25, 2012, http://unu.edu/news/announcements/
seeking-papers-on-african-indust.
33
UNIDO cited in Jomo Sundaram, Oliver Schwank, Rodiger von Arnim, and Rodiger L.von
Arnim, “Globalization and Development in SSA”, UN Department of Economic Affairs (DESA)
Working Papers, No. 102, February 2011, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/
papers/2011/wp102_2011.pdf.
34
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and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy,” Development Policy Review 30, S1 (2012): S5-S24.
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state.35 Granted that East-West trade was minimal during the Soviet era, Russia
used any opportunity afforded by trade to acquire valued Western technology.36
China has enhanced its prosperity by fully participating in the global capitalist
system. The miracle economies of East Asia and Japan attained their now enviable
status by operating within the world capitalist system. Emerging economies are
operating within the same system.
The global capitalist system is not altruistic. There is no Santa Claus in
international relations. Leaders of developed nations often protect the interests of
their countries first. Concessions are made, or gifts are given, in exchange for
present or future material, cultural, or ideological gains. Hence only strong states
in developing countries succeed in the world capitalist system. A strong state does
not mean a dictatorship or the classic autocratic regime that obtains and maintains
citizen compliance through the use of instruments of state terror.
A strong state means a government with sufficient organization, power, and
freedom to achieve its development goals.37 According to Obafemi Awolowo,
economic freedom exists where a sovereign country independent of outside control
or direction organizes the exploitation and deployment of its total resources for the
benefit of its people. The idea of a strong state, therefore, means that political
leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert autonomy from domestic and foreign vested
interests by enacting and implementing policies that are primarily in the best
interest of their citizenry. In development theory and practice, a strong state is
equivalent to a developmental state.38
A developmental state is proactive, interventionist, ambitious, autonomous,
energetic, and courageous. It invokes nationalism and patriotism as it enacts,
implements, and supervises its policies. It has a vision of where it wants to
lead the country. It recognizes the dominant ideology of neoliberal globalization,
operates within it, but is not slave to it. It situates its development policies and
practices within its unique history and borrows relevant models from outsiders
rather than depends on them. It uses national revenue to solve the people’s
problems and invokes integrity and honesty in the allocation and investment of
public resources. Furthermore, a developmental state believes that with good
35
Peter Gatrell, “Reconceptualizing Russia’s Industrial Revolution), in Reconceptualizing the
Industrial Revolution eds. Jeff Horn, Leonard N. Roseband, & Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press. 2010) 229-250; Peter Stearns, The Industrial Revolution in World History (Boulder, CO.:
Westview Press, 2013).
36
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leadership and organization, citizens can unleash their capabilities to multiply and
add value to natural resources to uplift themselves and society on a sustainable
basis. Hence a developmental state eschews a dependent mentality and promotes
a sense of national self-efficacy where leaders and followers join to boldly take
their developmental destiny in their own hands. Therefore, a developmental state
is a champion of organized indigenous agency and national self-reliance.
A developmental state is similar to a transformational leadership. It has
bold visions and takes bold steps to implement its visions.39 It makes leaders
out of followers so that the latter can effectively mobilize the larger society to
pursue the collective end.40 Subordinates of the apex leader in a developmental
state have the ability to mobilize those below them. Cabinet officers in the
executive branch of the central government, administrative heads and their
aides at the provincial level, and local government functionaries have leadership
capacity and enthusiasm for development as should the president of the country.
The legislature at national and provincial levels of government in a developmental
state is focused, courageous, imaginative, and makes transformational rather than
mundane and self-serving laws.
Governors or administrative heads of provinces see the economic development
of their provinces, states, regions, or districts as their primary responsibility, not the
responsibility of the national government. Just as there are strong states, so
should there be strong provinces, regions, or districts. The administrative head
and elected and appointed officials of the Ashanti Region of Ghana, for example,
should see the development of the region as their primary responsibility. That is
why Arthur Stinchcombe defines a strong province or region as one that keeps the
local part of a commercial flow of goods and services going, integrates that flow
within a cosmopolitan system of flows governed by a central government, other
provinces, or other sovereign states and builds institutions that arrange such things
as residences, churches, education, retail trade, and other activities that make
up life.41 Therefore, the distributionist governance practiced by provincial, state
regional and local government officials in some African countries does not
facilitate development. By distributionist governance I mean the habit of political
officials at regional and local levels to be complacent with monthly or periodic
allocations of revenues from the national government without making imaginative
James Burns, Transforming Leadership (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
Iain Hay, “Transformational Leadership,” accessed April 29, 2012, http://www. leadingtoday.
org/weleadinglearning/transformationalleaders; Mathew Kelly, (2003). Academic Advisers as
Transformational Leaders. The Mentor: An Academic Journal, January 1, 2003, accessed June 2010
http://.psu.edu/dus/mentor/03010mk.htm; Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).
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policies that can multiply those subventions by creating an environment that
enables citizens to expand productive activity. All state and local governments
in Nigeria depend on allocations from the national government for financing
most of their programs and this creates a disincentive to maximize collection of
internally generated revenue.42 The situation in Kenya and Ghana with respect
to allocations to counties and district assemblies respectively is similar to that of
Nigeria.43 Leaders of strong regions engage in regenerative governance by creating
an environment for economic expansion, increased employment opportunities,
and infrastructural modernization.
Consequently, the rule of thumb definition of development as improvement in
the quality of life of citizens’ is no longer a helpful model for steering development
in post-fifty Africa or anywhere for that matter. Resources with which to
improve quality of life do not fall from the sky. National development is driven
by the promotion of drivers of development through the deployment of organized
individual and collective domestic agency embodied in the efforts and activities
of the citizens themselves. Consistent with centrality of domestic agency
on which this paper is anchored, achieving development in post-fifty Africa
entails that African leaders of developmental states create appropriate conditions
under which the creative and physical energies of their citizens will be optimally
harnessed. Leaders of a developmental state or developmental regions can,
for example, challenge and provide incentives to its universities to construct
mini refineries as part of building domestic capability for a steady flow of
petroleum products.44 Or national, regional and local governments of a country
can strengthen, broaden and deepen national and regional entrepreneurship and
the industrial sector by procuring all their operational needs from local firms.45
The Federal Executive Council of Nigeria, in 2010, approved the importation
of one thousand plastic bins for the collection of garbage in the Federal Capital
Territory, Abuja on the premise that products made by Nigerian firms were

42
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at 10%” (May 2013).
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inferior.46 A political elite that takes development seriously will see the purchase of
local manufactures as a means to strengthen the manufacturing sector. In another
instance, the government of Senegal accepted a paltry $13 million from a foreign
firm to fish on its waters for four years. The superior technology of the foreign
company quickly depleted the fish population, displaced indigenous fishermen and
women, and increased unemployment and economic insecurity in the area.47
Tanzania’s gold mine is a hotbed of conflict between foreign firms and local
residents because the latter perceive themselves as marginal to a lucrative resource
in their native land.48
Harold Kerbo noted that developmental states do not enter into international
agreements that put their citizens in precarious positions.49 Other commentators
note that the liberalization of trade occasioned by the IMF/World Bank structural
adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s coupled with the influx of Chinese
textiles in the 2000s have caused a significant decline of the textile sector in
Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, and Nigeria.50 The latter scenario
is not conducive to Africa’s quest for development given the importance of the
textile industry in the industrial development of nations.
A developmental state knows that globalization creates winners and losers,
and that guided free trade rather than unbridled free trade has been the norm i n
m a n y of international economic transactions in the global system. For centuries,
national governments have enacted laws, charted colonial and imperialistic paths,
made policies, waged wars, negotiated and signed treaties, led business delegations,
funded research and development, and designed strategies in search of positive
outcomes for their national economies. These are elements of state intervention
too. The British government played an active role in the 19th century Industrial
Revolution previously attributed solely to the magic of the invisible hand.51
Richard Lehne observed that government influence over business in America
“EC Approves N927m for FCT Waste Bins,” Nigerian Tribune (September 23, 2010), accessed
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has even become more pervasive in recent decades.52 The British government
played the role of a developmental state during the Industrial Revolution; so did
German, Belgian, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Scandinavian governments in
the industrial development of their respective countries.53
The UN’s Economic Report on Africa 2011, was premised on the thesis
that Africa needed a developmental state even though it was a well-known fact
that strong activist states enabled development in Southeast Asia, Japan, and other
places where development had occurred in world history.54 Even Walt Whitman
Rostow, a foremost protagonist of neoliberal, modernist developmentalism,
assigns a central role to the state in his outline of stages of economic growth.
According to Rostow, the takeoff of economic growth is characterized by the
emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization
of the economy as a serious high-order political business.55 We now know, from
the East Asian experience, that a developmental state can emerge and operate
successfully anywhere and at any time there emerges a political group that takes
development seriously.
A developmental state is not an abstract entity. It is people, human beings,
elected officials, plus bureaucrats and technocrats in leadership positions who
are responsible for policy and action that empower their citizens to transform
their socioeconomic environments. Aware of the circumstances of their own
societies, leaders of a developmental state find ways to shepherd their citizens to
prudently create, manage, and expand national or local financial, physical, social,
and production infrastructure on the path to development. China currently earns the
attention and respect of the world as its political elite successfully shepherds the
national economy and human resources on the path to national development through
prudent policies and management.

On the Importance of Prudent Management of Financial, Physical,
and Social Infrastructure
Countries that make it in the development process seek ways to avoid the burdens
52
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of foreign debt. Avoidance of debt, especially external debt, is part of prudent
financial management. For example, the cancellation of a sizeable chunk of
Nigeria’s foreign debt by core countries in 2005 lifted it out of the debt burden.
Nigeria paid the final installment of its foreign debt in April 2006. But in August
2014, the head of the Debt Management Office put that country’s foreign debt at
$9.38 billion.56 The latter is a conservative estimate because the World Bank and
the World Fact Book noted that Nigeria’s external debt had reached $13 billion
by 2011.57 At the present pace, Nigeria steadily marches towards re-incurring as
much as the $18 billion debt forgiveness it received from international lenders less
than a decade after.
Of the thirty-nine countries listed under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative, thirty-three were in Sub-Saharan Africa and the majority of them
had attained completion status, the point at which debt relief was irrevocable.58 If a
primary objective of debt relief is to free up resources for social spending including
more spending on health and education, that purpose stands defeated if, as in the
case of Nigeria, these thirty-three SSA countries soon after debt forgiveness
incur new debts, become re-saddled with the burden of debt servicing, and use
the latter as an excuse for not spending on sectors such as education, health,
poverty reduction, infrastructure, technology acquisition, and capital formation
for economic modernization. Consistent with the central argument of this paper,
avoiding the debt burden is the responsibility of state actors who themselves
should be part of organized domestic agency. Countries that have made it on the
journey to development have placed a premium on high quality education while at
the same strengthening their economies.
Indicators of educational progress often cite quantity or enrollment trends but
de-emphasize quality or how well education prepared its recipients to effectively
function in their positions and roles in society. Flagship compendium of human
development indicators, “Human Development Report” is a good example of the
emphasis of quantity or rate of enrollment over quality or how much and how
well students learn. The education component of the Millennium Development
Goals (MGDs) is also premised on enrollment rather than on quality. But does
progressive increase in enrollment in all levels of education mean the production
O. Abioye and I. Onuba, “Nigeria’s External Debt Rises to $9.38 billion: DMO,”Punch Nigeria,
August 20, 2014.
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of human agents competent enough to lead and manage national development? A
study of quality assurance in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa conducted
by Peter Materu (2007) further illustrates this problem. In that study, a university
student in Ethiopia responded thus:
Most donors define African education success in terms of how many
students are being graduated and how many students are in school.
The quantity issue is of course one thing that should be addressed, but
it shouldn’t be the whole mark of any education intervention in Africa.
How an African resource could be better utilized by an African child
for an African development should be the issue.59
That African education should produce an African child capable of utilizing
an African resource for African development is consistent with the infusion of
organized domestic agency in the development process. Studies of education in
Africa leave doubts on the capacity of the educational institutions to effectively
play this role. David Johnson laments that the children who complete primary
schooling in Africa leave with unacceptably low levels of knowledge and skills.”60
A study by Justin van Fleet cautioned that the prognosis for the economic future
and social development of Africa was gloomy because over half of the children
complete primary school without learning basic skills.61 Peter Materu notes that
poor governance and insufficient qualified academic staff contribute to decline in
the quality of higher education in Africa.62 Otherwise why would international
agencies, including the World Bank, and national governments spend tremendous
amounts of financial and human resources on an alternative concept known as
capacity building in Africa?63
Capacity building entails the enhancement of skills and capabilities of
individuals and groups to enable them to be effective participants in their social
and economic environment. Educational institutions around the world play this
role. One can surmise that the proliferation of capacity- building programs in Africa
by national, international, and supranational agencies in the last three decades
means that national education systems have lost their ability to continue to play
59
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the role of producing human capital for effective leadership and management of
the development process.
Worthy of emulation is Lee Kuan Yew and his People’s Action Party who
as leaders of a developmental state were determined to promote the principle
of an organized domestic agency for national development. They implemented a
policy of massive economic restructuring with emphasis on technology, computer
education, and human capital development, which led Singapore to develop as a
leader in electronics, petrochemicals, and international trade.64
Granted that education is very important as a driver of development, higher
education is not a sufficient condition. Studies show that most people in developed
countries do not have university education.65 But the majority lives at middle class
level. Studies in the United States have found a rise in the rate of unemployment.66
The apparent oversubscription to higher education in some African countries is a
function of weak economies dominated by preponderant numbers of ultra-micro
and non-gainful economic activities in the ubiquitous informal sector. Strengthen
the economy in such a way that secondary school graduates with or without
additional short term vocational education can find gainful employment, and
you will see a drop in the number of applicants to universities. Strengthen the
economy in such a way that the majority of first degree graduates secure gainful
employment, and you will see a drop in the number of students rushing to pursue
higher degrees. In the ideal scenario, however, liberalization of and greater access
to higher education in Africa continues. But those who pursue higher education
will do so not because they see time in tertiary institutions or graduate education as
a temporary diversion from the anxieties of joblessness, but because they actually
want to and are capable of achieving educational success. This is the story of
many developed countries.
Because the majority of the economic activity in Africa takes place in the
unorganized informal sector where people are in an unending struggle to scrape
by, the economy is unable to play the role of a receptacle for educated people.
A developmental state shepherds citizens to bring organization, direction, and
dynamism to the economy through imaginative laws, public policies and actions. In
the end, additional investments greatly needed to improve the quality and quantity
of education will achieve intended goals of producing citizens who can effectively
64
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conceptualize and implement national development goals.
That the development process entails conceptualization of visions and
implementation of policies by the people of a given society is another constant.
There have been lots of think tanks, blue prints, conferences and summits
about everything in the purview of development in Africa. Everything said at
conferences on the state of infrastructure in any African country can be summarized
in one sentence, namely, something must be done about the poor state of physical
infrastructure in that country. The U.S. - Africa Business Forum which took place
in Washington D.C. on August 5, 2014 was no different. One of its sessions,
“Powering Africa: Leading Developments in Infrastructure,” focused on the
problems of physical infrastructure on the continent, especially the intractable
deficiencies in the power sector.67
Therefore there is more than enough information which a developmental
state can use to steer a country to the path of sustainable development. It is
time to stop talking and start doing something. It is common knowledge that
investment in physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, water works,
rail, air, and sea ports) has several advantages in all societies.68 It is a sure source
of creating jobs in a country. A developmental state can use it as an avenue to
broaden, deepen, and strengthen the skill capacities of indigenous technical skills
and the scale and scope of production in firms that supply construction inputs.
The modernized items of infrastructure facilitate the movement of people, goods,
and services. Good infrastructure is a powerful pull of domestic and foreign
investments because capital responds positively to where conditions for doing
business are most cost-effective.
The World Bank’s Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED)
verified this proposition in a series of studies of African economies from the 1980s
to the early 2000s. World Bank researchers lucidly defined the infrastructural
problems of many African countries including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon
Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and others. Those studies observed
the infrastrastructural deficiencies of many African countries and projected their
costs to business activity.69 The Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) jointly
conducted similar studies and corroborated the findings of the RPED on the
67
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poor state of infrastructure in Africa.70
Similarly, a s t u d y o f t h e transport situation in Africa showed that
only 14.2 percent of the roads in SSA were tarred and rail and air services
deteriorated due to poor maintenance of railways and runways.71 Vivian Foster and
Cecilia Briceño Garmendia report that forty-eight SSA countries generate the
same amount of power as does only Spain; thirty countries experience power
shortages and regular interruptions in service; and serious gaps exist in the
various aspects of transport infrastructure and water supply.72 SSA started with
stocks, similar to South or East Asia, of roads, telephone, and power but these
regions had left Africa behind by the year 2000.73 Foster and Briceño-Garmenda
attribute this slow pace of infrastructural development in SSA to constraints posed
by geography, high costs of services, funding gaps, oil price shocks, political
conflicts, and the high number of atomized or small nation-states, among others.74
These are not good excuses for poor performance among African countries because
the developmental state is all about surmounting constraints. There is no country
that attained development without obstacles on its way.
Declare a national emergency in an African country on revolutionizing the
national infrastructure through investments in public works. The result will be jobs,
jobs, jobs; and more jobs if the inputs for the construction and maintenance of
public works are sourced locally. It does not require special summits, white papers,
or conferences, to know that a government that wants to inject domestic agency
at the center o f the development process can tie job creation to the contracts
it awards indigenously and foreign-owned firms operating in agriculture,
manufacturing, construction, or services in its country. Establish mechanisms
to ensure that firms that win such contracts strictly adhere to the job creation
requirements of contracts and insist that indigenous professionals have decisionmaking positions, challenging roles, and avenues of learning by holding such jobs.
The role of a developmental state, therefore, is to make and implement policies
that enable private firms to make profit.75 Private firms, in the process, expand
70
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production, and thereby create many employment opportunities that enhance
the effective participation of domestic agency in development while eschewing
corruption.
That unbridled corruption cripples the ability of a developing country’s
governments to steer development is another constant. Corruption, the use of
political power for private gain, is a familiar characteristic of human societies.
While no society is exempt from it, it is more blatant and destructive in some
than in others. Toke Aidt found a strong negative relationship between growth in
wealth per capita–a measure of sustainable development–and corruption.76 Global
Financial Integrity reports that Africa lost more than $854 billion through illicit
financial outflows between
1970 and 2008 perpetrated by domestic and foreign actors; sub-Saharan
Africa experienced the bulk of the illicit outflow.77 From what we know about
development, countries that have been successful in the journey to development
in the last fifty years have done so on the strength of high national savings as the
experiences of the Tiger economies and China show. Loss of a significant bulk of
national revenue to private bank accounts through corruption, high internal and
external debts, the high costs of government in some countries, and the absence of
strong national, regional, and local tax collection regimes constrain overall national
savings in African countries. Hence prudent management of national revenue is a
stock of positive domestic agency that leaders of countries need to exhibit in postfifty Africa.

Leadership and Domestic Agency for Post-Fifty Africa
What we know about development, or the constants of development, summarized
above means that the governing elite of respective countries in post-fifty Africa at all
levels of government must tow a path different from the previous fifty years. They
should exert ownership of the development process and apply the developmental
state as the tool with which to achieve development goals.
Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley, and Peter Lewis observed that South
East Asians were much poorer than Africans at the time of independence in the
1960s but by 2005, South East Asians were two and half times richer.78 When
Lee Kuan Yew became Prime Minister in 1959, Singapore’s GNI per capita was
76
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$400,79 but it astronomically grew to $43,000 by 2011.80 This is a history-making
performance and national development is about a nation making history. By
contrast, the average GNI per capita in SSA in 2011 was only $1,257 the lowest
among world regions with many countries in the region below $1000.81
Some may quibble that Singapore is a small city-state and therefore not
comparable to most African countries in landmass, population, ethnic diversity
and its attendant sociopolitical problems. The success of Lee Kuan Yew was not
because of the small size of his country but because of his development-oriented
mindset premised on an acute sense of personal independence (which he translated
into state autonomy), plus his courage, a sense of self-efficacy and love for the
progress of his people, traits which are not easily apparent in African leaders.
African leaders may wish their countries to look like the United States of America
or France, or for their cities to look like Paris, Shanghai, or Dubai but will not
ask how those countries and cities got there. One of the strengths of Lee Kuan
Yew is his ability to look at societies which have succeeded, identify what he
could borrow from their experiences (external agency), and combine those with
the strengths of his own society (endogenous agency).82
As the saying goes, “opportunity knocks but once.” Lost years and lost
resources, natural resources especially, will never return. That 51 percent of SSA
population live under $1.25 a day fifty years after independence is not a cheery
situation.83 Nor should we cheer that 70-80 percent of Africans struggle to eke
out a living in the unorganized, unpredictable, rough, and some tines, ungainful
informal sector. That African leaders allow other societies to continue to dump
their value-added goods on a continent with a weak industrial base does not elicit
hope for industrial development in the near future. Reports about low standards
of education as highlighted above also pose a handicap to national development.
That the development process in SSA has not been steered towards the
infusion of an organized self-reliant agency is contrary to the history of pioneer
developed countries of the West, the experience of recently developed countries
of East Asia, and the ongoing high speed of national development in China. A
former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi laments
79
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that dependence on imports of manufactured goods coupled with a superficial
manufacturing sector portends a continuously weak economic future for his
country.84 The rest of SSA, except South Africa, falls within the scope of high
dependence on imported manufactures.
High dependence on imports does not indicate a development process
propelled by the society’s reliance on its own strength and resources, its members’
energies and its natural and cultural environment as rightly prescribed by The Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation.85 High dependence on imports also corroborates the
concern expressed by the World Institute for Development Economics Research
that Africa’s industrial sector was less advanced fifty years after independence.86
Mo Ibrahim noted that Africa’s lag in economic development rests squarely on the
way Africans have governed themselves and no amount of aid, he says, can move the
continent forward; hence Africans should get up and take on the responsibility of
development.87 In the same vein, President Obama said to the Ghanaian parliament,
“The future of Africa is up to Africans.”88
Ibrahim and Obama underscore the importance of endogenous and selfreliant development. The future of Africa will not belong to Africans if they cannot
establish sustainable backward and forward linkages in their economies through
value-added production and if they continue to allow countries more hungry and
aggressive to continue to exploit and use the continent’s natural resources to
secure their own national development. Achieving endogeneity and self-reliance
will therefore depend on how state actors in post-fifty Africa define their role.
One way is to define the African development dilemma as a governance problem;
the other is to see it as primarily a leadership question.

Governance Versus Leadership: Complementary Yet Distinct
Governance means making and managing public or organizational policy,
organizing people and material resources, controlling and encouraging
subordinates to exercise skill and commitment to achieve excellence in a given
set of assignments. In the realm of public affairs, governance refers to the range
of policies public officials enact and actions they take to manage the affairs of
84
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society.89
Good governance is highly necessary and very much needed in Africa
because it can yield positive incremental change. Similar to transactional leadership
the rate of change from good governance alone is slow and circumscribed.90
Stepping into the path towards another half century, Africa needs more than
ordinary managers of national affairs. The continent should aspire for leaders
that move their people to achieve profound institutional change. The latter is the
role of transformational leadership. In which case, leadership is different from
governance. While good governance aspires to perfect the status quo, good
leadership is determined to transform the status quo to a higher order. Truly,
Africa’s development is both a leadership and governance problem. But leadership
supersedes governance because a good or strong leader can inspire his/her followers
to practice and sustain good governance practices.
Leadership is a bundle of attributes and actions including knowledge, vision,
courage, drive, imagination, determination, transparency, decisiveness, motivation,
patriotism and nationalism deployed by occupants of strategic positions to move
their citizens towards profound and positive societal transformations. According
to Lee Kuan Yew,
All said and done, it is the creativity of the leadership, its willingness
to learn from experience elsewhere, to implement good ideas quickly
and decisively through an efficient public service, and to convince the
majority of people that tough reforms are worth taking, that decide a
country’s development and progress.91
This means that leadership creativity, a critical attribute of transformational
leadership, will spread to citizens who then apply and expand their creative
potentials to the highest possible levels.
In real terms, transformational leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert
independence and exercise courage in making choices in the best interest of their
countries within the global system of economic, political and cultural interaction.
They will lead their people to return quality and excellence to education,
revolutionize infrastructure and modernize productive activity in agriculture and
industry; make a determined effort to shepherd the industrialization of their
countries; insert indigenous professionals and labor at the center stage of building
national infrastructure; and deploy imagination to make policies that generate
89
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employment in public and private sectors of society.
Transformational leadership is inward looking but does not isolate
its society from the global system. It assumes ownership of the national or
local development problem depending on the layer of leadership. It enables
followers to unleash hidden and untapped capabilities and brings transparency
and accountability to the fore of national affairs. The motto of transformational
leaders in post-fifty Africa should be, use the people’s money to solve the people’s
problems.
The World Bank projects that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa would
grow from 4.9 percent in 2013 to 5.2 percent in 2015 because of an increase
in export volumes from several countries that discovered mineral deposits in
recent years, namely Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
and Uganda.92 Oliver August added his voice to the list of optimists of Africa’s
economic future.93 But some skeptics such as Richard Dowden see this optimism
as greatly exaggerated because optimists talk about rise in GDP due to income
from extractive sectors without mention of Africa’s place in manufacturing value
added exports and the lack luster performance of African leaders in governance.94
Furthermore, the 2013 Human Development Report projects that 60 million
people in Sub-Saharan Africa will still live in extreme poverty by 2050.95 That
will be close to 100 years after the modal year of independence. One may say that
60 million is substantially lower than the 371 million in extreme poverty in 2010.96
By contrast, however, zero population and only 2 million people will be in extreme
poverty in China and India respectively by 2050.97 The optimistic projections
on China and India may derive from the speed, breadth, and depth of economic
modernization especially in the export of manufactures ongoing in both countries.
In their analysis of the role of manufacturing in the future of global growth
and innovation, James Manyika et al. identified leading countries on indicators
such as value-added, production of energy and resource- intensive commodities,
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technology innovators, and installed capacity of industrial robots.98 No African
country was mentioned on any indicator of manufacturing. Further, a study of
technology transfer conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA) found that Africa was the smallest importer of capital goods
and the least favored destination of R&D projects.99 The findings of James
Manyika et al. and UNECA are similar to the drivers of development listed at the
beginning of the present paper. They are also consistent with the proposition
that African political and economic leaders should treat both the indicators of
industrial innovation and productivity and indicators of basic needs as drivers
of development rather than treat the latter as ends in themselves.

Conclusion
The success of African countries in development in the next fifty years depends

on a paradigm of development that accords unequivocal and dedicated primacy
to domestic human power/agency. As the United Nations rightly observed, if
African countries are to achieve substantial reduction in poverty, they need to go
through a process of structural transformation involving a decrease in the share
of agriculture and an increase in the share of industry and modern services.100
African countries should not expect other countries to do this for them because
it is a historical incontrovertibility that development is neither a gift nor can it be
outsourced. More than fifty years of foreign aid or development assistance has
not brought Africa close to achieving development as we know it in history. Only
countries that have transformational leadership embodied in a developmental
state can achieve such a change in the highly competitive global economy. The
goal of transformational leadership is both to shepherd and empower citizens to
define, own and surmount national development challenges by infusing organized
indigenous agency into development vision and action. That is the history of
development left by transformational leaders in both advanced countries and the
newly developed ones.
Africa’s development, especially post-fifty Africa, will not be different.
Inserting domestic agency at the center of national development requires
government policies that challenge Africans to independently initiate and
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consummate development programs. It will also require a conscious policy and
an unflinching determination by leaders to shepherd their countries to develop.
Development studies started in advanced countries on the premise that poor
countries needed help. The unintended effect of that premise is that it created
a mentality of dependence on advanced countries by Africans including welleducated African leaders. Effective infusion of domestic agency in national
development will require a fundamental change in the content and substance of
development knowledge from the present model that fetishizes external agency,
especially the agency of foreign countries, to a paradigm that conceptualizes
development as the sole responsibility of endogenous agency. The education
sector will be at the forefront of the effort to redirect development theory and
practice that emphasize an endogenous perspective.
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The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development
History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave
Trade
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Abstract: The Arochukwu people, popularly known as the Aro, are the most
debated sub-cultural group in Igboland. The Aro, whose ancestral home is
near the Cross River, and their co-Igbo neighbors were an integral part of
the early history of the hinterland of the southeastern region of Nigeria.
The Aro dominated commerce, politics, and religion in the region in precolonial times. With the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade in the fifteenth
century, they emerged as significant players. The Aro’s role in the region in
both precolonial and colonial times has shaped the way they are perceived in
contemporary Igbo society. This article examines two sides of the image of
the Aro people in contemporary Igbo society and argues that the negative and
positive experiences that neighboring Igbo communities had of the Aro since
the fifteenth century helped to evoke hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand,
and wonder, awe, and admiration on the other. The article traces the origins of
this dual perception of the Aro and analyzes the reasons why it persists.
Keywords: Southeastern Nigeria, Igboland, Aro, Slavery, Inter- group
Relations, Trade, Precolonial era, the Atlantic Slave Trade, Migration, Diaspora

Introduction
The literature on inter-group relations in pre-colonial southeastern Nigeria
acknowledges the influence of the Aro in the region.1 The Aro dominated their
neighbors in the hinterland, especially during the era of the Atlantic slave trade.
The leading role the Aro played in the slave trade led to their dominance and
resulted in what came to be “the fear of the Aro” by neighboring communities,
villages, and towns. This fear has in turn led to the generally held view that the
overall Aro’s positive influence “also had a dark side.”2 The fear of the Aro was so
strong that in the early years of colonial rule, a British official observed that Igbo
and non-Igbo groups in the hinterland still dreaded their Aro neighbors.3 That fear
K. O. Dike and F. Ekejiuba, The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria, 1650-1980: A Study of Socio-economic
Formation and Transformation in Nigeria (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1990), 223-226.
2
Kate Meagher, Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria (Ibadan:
Heinemann, 2010), 34.
3
G. Ugo Nwokeji, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Population Density: A Historical Demography of
the Biafran Hinterland,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, no. 3 (2000): 633.
1

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

30 | The Dual Image of the Aro
derived from the slave trade, which, as Inya Eteng argues, “left enduring hatred
between the Aro and their war mercenaries, on one hand, and community-casualties
of their slave raids, on the other.”4 Apollos Nwauwa insists that the Aro owe
“their notoriety” not only to what they did with their famous religious deity, Ibini
Ukpabi, but also to their skill in the formation and operation of a network of trading
oligarchy, mainly in human cargoes, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries.5
From the era of the slave trade in Igboland there remains “an ambivalent
social attitude of most people of various Igbo sub-groups toward their Aro
neighbors.”6 This article discusses some of the factors that shaped this attitude
toward the Aro within Igboland, and how in modern times a “dual image” of
the Aro exists.7 It attempts to establish the veracity and nature of this dual image,
as well as its ethno-historical underpinnings. Aro participation in the Atlantic slave
trade is an especially important point of reference particularly because the scale of
their activities and involvement in the trade constituted a critical turning point in
their relations with their neighbors.

Aro Relations with their Neighbors
Decades before and after the fifteenth century, the southeastern region of Nigeria was
characterized by great population movements, human settlements, and demographic
changes resulting from migrations, raids, intra/ inter-ethnic squabbles, and various
socio-economic tensions and challenges. Aro relations with the rest of their Igbo
neighbors within this region can be interrogated in five important historical
stages. The first was the pre-Atlantic stage. This stage, which began before
1400, was the period when the forces which led to the basic formation of the
Aro demographic composition, their fascinating state or kingdom, and their
economy were systematically coming into fruition through an elaborate network
based on a combination of the various institutions of trans-local connections.8 As K.O
Dike and F. Ekejiuba note, early Aro demographic configuration and development
Inya Eteng, Onye Ajuru Aju Anaghi Aju Onwe Ya: Ndi Igbo in Post-Civil War Crisis of Disunity,
2004 Ahiajoku Lecture (Owerri: Ministry of Information, 2004), 46.
5
Apollos Nwauwa, “State Formation and Evolution of Kingship Revisited: A Case Study of the
Origin of the Aro Kingdom,” in Between Tradition and Change: Sociopolitical and Economic
Transformation among the Igbo of Nigeria, ed. Apollos Nwauwa and Ebere Onwudiwe (Glassboro:
Goldline & Jacobs Publishing, 2012), 41.
6
Ndu Life Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade, Environmental Changes, and Human Migrations in
West Africa: the Case of the Aro of Southeastern Nigeria,” Igbo Studies Review 1 (2013): 32.
7
This is similar to the dual image of the Jews in English and American literature. See Jay L. Halio,
ed., The Merchant of Venice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4-5.
8
Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 20-23; Nigerian National Archives, Enugu (hereafter, NNAE.) H. F. Mathews,
ARODIV 20/1/15: Being the various accounts of Intelligence Reports on the Aro Clan, Arochukwu
District, Calabar, 1927; A. Harneit-Sievers, Constructions of Belonging: Igbo Communities and the
Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 18-20.
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economy derived, on the one hand, from an internal source, that is, from a series of smallscale migrations from the savanna fringes of the central plateau of the region, only to
converge in the rainforests of the Cross River basin.9 No doubt, this laid the foundation
for the transformation of the Aro economy through the intensification of agriculture,
competition for productive resources, and the growth of commerce. On the other hand,
an external source of change derived mainly from the Atlantic slave trade, which also
increased the momentum of internal migrations.
The second stage, which dates from about 1500, was that of the Atlantic slave
trade. The Aro economy had developed before the Atlantic slave trade began, but the
Atlantic trade was an important agent of change that contributed in developing the
perceptions of the Aro by their neighbors. The slave trade era witnessed the emergence
of the three-legged Aro trading oligarchy: the commercial, the diplomatic, and
the cosmological/oracular. Positioned as the middleman in the Euro-African trade,
and eager to meet the demand for captives by rising up to the challenge of tapping
the thickly populated Igbo hinterland, the Aro entered into various alliances with
neighboring communities, availing them to the sought-after European trade goods
and procuring slaves in exchange. They not only used their dreaded oracle, the Ibini
Ukpabi, to achieve their commercial goals, but also hired people of neighboring
Igbo war-like clans of Abam, Ohafia, Edda, and Nike to assist them with captivecatching, expeditions, or raids, and to generally protect Aro interests and enforce
their will whenever it was necessary to do so. The United States of America’s
domination of the modern world is similar to the Aro influence in the area. R. C.
Njoku succinctly captures this:
As the US today controls the world with superior technology and
military muscle, the Aro employed the use of their all-powerful oracle,
known as the Ibinukpabia (Long Juju), and their military alliance with
the Ohafia, Abam and Eda as instruments of fear and domination.
The Aro-Ohafia-Abam-Edda military alliance, like the US-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accorded the Aro the military
muscle to threaten and often raid other communities who were opposed
to their commercial and religious interests.10
Thus, the Aro emerged as the leading captive-recruiting merchant class of the
region.11 With the clear advantage they had over their neighbors, Aro traders seized
and enslaved populations, grew wealthy by selling many slaves, while retaining
For details, see Dike and Ekejiuba, 31.
R. C. Njoku, “Neoliberal Globalism in Microcosm: A Study of the Precolonial Igbo of Eastern
Nigeria,” Mbari: The International Journal of Igbo Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 59.
11
Martin Klein, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Decentralized societies in West Africa,” Public
Lecture, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria, January 22, 2000, 11.
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some for domestic use. By so doing, they were able to maintain and sustain a
complex network of client-patron relationships across Igboland and beyond, with
their Arochukwu homeland as the metropolis.
For the majority of people in the Igbo hinterland, the rise of the Atlantic slave
trade led to high-level feelings of insecurity.12 As a result of Aro- instigated
raids, many villages either had their community life disrupted or simply ceased
to exist. That European officers in latter-day colonial Nigeria filed reports about
villages that had been “exterminated” or “almost exterminated”13 suggests the
prevalence of high incidences of raids to meet the demands of the trade, especially
from the eighteenth century onward when the increasing demand in the Americas
for African captives provoked changes in the interior of the Bight of Biafra.14 At the
end of such raids, “the practice then was for majority of survivors to seek refuge,
for instance, in nearby hilly or forested locations, where, in some cases, they might
try to set up brand new communities; it was also not unusual for some survivors
to escape to their maternal home, that is, the land of birth of their mothers.”15
Available evidence indicates that during this period when the business of slaving
was the most lucrative business available, households across Igboland became
prepared to migrate at a moment’s notice, to change occupation, residences,
and social networks with little apparent hesitation.16 The incessant sense of
helpless preparedness and readiness to switch gears, in some cases, made the
capacity to maintain recognizable and usable forms of collective solidarity and
collaboration difficult. In the economic realm, the crisis which came in the wake
of the Atlantic slave trade created major challenges related to maintaining the
level of well-being for people of the non-exploiting classes at the lower ends of the
slave market economy. Socially, the arrival of immigrants, European goods, and
images that were perceived as “strange” created feelings of anxiety. Along
with these were stories about cannibalism associated with the export trade, which
created an atmosphere of fear and hatred for stranger elements, including the

For details, see Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 26-28.
NNAE., F. A. Goodlife, “Intelligence Report on the Otanzu, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province,
28935 CSE 1/1/5, 1933 & 1952; NNAE., I.R.P. Heslop, “Intelligence Report on the Nkalu Clan, Orlu
District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, CSE 1/85/6197A, 1936.
14
Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 27-29; see, also, Ndu Life Njoku, “Women’s Resistance against
the Slave Trade in Igboland, Southeastern Nigeria,” Ofo: Journal of Trans-Atlantic Studies 2, no. 1
(June, 2012): 34.
15
Udochukwu E. Akukwe, (retired teacher, now trader, age 81), interview with author, Umuejechi,
Nekede, Owerri, Imo State, December 15, 2013.
16
Chief Anthony Ogu, (trader, age 80), interview with author, Afor-Eziama Market, Eziama, Ikeduru,
Imo State, November 28, 2014.
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Aro. In the face of the challenges that these developments posed, however, the
Aro still triumphed. Over time they established settlements in parts of non-Aro
Igboland and beyond, with invitation in some cases, along with large quantities of
assorted gifts, from those desirous of their presence.18
The third stage is that of legitimate trade which began about the
last decade of the eighteenth century. For the generality of the people of
southeastern Nigeria, this stage was a critical period of commercial transition
from trade in “human cargo” to trade mainly in oil palm products. Particularly for
the Aro, the picture and challenge this new stage presented, as Chima Korieh points
out, were such that “they were unable to monopolize the palm oil trade in the same
way they had monopolized the slave trade. Unlike the slave trade, the production
and marketing of palm oil were readily open to local competition since the oil
could be produced by anyone who had access to the trees.”19
During this period of legitimate commence the Aro struggled to smoothly
transition to agricultural production, thus threatening their control of the better
part of the southeastern regional market. The difficulties the Aro faced in making
this shift, coupled with the threat to their regional dominance, underscores the
viewpoint that in the period before the legitimate trade, the Aro economy was
indeed driven by the slave trade.
It also gives credence to the crisis of adaptation view expressed by A. G.
Hopkins and others in reference to the Aro in the context of the legitimate trade
that opened up a new market economy.20 However, that the transition diminished
Aro control of trade did not mean a total collapse of their trading system. On the
contrary, Aro hegemony did not end as they became active to some extent in
the new palm produce trade in parts of the region by using old trading contacts,
organizational skills, and capital accumulated during the slave trade. The stage
of colonial rule saw a change in Aro regional position of dominance, with the
proclamation by the British of a Protectorate over the whole of southern Nigeria
in 1900. This political action automatically brought the Arochukwu district within
the Old Calabar Administrative Province. The British understood clearly that to
consolidate power in the conquered areas, they had to undermine the Aro influence.
17

The initial story then was that those enslaved were taken to the coast for sale to ndi Potokiri,
that is, people of Portugal, who would eat them up. Pa Nduka Clifford Opara (village elder, age:
85+), interview with author, Umuokoro, Achi Mbieri, Mbaitoli, Imo State, December 18, 2013; and
Udochukwu E. Akukwe.
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As the British colonial officer, Colonel Moorhouse, put it: It was inevitable, in my
opinion, that in the extension of the [British] Administration, there should be a
conflict between the Government and the Aros in the conditions that existed at
the time.” He insisted that “It was in order to break down the trade monopoly of
the Aros far more than any missionary influence that the decision to open up the
country was made.21
With colonial rule in place, the British embarked on an anti-Aro
expedition between 1901 and 1902 during which they defeated the Aro. This
defeat culminated in the destruction of their major source of influence - the Ibini
Ukpabi oracle.22 The defeat of the Aro and the destruction of their oracle paved
the way for the gradual introduction of Christianity and Western culture into
Arochukwu and the rest of the Igbo territory.23 Although Western influence
undermined Aro power in the region, the pre- conquest Aro-inspired migrations
and intermingling yielded various forms of inter-group relationships between the
Aro and their neighbors in the Igbo and even non-Igbo areas. Although Aro
migrations and settlements had various long-lasting effects, the most prominent
result is the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of Igboland
and beyond, encapsulated in what is popularly referred to as the “Aro Diaspora.”24
In spite of the many challenges which the Aro in the homeland and those “in
Diaspora” had to face especially during the colonial era, quite a good number of
them still distinguished themselves in the different areas they found themselves,
often taking advantage of Western education to enhance their prestige. Such Aro
sons as Mbonu Ojike, Alvan Ikoku, K. O. Mbadiwe, S. G. Ikoku, Reverend Inyama,
to mention just a few, had the impact of their achievements felt in the post-colonial
period in the fields of politics, education, and religion, among others.25 However,
to what can the Aro be said to owe their ascendancy in Igboland? Moreover, what
generally were their capabilities? To these questions, we now turn.

Domains of Aro Influence and Capabilities in Igboland
Aro traders were unarguably the driving-force behind Aro success and ascendancy
in Igboland. The traders owed their reputation, influence, and dominance more
to an accident of geographical location than to anything else. Arochukwu was
21
Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna (NNAK), Minute dated 28/9/1920 attached to letter No. 2532
of 17/12/21 in the file Conf. NO.80/1920.
22
The oracle, associated with immense religious and judicial powers, was the instrument of Aro
commercial dominance in the Igbo country (and beyond): NNAE, ABADIST 20/1/3– Long Juju of
Aro Report on, 1909-1923.
23
NNAE, ARODIV, 20/1/15, 13; NNAE., ARODIV, 31/1/55, 15.
24
Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 31-32; see Ohia, 6-8.
25
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strategically located around the Enyong Creek, which links it to the main artery
of the Cross River system – “the highway by which ‘light and civilization’ would
penetrate the remotest recesses of the terra incognita inhabited by the Ibo, the
Ibibio and the Ogoja peoples.”26 Therefore, it had the advantage of commanding
the gateway into the densely peopled Igbo hinterland, apart from being within easy
reach of the main southeastern Nigerian coastal ports. Thus, with a location that
was favorable, the Aro naturally manipulated their geographical advantage to gain
high economic status.
Aside from a favorable geographical location, the Aro had the advantageous
influence of the authority of the widely famed Ibini Ukpabi oracle. The oracle
conferred on the Aro the appellation “Umu Chukwu” (“Children of the high
God”), making them almost untouchable as they traversed the length and breadth
of the Igbo territory.27 In addition, there was the Aro military alliance system which
they relied on to protect their interests. They made use of the services of war-like
neighboring Igbo clans who, even on short notice, served to ensure the protection
of Aro interests in the region. Any analysis of the factors and strategies behind Aro
success and dominant influence in Igboland is incomplete without recognizing the
remarkable Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure, and their flexible social system
embodied in the trinity of the trader, the diplomat, and the oracular agent. With their
array of exotic wares, wherever the itinerant Aro trader paused, prominent men
literally fell over each other to host him, and even tried to lure him to establish a
resting place of sorts. Then, the readily available agent of the Aro oracle would
act as a guide for consulting the oracle, and also serve as a guarantee for security
along hazardous routes. Finally, the presence of the Aro diplomat was necessary
for ending those inter-community feuds, which were adjudged unprofitable to Aro
interest because of the challenges of insecurity they posed to travelers. Additionally,
the presence of the diplomat was a known deterrent to attack from potential invaders
because of both the fear of real or imaginary repercussion from the dreaded Aro
oracle and the fear of the inevitable military reprisal that would certainly follow
such action.28
The image of the Aro in Igbo development history hinged essentially on what
constituted Aro sources of influence and capabilities, especially in the slave trade
era. It is possible to present these in five distinct domains. The first is “the domain
of human social capabilities.” This embodies Aro ability to apply common-sense
26
A. E. Afigbo, “Trade and Politics on the Cross River Basin, 1895-1905,” Journal of the Historical
Society of Ghana xiii, no. 1 (1972): 21.
27
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psychology in controlling the land and peoples of their homeland region. After
mastering the regional land and river transportation network systems, Aro traders
and diplomats divided the environment into two parts: the abode of “bush people,”
whom they called ndu mba ohia, and the abode of “littoral people,” or ndu mba
mmiri. While the “littoral people” consisted of all those who lived close to the
coast, such as the Efiks and the Ijaws, “bush people” referred to those who lived in
the hinterlands.29
Being in direct contact with the coast-based Europeans, the littoral
communities were better armed and they were also largely organized under
centralized political structures. Additionally, their men of authority occupied a
strategic middleman position in the slave trade. By virtue of the geographic location
of such communities, the Aro avoided raiding them for captives. Rather, exchange
of trade goods, which included human cargo, and diplomatic cooperation with the
leaders of these communities, mainly through the instrumentality of the Ibini Ukpabi,
were the defining characteristics of the relationship between these communities and
the Aro. On the other hand, seeing the “bush people” of the decentralized Igbo
hinterland largely as people of “primitive tribes” that were very much uninformed
about the goings-on in the coast-based Euro-African relations at the time, the Aro
designated their abode as the main source of captive extraction. The abode of the
littoral people was the main destination point of captives before shipment across
the Atlantic. Little wonder then that the catchphrase for punishing a recalcitrant
fellow in the Igbo hinterland during that period of insecurity was simply: iresi
ya ndi mba mmiri;30 that is, “to sell the fellow off to the littoral people” or people
of the coast. Furthermore, the Aro, not insensitive to local cultural forms, were
thoughtful and smart to appropriate and put to use the important element of trust,
building it into their unequal social relations with their neighbors. To facilitate this,
they dutifully adopted the dialect of their host. Moreover, in recruiting professional
load carriers from host communities, the Aro relied on the advice of local men of
authority, whose trust and confidence they earned and to whom they gave material
presents, but also a promise to provide for the load carriers’ security/protection. In
addition, they re- invented the institution of Igbandu (“blood pact”) to service their
trade relations. Whereas Igbandu was originally used, for instance, to re-establish
confidence between disputants, especially in kinship relationships, the itinerant
Aro trader used it in forming friendships and alliances with alien groups.31 In other
words, they adapted the institution to establish strong links with non-Aro Igbo
Pa Abiakam and Pa Opara.
Udochukwu E. Akukwe and Pa Opara.
31
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sub-groups, thereby making it possible for them to gain entry into areas where
a forcible entry would disrupt trade by generating hostility or resistance. Thus,
Igbandu removed the element of mutual suspicion, established confidence in the
contracting parties, and made it obligatory for local chiefs and men of authority
to keep trade routes open and secure for Aro traders to ply their business without
hindrance.
Next is “the domain of economic capabilities” under which the Aro
became the major purveyors of European trade goods, including the exotic/ luxury
ones, such as gun and gunpowder, obtained from within the abode of the littoral
people. With such goods, they endeared themselves to the elites in the abode
of “bush people,” and stimulated differences in wealth and social status in these
communities. For instance, the possession of a gun by an individual, and the firing
of gunshots during ceremonies, such as funerals, soon became indicators of a
high-level social status.32 Thus, the Aro depended on the coast-bound export trade
to generate luxury goods with which they increased their power and prestige
vis-à-vis their neighbors. As a result of exposure to what was perceived by the
standards of the time as “better things of life,” expectations were raised, and
this “created in these areas a new class of men anxious to acquire wealth and titles
– a class with whom the Aro also allied to extract captives through kidnapping and
occasional raids.”33 Therefore, Aro dominance was based on wealth accumulation
through trade and military power, as is evident in the politico-legal domain
With the influence and authority conferred on them by their oracle, the Aro
became key negotiators in local socio-political disputes, enthroning the justice
system of their oracle in the abode of the so-called “bush people.” With time,
the Aro justice system became fundamental to the social organization of people
in various parts of the Igbo hinterland.34 For instance, as an integral part of
the traditional Igbo judicial system, consulting with the Ibini Ukpabi oracle at
Arochukwu became an effective means of achieving genuine reconciliation and
of re-establishing confidence between disputants whose relationship was so
strained that normalcy was impaired. With their justice system installed, even
without having to push ultimately for the acceptance of their political lordship,
the Aro used the services of fighting allies to assert some quasi-political supremacy
whenever the need arose. By the same token, however, the allies were also used to
32
Chief Joseph Ndubuisi, (retired teacher, aged 75 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu,
Abia State, December 18, 2013; and Mazi Sunday Okoro, (retired teacher, aged 65 years), interview
with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2014.
33
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raid for captives in the abode of the “bush people.”
The importance of the Ibini Ukpabi in Aro ascendancy should not be
overstressed. As much as the oracle was paramount in the imposition of Aro
hegemony, it operated in perfect symbiosis with the great Aro commercial acumen:
the utilization of contacts made in the course of promoting it to advance Aro
commercial interests, and vice versa. As pointed out earlier, the ability of the
Aro to impose their authority in Igboland also rested on their military prowess.
The exercise of the ability to implement this policy was, however, guided by
tact because, as Alan Burns explains, the Aro were not a military people but
owed their power to their relatively great intelligence when compared with the
neighboring groups.35
Under the “domain of culture and cosmology,” the Aro advertised their
oracular power and propagated the Ekpe/Okonko society in many parts of Igboland,36
using the cult members to further expand their commercial interests. Remarkably
with time, the use to which the Aro put their oracle contributed in influencing or
changing Igbo cosmology, having impacted the Igbo worldview, as Aro agents
were often invited to different parts of Igboland to help to establish local shrines,
or Ihu Chukwu, of the great Chukwu, the high God of the Igbo pantheon. For the
Aro, the spirito- psychic field involving occultism and the use of charms was very
useful in the very dangerous business of slaving. Though risky, under the effective
protection of their dreaded oracle, and distinguished as “children of the high
God,” the Aro confidently strutted from one community to the other, directing the
procurement and movement of captives.
Finally, there was “the domain of the physical environment.” With no
encumbrances, the Aro travelled and traded extensively in the course of which
they built up a sequence of resting places stretched out as a trade diaspora
along the trade routes. The subsequent proliferation of Aro settlements in precolonial Igboland was a corollary of these resting- places. According to David
Northrup, the more important resting places gradually became trading centers,
and finally Aro settlements.37 From these trading centers, new settlements were,
in turn, founded owing either to Aro initiative or the initiative of a local man
of authority. This was the genesis of “Aro imperialism,” which became the
Sir Alan Burns, A History of Nigeria (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 215.
For information about the power of the Ekpe society, see NNAE File No. B 1680/15 J. N. Cheetam,
“Report on Secret Societies,” 1915; see, also, John N. Oriji, “Transformations in Igbo Cosmology
during the Slave Trade: A Study of the Genesis of Place-Names, Totems and Taboos,” in Nwauwa
and Onwudiwe, eds., 106; and, F. Ekejiuba, “Aro Worldview: An Analysis of the Cosmological Ideas
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foundation of effective Aro hegemony. Once a settlement was formed, as Uche
Ohia notes, the Aro acquired landed property and took wives from among their
host communities. Such affinities served both to ensure peaceful co-existence and
to increase the size of Aro groups since, while freely marrying non- Aro women,
the Aro men at the time never permitted their daughters to marry a non-Aro.38
Thus, the Aro migrated and settled permanently in choice or strategic parts of
Igboland either to enable them advertise and promote the powers of their oracle, or
simply to be better able, among other things, to tap captives from even the most
isolated but well-populated hinterland communities. This strategy produced two
types of Aro: “the Aro-uno,” the home-based Aro or those Aro who remained at
home in Arochukwu, and “the Aro-mba” or “Aro- Uzo,” the Aro abroad or the Aro
living outside the homeland.39 In other words, the strategy led to the formation of
Arochukwu confederacies, which maintained direct links with the Atlantic market
even though they were not under any central authority.40
With the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria, most non-Aro Igbo, for
fear of domination, became determined to halt Aro expansion into neighboring
territories, an expansion that had been going on for hundreds of years. In many
cases, the Diaspora Aro soon began to be treated as “aliens,” especially under the
Native Lands Acquisition ordinances of the British colonial state, notwithstanding
the number of generations for which they had been settled in non-Aro areas, or the
means through which they acquired titles to land. In some cases, they were made
not to acquire land, or alienate it, without the permission of their indigenous
landlords.41 In the final analysis, commercial reasons connected to the Atlantic
trade were certainly not the exclusive motive for Aro migrations/settlement
outside their immediate homeland, but they were, indeed, a powerful incentive
for temporary or permanent movement of the Aro across the Arochukwu borders.
They moved across their home borders in order to bridge different contexts in the
commerce of the time, or, they just left Arochukwu as fortune-hunters in search
of greener pastures elsewhere. Accordingly, Aro migrants can best be described as
entrepreneurial pioneers, as bricoleurs making the best out of the changes associated
with the trade of the Atlantic community. So, even though it is valid to say that
the Atlantic trade did not shape or initiate Aro responses to changes in the region,
it did set the parameters for the forms of change that took place in the area. For
the Igbo hinterland area of southeastern Nigeria, migrations by a predatory group
Ohia, 7.
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like the Aro were undertaken to cope with environmental and demographic changes
and demands occasioned by the slave trade and resistance to it. Thus, trade and
environmentally instigated migrations resulted in the permanent geographical
dispersal of the Aro in various parts of the Igbo territory and even beyond; but,
for the same reason, they also form the background factors of what later led to
their dual image.

Aro Dual Image
In the context of ethno-history, the dual image of a people rests upon their
achievements, exploits, and performance recognized as impacting favorably or
profitably and otherwise on some other people or groups. The dual image of the
Aro is a function of the level of their overall attainment rooted at all levels of
their material, psychic, and spiritual being. At the exoteric level, it derives from a
people’s ethno-history and culture; that is, from the level of their material and nonmaterial achievements, modes and methods of living, and the story which is told,
or history which is written, about them.42 Each group of people is a product of
history. Their past has brought them to where they are today.
A dual image can be the attribute of an individual person or a group. An
individual can have this image either as a result of what he has achieved as a person
or by belonging to a group that has made a particular mark in human history
because of its placement on the ladder of culture and civilization. Thus, a Mazi
Nwachukwu Okoroafor of Arochukwu, even if he is a lily-livered fellow will
attract, at least outside his Arochukwu homeland, the same dual image associated
with an average Aro man because of the Aro exploits in the past. An individual
achievement can be a freak occurrence, but a group’s achievement can, and
usually does, gel into a system or what we may call “culture and civilization.”43
Thus, for emphasis, the achievements and exploits of an individual cannot confer
a dual image on a group, though a group’s achievement/exploits can confer a dual
image on a person who belongs to it, even if he was an outright failure. That an
individual’s exploits or achievements cannot give a group a dual image is like the
old story or adage that a tree cannot make a forest, or one swallow makes a summer.
The exploits or achievements from which a dual image derives can fall into
any of the following three fields of activity: i) mentifacts by which we mean mental
constructs; ii) socio-facts or social institutions and usages; and iii) artifacts or
tools for doing work. In the field of mentifacts are areas such as philosophy
and ethics; in socio-facts things like religious, political, economic and legal
A. I. Nwabughuogu, “Ugwu Ndi Igbo in the Nigerian Nation State,” Ugwu Abia (Umuahia: Ministry
of Information, 2000): 33-34.
43
A. E. Afigbo, “Ugwu Isi Oji or the Blackman in the Context of Global Civilization,” Ugwu Abia,
(Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 59.
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systems, social life and values, language, etc., count; and artifacts are such
things as material tools for getting things done. Put in simpler terms, human social
achievements and exploits can be compartmentalized into two large fields, the
spirito-psychic and the mental-material fields. For pre-colonial Igboland, especially
in the heydays of the Atlantic slave trade, the spirito-psychic field, which includes
occult and oracular powers, was, in a sense, almost the exclusive playing turf of
the Aro through the instrumentality of their Ibini Ukpabi oracle. With this oracle,
Aro cosmological influence in the context of their relations with communities
in the Igbo hinterland, for example, spread out to take Igboland (nay, the southeastern region) by storm.
Even though the mental-material field, in this case, Western science and
technology, was the private domain of the West, the Aro were at least among
the first of the hinterland southeastern Nigerian peoples to have a toehold claim
in this field through their middleman position in the trans- Atlantic trade. Aro
acquisition, through trade with Europeans at the coast of items such as gun and
gun powder, umbrella, narrow, etc., at a fairly early historical age paid off for
them as it constituted part of the secret of the dazzling successes they recorded in
their many-sided relations with the rest of the Igbo. This trade, indeed, set the
foundation for their early superior positive and popular image in Igboland, which
became an important basis of their domination of the region. It is possible, now, to
highlight some crucial aspects of this domination, which are germane to the issue
of an Aro dual image in the area.
Igboland was predominantly a decentralized society whose growth and
development, given the overall impact of the slave trade, was not in any way
promoted by internal Aro exploitation for captives. Decentralized societies were
victims rather than predators within the Atlantic slave system. There were two
kinds of decentralized societies in the context of the slave trade: those raided by
outsiders and those internally exploited for captives. Igboland fell into the second
category. At no time did any neighboring non-Igbo group directly raid the Igbo
for captives.44 Together with their allies, the Aro did. They masterminded the
raiding of communities and sub-groups, especially in the Igbo hinterland, but
were themselves never raided. To fall into the hands of an internal group of
predators was, for all intents and purposes, worse than to be raided by outsiders.
Aro-led internal exploitation of their own ethnic group proved quite disastrous for
Igboland. Thus, by the middle of the 18th century the area had become one of the
most important sources of slaves for the Euro-African trade.45
Further, it may well be that the internal Aro predatory role was mainly
44
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responsible for the existence of the village-type political structure in most parts
of Igboland, such as outside Oguta, Onitsha, and parts of western Igboland. The
Aro strategy of internally exploiting and tapping Igboland inch by inch weakened
societal solidarity and undermined any successful anti-slave resistance. With the
Aro strategy of instigating inter- and intra-group squabbles, resistance could not
be possible in the absence of a centralized authority.46 The strategy may have
exposed the Aro to the generally advantageous small-scale political organization
of non-Aro Igbo communities, which, at the time, they may have found suitable,
at least in the short run, for their captive extraction business. But, in the long run,
such a strategy also discouraged the game-changing move towards political
centralization. As Kate Meagher rightly avers, Aro “predatory relationship
with the Igbo hinterland, which involved the encouragement of slave raiding and
other institutions of slave procurement, may have contributed to their inability
to consolidate their extensive coordinating role into the formation of a centralized
state.”47 In any case, the fact remains that, tapping one village after another was,
par excellence, the Aro “divide and rule” policy, or a “divide and enslave” tactic,
suitable to their slaving business since it kept local units fragmented and therefore
vulnerable.
The Aro, whose own in-built and self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring
wealth through slaving activities was to see it more as a means of exchange than
as means of production, contributed in building the foundations of a spineless
feudalism in pre-colonial Igboland. They first led the way in inoculating the
Igbo with the virus of a nouveau appetite for European trade goods, leading, in
the end, to the “de-industrialization” of the indigenous economy.48 Next, they
stimulated differences in wealth among the Igbo in a manner that paved way for
a rabid acquisitive propensity and instigated the commoditization of “everything
around them and the commercialization of life” leading to “the rise of mercenary
instinct in a good number of the people.”49
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Under the influence of the Aro, accumulating captives and selling them off
into slavery became the much sought-after occupation in order to “get-rich quick”
and as a means to provide revenue to purchase European goods. Domestically, it
even became a class status symbol to acquire captives and use them as slaves. In
fact, the growth of the local Aro-driven slave trade created sinister opportunities
for capital accumulation by the elite, but also imposed burdens on the agricultural
economy because of the undue emphasis on the enslavement process, the
institutionalization of slavery, and the neglect of the subsistence sector due to the
heightened commoditization of human beings.50 Thus, the Aro may be the precursors
of “the negative entrepreneurial spirit that is today legendary and proverbial in
Igboland.”51
In the area of cosmology, the proliferation of oracular deities in pre- colonial
Igboland is traceable to the Aro. Monday Noah’s research shows that “the Long
Juju,” as visiting Europeans nicknamed the Aro oracle, was specifically designed
or re-designed for the commoditization of human beings, and might have been
the largest single vault in the region “where human beings were held awaiting
shipment.”52 Dike also considers the Aro oracle as the medium through which the
captives exported from the ports of the Niger Delta were largely recruited, and
estimates that half or more of the slaves exported from this region had passed
through its mysterious portals.53 As we noted earlier, the influence of the Ibini
Ukpabi contributed in changing Igbo cosmology, with deities and shrines
mushrooming in different parts of Igboland as if in emulation of the Aro. Yet, the
influence of the Aro oracle continued to dwarf other oracles such as the Igwekala
of Umunoha, the Ogbunorie of Ifakala, the Amadioha of Eziama, the Agbala of
Awka, the Kamalu of Ozuzu, etc.54 Given the foregoing, it may be difficult to rule out
that, considering the extent of their cosmological impact on the rest of Igboland,
the Aro may also have laid the institutional foundations of ritual slavery, or the Osu
caste system, in parts of the Igbo hinterland.55
50
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The Aro art of long distance trading, as well as their habit of migrating, settling,
and integrating into host societies have had a demographical impact on the
greater part of non-Aro Igboland, resulting in high population densities, population
re-configuration, the fear of domination on the part of host communities, and land
disputes. The ripples of some of these may have worsened the negative image
of the Aro. But, the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure which manifested in
their art of long distance trading also manifested in the Diaspora Aro’s habit to
contribute meaningfully to the development of host society, while not forgetting
their homeland. On another front, the Igbo, now well-known for their presence in
virtually all parts of the civilized world, would appear to have emulated or copied
the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure. Shrewd and resourceful, the pre-colonial
Aro had led the way in introducing local institutional mechanisms, such as
armed convoys, organized rest houses, marital alliances, fictive kinship, and
indigenous credit system, for overcoming the risks and lightening the burden of
long distance trade in the then fragmented and insecure pre-European political
environment of Igboland and environs. It has therefore been rightly argued that
the rapid expansion of the Igbo diasporas was a product not only of population
pressure at home, but of the prior development of social “blueprints for
migration” in pre-colonial Igbo social organization.56 The organization of traders
and fortune hunters into itinerant groups created a framework for migration that
did not rupture linkages between migrants and their home areas. Pre-colonial
institutions requiring the annual return of migrants to their home town for festivals
were well established among the Aro, and spread to other Igbo groups with the
passage of time.57 According to a study on entrepreneurs in Nnewi, which was
a commercial Igbo town, “systems of apprenticeship also followed a diasporic
pattern, in which masters settled apprentices in other parts of Nigeria in order to
widen their networks and avoid problems of oversupply in a given area.”58
Thus, what is now the Igbo diaspora began, in a very real sense, in the precolonial era as the Aro trade diaspora in order to benefit maximally from the slave
trade. The Aro successfully colonized strategic trade routes and places in nonAro Igboland and beyond in their own form of Aro lebensraum, if you will.59
Clearly, the Aro were successful, in part, because their trade diaspora was not tied
to the apron strings of the political agenda of an expansionist state. To some extent,
therefore, they were the precursors of what one may now refer to as the modern
globalization of the Igbo, continuing, as it were, from where it stood following
Meagher, 41.
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the abolition of the slave trade.
Finally, the character of Anglo-Aro relations during the period of colonial
conquest, and the nature of Aro resistance influenced Anglo-Igbo relations for the
better part of the colonial period. Unlike the majority of the rest of the Igbo subgroups, the Aro perceived rather quickly that the presence of the British posed
a great threat to their economic interests.60 Although they realized the military
superiority of the British, the Aro believed that they were clever enough to outwit
them:
They decided therefore to engage in endless negotiations while, at the
same time, determined not to yield an inch of territory to the British.
Employing to the fullest that Aro capacity for sweet but tortuous doubletalk, they got the British bogged down in fruitless negotiations for five
years. It was not until 1899 that the British were able to see through
the Aro game and decided on military conquest. The experience left a
decided impression on the British about the Igbo.61
Because of the nature of Anglo-Aro relations, the British and the
Igbo never really came to love each other, even if there existed until the end of
colonial rule a certain uneasy type of admiration between them. Aro predatory
relationships with the rest of the Igbo, which involved the encouragement of
raiding and other institutions of captive procurement, impacted Igboland. However
adventurous, enterprising, and materially successful the Aro were through their key
role in the slave trade in Igboland, the flipside is that their ascendancy and influence
are irrevocably tied to the unpleasant memory of a remarkable aspect of brutal
Igbo history.

Conclusion
This article has shown that the dual image of the Aro is traceable to the central
role they played in the slave trade in Igboland, the memory of which lingers in the
60
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consciousness of many Igbo people in southeastern Nigeria. The Aro dominance of
pre-colonial Igboland was notoriously based on the cold logic of their built-in and
self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through infamous slaving activities.
That the slave trade could and did develop in the context of the southeastern
Nigerian hinterland despite the absence of a strong centralized power was largely
because of the Aro factor. Within the context of the Atlantic economy, it is to their
credit that the lack of a central government in Igboland during this period did not
prevent the formation of a complex commercial network, one that remarkably
was, in part, supported by private enterprise dominated by the Aro people. Aro
trade merchants were successful as cultural brokers who connected small Igbo
communities to the wider world. With great wealth amassed in the process, the
Aro were emboldened by their achievements and came to refer to themselves as
“Aro oke-Igbo” (“Aro – the great Igbo” or “Aro – the male Igbo”); and they were
reverentially regarded throughout precolonial period as “the government” of that
period.62 The respect accorded to the Igbo by their neighbors was due in part to
Aro economic, religious, and military power. The Aro oracle commanded respect
that extended to Isoko, Urhobo, Idah, and Idoma.63 A German Doctor, Hermann
Koler, reported in
1840 that the dominance of the Igbo language in the southeastern region and
the respect neighboring societies had for the Igbo had to do with the Aro-driven
trade of the Igbo and their warlike nature.64
Yet, one cannot account for the many-sided setback of Igboland as a result
of the slave trade without the unsavory realization that it has much to do with the
predatory role of one of its very own sub-groups. The Aro remain a critical aspect
of the unpleasant memories of inter-group relations in pre-colonial Igboland. The
place of the Aro in the pre-colonial history of Igboland can be better explained in
the context of a successful creation of a network of an exploited people connected
to the Atlantic economy. This is so because the Atlantic Ocean, and with it the
Atlantic economy, redefined Igboland, and on this ocean a trauma is inscribed.
One aspect of the aftermath of pre-colonial Aro activities in Igboland is
that many Igbo sub-cultural groups tend to loathe the Aro presence to the extent of
abhorring relating closely with them and even forbidding marital ties with them.
As one oral informant cynically put it, “Even if we now have started trusting the
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Aro, the demon in them we do not trust!” Those who refuse to trust the Aro have
continued to harbor anti-Aro sentiments; they continue to view their presence with
suspicion, easily justifying their attitude by evoking memories of “what they
regard as the treacherous Aro activities in the age of the Atlantic trade of the
not-too distant past.”66 Nonetheless, there are still people across Igboland that are
convinced that Aro socio-economic ascendancy in the area, far from constituting a
disaster, was an unmitigated blessing. To this group, the Diaspora Aro have been
whole-heartedly accepted in their midst as their kith and kin, having lived in their
host communities for decades, if not centuries. This has often been portrayed by
statements such as: “Ndi Aru bu Bekee mbu anyi ma; ha weteere anyi ihie,”67 which
translates to “The Aro were the first Europeans/white men we knew; they brought
us civilization.”
The introduction of the slave trade marked a great turning point in the history
of Igboland. The Aro participation in the trade had some positive, though mainly
negative, repercussions for the Igbo people, who still evoke m e m o r i e s o f
its impact. Studying the Aro-Igbo aspect of the long history of the trade
and its repercussions advances a better understanding of the interplay of
international and local socio-economic dynamics in intra/inter-group relations.
For in Igboland, inter-group relations over these centuries were not overtly guided
by the alliance of coercion and capital.68 On the whole, the study analyzes the role
of the Aro in the slave trade in Igboland and the reason for the kind of memory it
evokes in contemporary social relations among groups in the area. Additionally,
it reveals how a particular understanding of the tensions and complexities of a
critical aspect of the Igbo present is embedded in the past.
65
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Abstract: The escalation of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria that peaked in
2010 has led to the emergence of many theories to explain its causes.
These theories focus on the socio-economic/ human needs, vengeance, the
Islamic theocratic state, and political dimensions. Beside the socio-economic
perspective, which harps on the pervasive poverty in the North, the theocratic
state analysis seems compelling not only because it fits into the sect’s mission
to Islamize Northern Nigeria and carve it out as a distinct political entity,
but it also resonates with political Islam, the driving ideology behind such
Jihadi groups as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with which the sect has been linked. While this
paper identifies with the political causes perspective in offering more cogent
explanation of the crisis, it goes beyond theory to underline empirical facts
that have shaped the group’s violence. It argues that in its current dimension,
the Boko Haram crisis is squarely an outburst of a sense of exclusion by
some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country. To save the
country from similar crises in the future, Nigerian leaders should devise clearlydefined periodic power-sharing formulae that can enable its component parts
to have a voice.
Key Words: Boko Haram, Political Islam, Global Islamic Crescent, Political
Militia, National Consensus.

Introduction
This paper analyzes the nature of the current terrorism in Nigeria by situating it
within the context of the country’s extant democratic milieu and political experience
rather than lumping it together, in Ankie Hoogvelt’s terms, with the broader
theme of the “current Islamist crescent.”1 It adopts the popular name Boko
Haram to identity the terror group that has waged an unrelenting campaign
of violence against Nigerians since 2009. Otherwise the official name of the
group is Jamatu’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad (People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad). This clarification removes
Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the New Political Economy of
Development (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001).
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certain ambiguities which have beclouded the sect and its activities and obviated a
clearer understanding of the objective of the current violence. Such ambiguity
invariably hindered to some extent the state’s ability to properly diagnose the
problem at the initial stage and respond appropriately. That failure on the part of
the state enabled the group to metamorphose into the lethal monster it has now
become.
Boko in Hausa language means book (education). Haram on the other hand
means sin. Since the education common to the people of Nigeria is the western
model, boko has come to generally mean, western education. Boko Haram therefore
means western education is a sin. This name was given to the Jamatu’atu Ahlis
Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad by the Nigerian media because of the general
assumption that the group’s philosophy seems to resist western education. The
group has however contested the misrepresentation. According to one of the sect’s
members, Mallam Sanni Umaru,
Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilization” is forbidden.
The difference is that while the first (Boko) gives the impression
that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West…
which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy
of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader. It
includes education but not determined by Western Education.2
Mallam Umaru’s exposition on the group has no doubt inspired the attempt
to explain the group’s emergence and philosophy within the clash of civilization
theoretical framework. Advanced by Samuel Huntington, the theory argues that in
the post-Cold War era, people’s cultural and religious identities will constitute the
primary source of conflicts in many countries of the world.3 Based on that theory,
Ezeani E. Onyebuchi and Chilaka F. Chigozie argue that the violent extremism
going on in Nigeria amidst the transformation of the country’s politics could be
understood as a clash of civilizations.4 Hence the driving force of Boko Haram is
religion, with Islam violently questioning Western values. This foundation resonates
with the global political Islam from which Islamist groups generally draw their
inspiration.
This paper goes beyond the general theory of Boko Haram’s religious origin.
Cited in Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and
Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria,” in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism
and Counter-Terrorism, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic
Publishers Limited, 2013), 204.
3
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While it acknowledges its religious posturing, the paper critically interrogates
the sect’s assumed religious background and contextualizes it within the general
political milieu in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria from where its violence
began and spread. In doing this, the paper attempts to draw attention to how
this phenomenon actually first arose and how it has grown to acquire the life it has
today. The paper emphasizes the sect’s violence, which has constituted a major
security challenge confronting contemporary Nigerian society. In this regard, it
considers the critical junctures, first, when the sect originally known in its
immediate environment as non-violent in its propagation of its Islamic messages
began to acquire arms; and second, the intersection at which it jettisoned its nonviolent posturing, even prior to the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, before
finally turning its rage against the larger Nigerian society.

Boko Haram’s Early History
According to Nnaemeka C. Okereke, initially, the Boko Haram sect had no
specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated
based on the perception of the local population.5 Therefore, either as Yusufuya
sect, Nigerian Taliban, Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji, Shabaab
Muslim Youth Movement, Boko Haram, or Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda’awatiwal
Jihad, a name of which the sect approves, the exact date which the sect manifested
on the Nigerian landscape remains largely a subject of speculation. While some
tendencies trace the origin to 1995, others argue that the group was founded
around 2001 or 2002. Similarly, the founder of the group is also contested. It
is either ascribed to one Lawan Abubakar, who left for further studies at the
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, or to an evangelical group formed by
Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, who reportedly felt
dissatisfied with Western values.6
Relevant to this analysis, however, is that Mustapha Modu Jon, known as
Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, was the leader of the group in 2009 when the Boko
Haram stand-off with security forces gained wider national attention. Under Yusuf,
the sect was said to have recruited its membership of mostly women and children,
school drop-outs and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates most of
who tore up their certificates.7 Like the origin, the sect’s propensity for violence
Nnaemeka C. Okereke, “Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko
Haram Crisis,” in Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu
and Ahmed A. Sokoto (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd, 2011).
6
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Haram Insurgency,” The Peace and Conflict Review 7, no.1 (2012), accessed December 26, 2013,
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7
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has also been a subject of controversy. Certain accounts cast Yusuf as someone
whose preaching tilted towards violence. This was premised on the fact that
he derived his inspiration from the works of a fourteenth century legal scholar,
Ibn Taymiyya, who preached Islamic fundamentalism, and was also considered a
“major theorist” for radical groups in the Middle East.8
There was also an account that Yusuf, a native of Girgir in the Jalasko local
government area of Yobe state, received Quranic education in the Chad and
Niger Republics and was imbued with radical instincts, which generated friction
between him and other moderate Islamic scholars such as the late Jafa Adam,
Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir.9 Remarkably, Yusuf was the son of Mallam
Yusuf, a clerk at the Maiduguri office of the Kaduna State Transport Authority,
who later abandoned his secular job to found an Islamiyya school where he taught
the recitation of the Qur’an to Almajiris (street children). Yusuf Jr., a secondary
school drop-out soon joined his father in his Quranic School, where his
profound oratorical skills were honed. According to Simon M. Reef, it was here
that Yusuf Jr. developed the effortless ability to convince people about the sincerity
of his cause; his charisma also began to manifest.10 He became so popular, grew in
influence, and effortlessly succeeded his father. Going by this version of Yusuf’s
background, that projects him as one imbued with radical instincts, and which
forced his relocation from Borno, where he grew up to Yobe his home state, he
could be perceived as one with trouble-making potentials. Indeed, although he was
said to have initially gone about his preaching peacefully, his views nonetheless
drew attention from other Islamic preachers who saw both his preaching and
interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to authority.11
On the other hand, despite the inspiration Yusuf drew from Ibn Taymiyya,
other accounts had him as someone who was opposed to any form of violence
and who insisted that it was against the teaching of Islam. He resisted some
of his followers’ relentless beliefs that “an Islamic state was realizable through
preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up
arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers.”12 Such a personality trait contrasts
significantly with that of Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau, the Kanuri
psychopath who “enjoys of killing anyone that God commands me to kill, the way
Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” accessed December 26, 2013 www.cfr.
org/nigeria/boko- haram/p25739.
9
Freedom C. Onuoha, “Countering the Financing of Boko Haram Extremism in Nigeria,” African
Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Extremism 2, no. 1 (December 2011), 94
10
Simon M. Reef, “Foi’s Neighbours Open Up on Sheriff,” People’s Daily, August 10-16, 2009, 6.
11
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12
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I enjoy killing chicken and rams.” The emphasis on the personality difference
between Yusuf and Shekau becomes useful for the purpose of ascertaining, as I
have noted elsewhere, whether the sect’s current level of radicalization is a function
of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the state, or
due to the accession of its leadership of Shekau.14 It is noteworthy that before the
death of Yusuf, the sect had already acquired arms and had also violently protested
the killing of seventeen of its members who were on a funeral procession.
13

Boko Haram, Political Islam and Militant Islamic Violence
The concept of “political Islam” has generally been adopted by many scholars
to identify the seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the
secular domain of politics - an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside
of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.15 Hence, for Ibrahim
Muazzam, in its contemporary forceful form, political Islam “is a modern
ideological construction and not the product of a historical continuity with an
essentialist Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of people. It is the result of a
protracted societal crisis of multi-dimensional proportions revealing an ongoing
dialectic between Muslims and their socio-economic political environment.”16
The rise of Islamist movements, Muazzam further notes, is thus, a result
and a symptom of a society in crisis - the outcome of a process of development
that has taken place in these countries, which includes rapid urbanization and
social mobilization that has exceeded the capacity of the system. He also perceives
that the activism of some of the Muslim groups as a function of the social, economic,
and political context found in the various societies.17 Hoogvelt blames the crisis
on colonialism and globalization, and argues that the contemporary Islamic revolt
is the consequence of millions of people who do not have any prospect of being
incorporated into the new global system. As she notes, “It is the failure of the
national evelopment strategies in the neocolonial period, coupled with the
recent episode of globalization that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent.”18
Hoogvelt further makes the point that Islamic resurgence is best understood
as a politics of identity in response to exclusion. In an attempt to remove the
13
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2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18020349.
14
Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
15
Charles Hirschkind, “What is Political Islam,” Middle East Research and Information Project,
accessed December 23, 2013, http://merip.org/mer/mer205/what-political-islam.
16
Ibrahim Muazzam, “Security Challenges in North Africa and the Maghreb,” African Strategic
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pejorative edge from “political Islam,” however, Charles Hirschkind argues that
despite the militant violence that has given practical meaning to the concept, it
is not all forms of contemporary Islamic activism that revolve around trying to
“capture the state.”19 He contends forcefully that
The vast majority of these movements involve preaching and
other da‘wa (missionary) activities, alms giving, providing medical
care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting what is
considered in the society to be public virtue through community action.20
The early history of the Boko Haram in Nigeria casts the group both in
Hirschkind’s idea of the political Islamic groups which try to promote public virtue
through community action and Hoogvelt’s Islamists who have raised the spectra
of the jihad.21 For instance, Yusuf’s refusal to yield to the pressure by some of his
followers to take up arms as a way of realizing an Islamic state aligns the Boko
Haram sect with Hirschkind’s characterization. Similarly, Sanusi Mohammed, a
journalist who had studied and had interacted with some leaders of the sect prior
to the outset of the crisis, insists the sect was “not founded as terrorist group as
erroneously believed in some quarters.”22 Even after Yusuf’s death, given its antigovernment posturing, it would have been uncharacteristic of the group to agree to
mediation by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was seen as an unofficial
envoy of the government. That meeting held on September 15, 2011 and aimed at
opening a channel of dialogue between the government and the terror group, and
had in attendance Yusuf’s father in-law, Babakura Fugu, a known gun dealer who
made his property at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri available to his son in-law
for his religious activities.23
Certain tendencies about the sect, however, project it as a jihadist group.
At its earliest periods, Yusuf leveled charges of corruption and failure to preach
pure Islam on the sheiks that appointed him leader after Lawan Abubakar’s
departure.24 Under Abubakar Shakau, the sect later declared its intention to
Islamize Nigeria and truncate the country’s democracy. One of the earliest names
Hirschkind.
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of the sect was the Taliban; the leadership of the group also trained in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which are well-known as the Taliban’s abode; and after the attack on
a police station in Kanamma, Yobe state, the sect briefly flew the Taliban black
flag as a gesture symbolizing commonality of cause.25 Some members claim to
have trained in Afghanistan. Very germane here is that the Soviet resistance,
from which the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria seemed to draw its inspiration, occurred
against the backdrop of the Soviet replacement of the traditional Islamic practices
and social conventions in Afghanistan. The call for a jihad in Afghanistan and its
day-to-day implementation were not initiated by Muslim states as such, but by
transnational Islamic religious networks. Thus, to the Boko Haram sect, which is
part of this network, a “defensive jihad,” according to the Sharia, obliged every
individual Muslim to participate.26
The sect leader, “Yusuf …embraced technology, [and] believed Western
education should be ‘mediated through Islamic scholarship’, such as rejecting
the theory of evolution and Western-style banking. He preached a doctrine of
withdrawal.”27 And in spite of the unheeded complaints of a group of fifty
Maiduguri-based Islamic clerics, who claimed to have warned and complained
to “the government and security agencies about the activities of Yusuf,” not until
the murder of Yusuf, his father in-law, Fungu, alleged, financier Foi, and members
of the sect at a funeral procession in Maiduguri, did the Boko Haram violence scale
up in the North-East.28
Noteworthy is that the government had made available the sum of a N100
million blood money to the sect for the loss of some of its leadership. While the
acceptance of the blood money from the government by the sect does not
conform to a true jihadist movement, Boko Haram’s current level of radicalization
could well be a function of the ascension of Shekau. Indeed not until late August,
2011, after it had expanded the scope of its violence outside of the North-East,
vis-à-vis the bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja, were there any
credible links between the sect and some al-Qaeda regional affiliate groups such as
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somali’s al- Shabaab.29 Furthermore,
the fractioning of the sect into two groups, with one focusing on local grievances,
namely, the ascendency of a Muslim to Nigeria’s presidency, and the other seeking
25
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alliance with external jihadi groups dedicated to imposing Islamist rule across
the world, raises doubt about the group’s genuine commitment to the global
Islamist agenda from the outset. Despite reference to the establishment of an
Islamic government, the revelation that the Boko Haram was out to end the 1914
amalgamation that brought together the Northern and Southern Protectorates to
form the country called Nigeria30 fits into the political feud theory that the Boko
Haram violence revolves around Northern angst against President Jonathan for
ignoring an informal power-rotation agreement that should have kept a Muslim
Northerner as president this time around.31

The Political Origin of Boko Haram Violence
A common notion about the Boko Haram sect is that it is a fundamentalist jihadist
movement bent on imposing the Sharia law on Nigeria. This perception is fostered
both by its perceived philosophical and perverse spiritual underpinnings, namely,
total abhorrence for Westernization and secularization. According to Joseph
Lengmang, this foundation drives the group’s activities, including its violence.32
The abhorrence of westernization and secularity is also perceived to have been
boosted by the reintroduction of Sharia in 1999 by the then governor of Zamfara
state, Ahmed Yerima Although the re-introduction of the Sharia in Zamfara turned
the abhorrenc of westernization and secularity ideology into a grassroots movement
in the North, despite the subsequent adoption of the Sharia by 12 northern states
widespread “disillusionment” accompanied the manner in which the Sharia was
implemented. That faulty implementation provided profound dissatisfaction,
which the Boko Haram sect tapped into to promote the idea that an Islamic state
would eliminate the inconsistencies.33
But while the sect’s emergence has generally also been attribute to the
ideology of hatred for westernization and secularity, the Boko Haram phenomenon
actually arose from a prevalent culture of political thuggery in Nigeria. By
this culture, political gladiators establish political militias which they use in the
fierce struggle for the capture and control of political power. These militia groups
exist across the regions and states of the country where they assume different
forms and perpetuate criminal political activities on behalf of their benefactors.
In the North, Borno and Yobe states had the Ecomog, Bauchi, Sara-Suka,
Gombe, Yan- Kallare, Taraba state, Banu-Isra’il, Adamawa, Yan-Shinko, Kano,
30
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Yan Gumurzu or Yan daba. In the South, the defunct “Bakasi Boys” operated in the
East and were particularly notorious during the administration of former governor
Chinwoke Mbadinuju in Anambra state.
There is also the Odua Youth Movement in the South-West, and the “NigerDelta Defense Force” in the Niger-Delta/South-South region. They are usually
drawn from jobless university graduates and street wanderers, criminals, common
thugs and in the North as abandoned Almajiri’s (street children). In most of the old
Eastern part of the country, most of the youths who constitute the army of militants
and kidnappers graduated from being political militia gangs who were recruited
for criminal political activities during elections and dumped by their benefactors
afterwards.
The culture of nurturing political militia gangs is however not a new
phenomenon in Nigeria. It dates back to the pre-independence era. From the
1950s, instances of political violence including the formation of political militias
in the course of the contest for political power had become increasingly evident.34
In the North, there were the Jammiyar Maukhatar, and the Positive Action as the
armed political gangs of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and Northern
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), political parties respectively. In the East
the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the Zikist Movement,
whereas the Action Group (AG) political party had the Awoists.35
However, an important distinction needs to be made among these political
militia groups both in terms of the eras and political geographies in which they
operated and in some instances still subsist. In the pre- independence era,
whereas both in the North and South, political militias were unknown to have
emerged from any religious origin, those currently in the North do. Currently
also whereas in the South those which drift into sundry criminal activities like
kidnapping and armed robbery do not link their cause to any known religious
ideology, their counterparts in the North do.
Although the Boko Haram insurgents currently espouses religious
ideological orientation, most of its foundation membership were essentially made
up of elements drawn from the army of political militias in some parts of the
North. The point of departure however is that hitherto, political militant gangs were
raised by political parties rather than individual politicians. The Boko Haram, as a
violent group specifically started off as Ecomog, a band of political thugs linked
34
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to the former governor of Bornu State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and some other politicians
in the state in the struggle for the control of Government House in Maiduguri,
aimed specifically at dislodging the then incumbent governor of the state, Mala
Kachallah. The conditions that bred the army of recruits for both the politicians
and the Boko Haram sect also clearly predate both Yusuf and Boko Haram. These
conditions include general adverse socio-economic conditions, which equally bred
an army of disillusioned citizenry and youths who questioned the existing socioeconomic and political system in Nigeria, and the Sharia fervor in the North, which
favors the imposition of the Islamic legal system as an alternative to the Western
system.
In Borno state, the former governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, was said to be
instrumental to the prominence of the sect. It was alleged that he was one of
their financiers and supporters until the alliance broke down.36 Despite Sheriff’s
persistent denial of any link with Boko Haram, Ali Konduga, an arrested member
of the sect, confessed to the agents of the Nigerian State during interrogation
that a certain politician from Borno State stepped in to sponsor Ecomog when the
relationship went sour with Ali Modu Sheriff.37 Then acting Minister of Defense,
Labaran Maku, was therefore right when he blames politicians from the North
East for the “insecurity [which] is not religious but the after-effect of violent local
politics.”38 Thus, the killing of government functionaries in Borno and Bauchi
States in the early stages of violence clearly links “the rise of Boko Haram in
Maiduguri and Bauchi … to politics.”39 Sheriff also views the Boko Haram
violence as political and not religious.40
Ustaz Buji Foi, the alleged financier of Yusuf, deserves further mention at this
juncture. Foi’s days as chairman of Kaga Local Government Council under the
Kachallah administration was ‘“unprecedented in the history of the area council”’
in terms of “transforming Benisheikh, the headquarters of the (Kaga) council
into a paradise of administrative transparency.” He was “noted for his sense of
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fairness.” At the expiration of his tenure as the
Kaga Area Council chairman, Foi was appointed the caretaker committee
chairman of the same area council. Described as a man of impeccable honesty,
and “one of the few voices in the wilderness crying against corruption by
politicians selected into public offices,”42 Sheriff appointed Foi as commissioner
for local government affairs. He was later redeployed to the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and his house according to his neighbors was always visited by politicians
including Governor Sheriff.43
Foi and his Boko Haram group had worked as part of the political militia
that helped Sheriff win his election. In addition to a commissionership slot in the
government, Sheriff was also effecting the full implementation of the Sharia as part
of the pre-election deal with the group. Sheriff’s reluctance to effect this latter
part of the deal obviously angered the Boko Haram sect and strained the group’s
relationship with him. Thus, at the beginning of the Sheriff’s second term in office,
Foi approached him with a proposal to resign his office, because according to Foi,
it was the only way he could make paradise.44
Sheriff preemptively dissolved his cabinet to forestall Foi going to town with
the news that he left the cabinet.45 The adoption of the Sharia in twelve northern
states,46 and Sheriff’s failure to adopt the Islamic legal system in Borno where
it was hoped could eliminate the inconsistencies observed in the implementation
of the Islamic legal system in other northern states, could have inspired Foi’s call for
Sheriff’s resignation after he walked away from Sheriff’s government. Situating
Foi’s grouse within another context is also necessary. Besides the issue of
corruption, as commissioner for religious affairs, Sheriff’s administration had
banned motorcyclists’ movement in Maiduguri after 7 p.m. His administration
also imposed a law that required motorcyclists to provide helmets for themselves
and their passengers as a way of protecting them against head injuries in the event of
accidents. This piece of legislation affected mostly the down-trodden and Almajiris,
most of whom were used as political militia during elections, thereafter abandoned,
flocking around the Islamic preachers who fed them daily with religious fantasies.
Ustaz Foi was known for his “sense of fairness.” On the surface, the motorcyclists’
reluctance to obey the helmet legislation may appear a protestation of their poor
material conditions. In reality, however at play was resistance politics against their
41
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abandonment in the post-polls period by the Boko Haram group whose members
worked as political militias as it was also against Sheriff’s refusal to adopt the
Sharia. The helmet legislation provided an ample opportunity for the Boko Haram
leadership to mobilize its members against the government.
Governor Sheriff later relished how he set up a security outfit, “Operation
Flush,” to deal with Yusuf and his crowd, which included Foi:
As a governor, I had to take charge and restore some measure of order
to my domain. I started creating laws. I first started by making a law
regulating motorcycles, because at night, you find over one thousand
motorcycles in the city. They would move from one end of the town
to the other with different kinds of weapons: cutlasses, swords, etc….
And because they don’t wear helmets, I insisted that they begin to do
so. I asked that their members be arrested and tried.47
Foi was killed in the aftermath of the crackdown on Yusuf’s followers. Before
his death however, the former commissioner had demanded to meet with governor
Sheriff, a request that was reportedly turned downed by the then governor.According
to Okereke, “there exist [sic] a school of thought that contend [sic] that the killing
of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Ustaz Buji Foi was orchestrated to deny Nigerians
true knowledge of the major sponsors and profiteers from the incident.”48 It was not
ascertained whether Yusuf’s father’s low-level education and a corresponding
poor material condition influenced his resignation of his secular job, as well
his son’s dropping out of school. But Yusuf, who had taken over from his father,
whose Quranic school was receiving wards from people within and outside of the
Maiduguri, became someone whose “popularity was phenomenal, making friends
easily, and some politicians who sought the truth identified with his movement
discreetly and assisted him tremendously.”49
Perhaps amidst his preaching which resonated anti-corruption messages and
disappointment with the western system of governance, past administrations
before Sheriff’s had become uncomfortable with Yusuf as his influence grew in the
state. Attempts to restrict him to certain sections of the state prompted his father inlaw, a known arms dealer who was also quite influential, to offer Yusuf the refuge
of his large compound in the Railways Quarters in Borno State. It was at this
location that Yusuf built “a movement that would ultimately unleash a phenomenal
crisis which has not been seen in the history of Borno state since the Maitatsine
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violence of 1983.” Why authorities refused to revoke Yusuf’s abode despite
security reports of the unwholesome activities going on there, is suggestive that
either Yusuf and his father in-law had become too powerful and untouchable by the
authorities, or that in certain critical quarters, the movement Yusuf had built was
of immense importance to the political actors holding the reins of government.
Noteworthy, however, about the man who would later lead a group that declared
Western civilization as forbidden, were some of the activities that went on in
his large Railways Quarters abode. It was reported that, “despite claims that Boko
Haram was against western education and its leader averse to western civilization,
a trip to one of Yusuf’s compounds outside of the Railways Quarters shows that he
ran a nursery school that was involved in teaching English and Maths…. Yusuf
had computers with internet services for communication.”51
When the security forces stormed Yusuf’s abodes, they also found a Toyota
Sienna SUV, among seven cars and many motorcycles, which belonged to sect
members who used them for commercial operations otherwise known as okada.52
The discovery therefore contradicts the sect’s posturing:
50

Available information indicates that the group emanated from
an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers
anything western as an aberration or completely unislamic.
The group viewed the western influence on Islamic society as
the basis of the religion’s weakness. Hence their declaration that
western education and indeed all western institution is infidel
and as such must be avoided by Muslims…. It was gathered that
most people sold their belongings to contribute to the coffers
of fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of
western influences and domination.53
Prior to his death, Yusuf’s abode usually gave the impression of big party
as the whole area of the Railway Quarters would be lined with exotic cars
owned by very powerful individuals who would arrive with tinted glasses that
shielded them from easy identification when visiting Yusuf.54 It is also not known
at what stage Yusuf began to use his large compound at the Railways Quarters as a
training ground for militant activities. It is ironic that the same Yusuf, who a f t e r
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the shooting of his members by the men of the Operation Flush boasted that “his
group would be prepared to confront all the security agencies in the State as well
as government,”55 was also the same man who earlier had been cast as resisting
Islamizing Nigeria by means of violence. It is therefore safe to speculate that
while Yusuf did not believe in using violence to propagate Islam, turning his
abode into a training ground for militant activities as well as the weapons found
with his followers, were all part of the instrumentality used in supporting
Sheriff in edging out Mala Kachallah, then the Governor of the Bornu State
Government House, with the understanding that Sheriff would introduce Sharia
in the state. Sheriff’s failure to implement that pre-electoral understanding thus set
his administration on a collision path with the sect. When Nigerian soldiers stormed
their Bama camp in Borno in 2013, they found items such as used condoms which
contrasted a Moslem preaching of a return to the Islam’s glorious days of great
piety56 – thus exposing the contradiction between what the sect preached and
what they practiced.
Undoubtedly, this questions their pious religious posturing. Each socioeconomic and political environment has its peculiar character that can easily be
exploited by criminal elements. In the Southern part of Nigeria, a predominantly
Christian area, religion is treated as a distinct sphere of life, and separated from
socio-economic and political issues. Hence in the old Eastern states, abandoned
disgruntled political militia men drift into militancy, oil pipeline vandalism,
and kidnapping to make a living. In the South-West, street extortion and money
hustling, otherwise known as Area Boyism hold sway.
However in the predominantly Moslem North, where the Boko Haram violence
occurs, criminal elements exploit the tradition of the Islamic religion ordering of
social relations among people, including legal, contractual institutions, social
and political institutions, and issues of economic propriety and practice57 to blame
western values for the mismanagement of the country’s resources. In addition, the
lack of Western education and high unemployment rate in the Northern region offer
such group “a seemingly bottomless reservoir from which to draw disgruntled
youth recruits.”58 With the thin line between Islamic religion and other spheres
of life, extremist groups like Boko Haram that appear fed up with failed promises
of politicians, would easily resort to seeking spiritual solutions to what is viewed as
Ibid.
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an insoluble problem. Furthermore, coupled with some segments of the Northern
Muslim population, allegedly unhappy with the compromise of state-level Sharia
co-existing side by side with a secular system, these groups increasingly become
radicalized and are more willing to periodically express themselves through
violence. Within these groups also are elements who share the view that Western
education is incapable of stimulating any meaningful development and prosperity
in the region; hence their quest for the imposition of the Sharia on the country. 60
59

Understanding the Boko Haram Violence
In the synopsis to an essay on the security challenge posed by the Boko Haram
violence, I have postulated that analyses that consider the political context of
the insurgency deserve particular attention, especially in relation to President
Jonathan’s contestation of the 2011 presidential election and the recently
concluded 2015 elections.61 Similarly, in another work, which focused on the
tendency by Nigerian ethnic groups to employ violence in the struggle to capture
central power, I stressed how forced co-habitation of the disparate pre-Nigerian
groups in a single political economy by British imperialism engendered a sociopolitical environment which predisposes these social forces to intense struggle for
power whose utility value is its guarantee of unfettered access to the public till.
The utility of violence in the struggle for political ascendency, was “evident in
the Hausa-Fulani hegemony of the 1960s through the late 1990s via the control of
the country’s military, the Yoruba presidency from 1999-2007 via the violence
that trailed the annulled June 12 1993 presidential election and the Ijaw presidency
via the Niger Delta militancy.”62
Jean Herskovits has rightly argued that while the original core of the group
remains active, Boko Haram has become a franchise for many criminal gangs who
have adopted the name to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them.63
Although the Boko Haram sect had formed prior to the emergence of the Jonathan
administration, the intensity which its violence assumed in the post-2011 general
elections period, led to the inevitable conclusion that the insurgency is not only
about fulfilling the pre-election threat by some Northerners of making the country
Lengmang, 101.
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ungovernable should Jonathan contest and win the election, but also geared towards
the North’s quest to reclaim power by 2015. In the period leading up to that
election, some political forces from the North bitterly challenged Jonathan’s moral
authority to vie for the country’s presidency on the premise that the North was yet
to do an eight-year term in the context of North-South zoning and power rotation
principles said to have been instituted by the then ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP).
Amidst the rancor surrounding his ascension to power in 2010 following
his predecessor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s death, as well as the opposition that
mounted against his vying for the 2011 presidential polls, Jonathan had come up
with an appeasement gesture towards the North- West region of Nigeria from
where Yar’Adua hailed, namely, the choice of Namadi Sambo, the governor of
North-West state of Kaduna, first as his deputy, and second as his running mate
in the 2011 elections. Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa, the Chief Whip of the House
of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the NorthEast caucus in the House made a statement very significant in this analysis.
According to him, “We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has
been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is
responsible for insecurity in North-East.”64 Thus, “in the general context of
Northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko Haram may be conceived of
as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense
of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group.”65
In attempting to establish a causality between the current season of
violence in Nigeria and intense contestation for federal power that marked
Jonathan/Ijaw ascendency since 2010, Nigeria’s Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka,
had played down the perspective that links the mayhem to economic factors such
as unemployment, mismanagement, misplaced priorities, social marginalization,
and massive corruption. According to him, “to limit oneself to these factors alone,
is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless
caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in
the face and give it its proper name – and response.”66
Former Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, conceptualizes
the Nigerian army from July 1966 to May 1999 as an Hausa- Fulani ethnic militia in
Ahmed Mohammed, “Nigeria: North-East Suffers Marginalization,” Sunday Trust, February 12,
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the unclassical sense of the term (ethnic militia) in that although the Nigerian army
is composed of representatives of many of the nationalities of Nigeria, it was only
the Northern Hausa-Fulani military representatives who had a sense of collective
interests to advance and protect. Hence, the first intervention by a formal ethnic
militia in Nigeria’s politics was in July 1966 when the counter-coup took place
and the series of coups since July 1966 were designed by the North to protect
the North.67 Following the end of the ideological Cold War between the West and
East, military rule generally became an aberration globally. For Nigeria, perhaps
the most important effect of that development was that the Nigerian army could
no longer be appropriated as an ethnic militia by any ethnic group to topple an
elected government - a tendency that had existed among the Hausa-Fulani ethnic
group for most the country’s political history until 1999. Indeed very significantly,
in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sagir
Mohammed, had formed a northern militia, the Arewa People’s Congress (APC)
to “protect and safeguard the interest of the North wherever it is.”68 And outside
of the North, the APC is perceived by some as founded for “the maintenance
of [Northern] hegemonic control in national politics.”69 More so, “unlike the
other ethnic militias who seek change, the Arewa People’s Congress seeks the
maintenance of the status quo, irrespective of its crises of marginalization.”70
Bingham Powell Jr. conceives of democracy as a strategy of government
based on the gamble that the potential for participation and responsiveness that it
offers will make possible a resolution of conflict without violence. Where largescale violence or coercion does however appear, he contends, democracy is
fundamentally threatened. Not only does the influence of coercion on decisionmaking weaken the importance of democratic resources, but failure of government
to maintain order and security leads citizens to look more positively on authoritarian
alternatives.71
Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, organized political violence has
three very general objectives: to change the bargaining rules of the democratic
game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to

67
Ajibola B. Akinyemi, “Ethnic Militia and the National Question in Nigeria,” in Urban Violence,
Ethnic Militia and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, ed. Tunde Babatunde
(Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2003), 21.
68
Kalu N. Obasi, Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria (Abuja: Third
Millennium Ltd, 2002), 43.
69
Ibid.
70
Akinyemi.
71
Bingham Powell Jr. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982), 154.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

66 | Beyond Political Islam
intimidate the opposition while mobilizing.72 “And the association between rioting
and deaths by violence was notably higher in ethnically fractionalized countries.”73
There is a direct correlation among the following variables: the rejection of
military intervention in politics, the North’s marginal occupation of the Nigerian
presidency since the commencement of democratic governance in the country in
1999, the emergence and transformation of the Boko Haram as an ethnic militia
in the context of an appropriated machinery, and the current virulent violence
in Nigeria, which has resulted in thousands of deaths. The huge resources
committed to the counter-insurgency war in Nigeria could have been deployed to
tackling many of Nigeria’s infrastructure problems. And sustained violence and
deaths have forced the Nigerian citizenry to begin to question whether the civilian
(democratic) framework is capable of being secure. The Boko Haram violence in
Nigeria obviously poses a real threat to the country’s young democracy. In
the context of an ethnically fractionalized country, the marginal occupation of
the Nigeria’s presidency by the Northern power elite since 1999 also resonates
with the logic of “highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated
individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes are determined to bring society
to its knees and under a specific fundamentalist strain.”74 Equally, the rise of the
counter-terrorism outfit, the Civilian “Joint Task Force” (JTF), made up of the
Borno youths in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the hotbed of the Boko
Harm insurgency, evinces the conclusion that deadly violence is not, systematically
and crossnationally, a product of patterns of citizen involvement and support, but
of the strategic efforts of small groups of political elites. The Northern commoner
who continually grapples with the factors of basic needs such as food, shelter,
and housing is more concerned with the dilapidating effect of the insurgency on
his daily life than the elite who worry about political power. This elite responds
rather directly to the strains and limitations of ethnicity and lower modernization,
to checks of constitutional structure, and to the policies of political opponents.75
Are there, therefore, forces sworn to bringing back the military as Soyinka has
postulated? The crux of the problem, indeed, perhaps, as Africa’s foremost political
economist, the late Claude Ake, rightly noted, is the over-politicization of social life:
“[W]e are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that
we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political
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power.” The late former National Security Adviser, General Patrick Oweye Azazi,
had declared that the Boko Haram violence was all about wrangling over power
rotation. Azizi died shortly afterwards in a crash in a military helicopter. In his
response to a private letter made public by former President Olusegun Obasanjo,
President Goodluck Jonathan was also of the view that,
76

At the heart of all the current troubles in our party and the larger
polity is the unbridled jostling and positioning for personal or group
advantage ahead of the 2015 general elections. The “bitterness, anger,
mistrust, fear and deep suspicion” you wrote
about all flow from this singular factor.77
Reference needs to be made to the attempts to explain the violence within
the social/human needs theoretical framework, which going by the foregoing
analysis has already encountered formidable difficulties. Indeed the then ruling
People’s Democratic Party, PDP, had dismissed Boko Haram as a not a product
of poverty or misrule, but a local terror group.78 Apart from among other
prominent northerners like the former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor79
and the governor of Niger state, Aliyu Babangida,80 who link the Boko Haram
violence to poverty, strong voices in the North have also faulted the social/human
needs perspective. Former senate president, David Mark, argues that poverty and
unemployment no longer offer a cogent explanation for the insurgency as these
adverse socio-economic conditions are not exclusive to the North.81 The Catholic
Bishop of Sokoto Dioceses, Mathew Hassan Kukah, also adds quite an illuminating
angle to the debate. According to the cleric,
the Bureau of Statistics had released a report that Sokoto State
was the poorest state in Nigeria. I wasn’t prepared to join the
debate, but if Sokoto is the poorest state in Nigeria and if Boko
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Haram is driven by poverty, shouldn’t we (Sokoto) be the most
violent state in Nigeria? How is it that we are still the most
peaceful? What this does is that it explodes the myth and perhaps
we might have founded our analysis on a wrong premise. I don’t
think you can scientifically correlate violence with poverty.82
Indeed hordes of beggars who line Katsina streets reflect the poverty in that
North-Western state, yet it has neither bred nor harbored such a violent group.83
Despite the broadening of its contacts with other Islamist groups such as alQaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which warranted the designation with its splinter
group, Ansaru, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, the
perspective which views the political militia strain of the Boko Haram sect as
espousing a strong local concern intricately woven around the country’s politics
resonates very strongly. Serious consideration needs also be accorded to the
impracticability of imposing the Sharia on a heterogeneously complex political
community such as Nigeria. The core of the Boko Haram committed to Islamizing
Nigeria remains a fringe group, which not only antagonizes mainstream Northern
Muslims, but also are yet to evolve a broad coalition that will include mainstream
Northern Muslims and their elite corps. The author has argued elsewhere that
whereas the Mujahedeen are focused on Islam’s days of glory or great piety,
which to them assures the true believer of spiritual salvation and an eternally
joyful existence in the world beyond, the average Nigerian Muslim political elite
is most likely uninterested in the core Boko Haram’s version of Islam, and may,
in the words of M. Mozayyan, be more interested in a future that guarantees
independent thought, social liberty, modernity, and economic remuneration in a
world– progressive Islam.84
The transformation of the violence from a Bornu affair to a national affair
fits into the characterization of the group as “a local terror group” by the PDP. Thus
between June and August, 2011 when it struck at the police headquarters and the
United Nations building both in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital and arguably safest city,
the Boko Haram sect had transformed from a violent group whose campaign was
initially restricted to the North East part of the country to a more formidable force.
It had graduated from a hitherto presumably bunch of rag-tag inconsequential
miscreants that could be summarily dealt with to a virulent violent organization
capable of issuing and making good its threat.
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The attack on the police headquarters was not only a cynical response to the
boast by then inspector-general of police, Hafiz Ringim, that he would crush the
group in the aftermath of its attempted attack of the headquarters in Maiduguri,
the capital of the North East state of Borno, it was also for “the humiliating
treatment meted out to our members by security agencies in various parts of the
country.”85 The United Nations building bombing clearly, therefore, supports the
PDP position that “some people are out to perpetrate acts of terrorism in Nigeria to
create a semblance of insecurity.”86
In an interview titled, “Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty,” Kukah
raised a very pertinent question:
Can we explain why this Boko Haram is dominant in Maiduguri, Yobe
and not in Sokoto or Kebbi? … If this was about religion, and Muslims
are trying to expand the frontiers of Islam, which kind of a stupid
man will be fighting inside his own house and hope to conquer other
people?87
At the immediate domestic level, it is obvious the group is at war with
those that armed and used them to defeat opponents in the political struggle and
later abandoned them, and which explains the initial killing of politicians in Borno
and Bauchi. While that local score might not have been settled, as the violence
attracted national response from the federal center, some highly placed and highly
disgruntled persons who lost out in the power stake began to appropriate the
group for violence in the struggle for central power. This explains why while the
sect makes attempts to penetrate Abuja, its campaign in the North-East persists.
The factionalization of the group soon after Yusuf’s death, apart from providing
explanation for the group’s current level of radicalization, also could prove that
while the original group represented by the murdered Yusuf’s father in-law, Fugu,
remained the core commitment to the sect’s initial ideals, the faction which actually
killed him was the political armed gang determined to protest Jonathan’s vying of
the 2011 presidential polls and importantly, his contesting the presidency again in
2015.
The violence however appears to pay off. While central power might have
moved out of the North, the Nigerian state under the Jonathan presidency continued
to make huge concessions to that part of Nigeria which perhaps would not have
been the case but for the insurgency; while the North-East in the meantime may
85
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not have yet occupied central power as the North-West, North-Central, SouthWest and now South-South, certain socio-economic and political measures have
been taken to address its crisis of marginalization than had previously been the
case. On the socio-economic sphere, the government created a N100 billion Green
Belt de-desertification project for some frontline states in the North. No such
special initiative has been designed specifically for the South-East, which is being
ravaged by gully erosion but has not taken up arms against the state despite its
obvious marginalization from the country’s topmost political office. There is also
the Almajiri education program initiated by the federal government for the entire
northern region. For the North-East region specifically, a N2 billion special
intervention program was ear-marked in the 2014 annual budget for the states of
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which have been devastated by insurgency and were
placed under a state of emergency at some points in time.
In the political sphere, as the military crackdown on the insurgents persists,
unlike the previous state of emergencies in the country, which were in 1964 and
2003, civil political structures remained in the areas where it had been declared.
The chairmanship of the ruling PDP appears to have been conceded to persons
from the area as a way of giving the region a sense of inclusiveness.
Conclusion
This paper focused on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria beyond the general theme
of the current global Islamic violence. While acknowledging Islamist violence as a
factor, it however places much premium on the local contexts of the violence and
argues that the local political issues, more than any other considerations, offer more
cogent explanation of the problem. The paper notes the religious origin of the sect,
which later transformed into a militia group for politicians, a tendency that dates
back to pre- independent Nigeria. From a local Borno affair, the group became a
ready tool appropriated by some elements of national politicians struggling for the
control of central power. These elements were specifically dissatisfied with the
return of central power to the South following the death of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua,
which denied the North the opportunity to be in power for many years. Jonathan’s
initially speculated interest in contesting the 2015 presidential elections rallied
these forces together and pitted them against his government. Although initially
the violence was perceived as a general Northern protestation of its loss of central
power, it however later became clearly a North-East tool for bargaining for political
ascendency. However, while the concern with the local political issues within the
North-East area persists, increasing state clamp down on the sect eventually drove
it into seeking alliance with international terror networks.
The Nigerian state has adopted some counter-terrorist measures to stem
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the violence. Apart from the military option, some socio-economic measures
have also been adopted. However, no visible political concessions have been made,
especially at the national level where the political disagreement actually raised the
scepter of the violence. There is, therefore, the need for a national consensus for a
viable power-sharing arrangement among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups in order
to give each component
a sense of belonging in the country’s power equation. The arrangement
should come in the form of a constitutional legislation that provides for the
rotation of power among the component parts in a pre-agreed formula.
Indeed, democracy as a government of the people for the people and by
the people should be adapted within the reality of Nigeria’s multi- ethnicity to
ensure that no group is made to feel left out of the country’s political power.
Perspectives which suggest that it matters less where the political leadership
at the national, state, or local government levels emanate from tend to ignore
the reality that although no particular ethnic group in Nigeria can claim exclusive
monopolization of pillaging the commonwealth at any point in time, politics in
Africa still remains privatized by the continent’s leaders. Indeed, according former
Senegalese leader, Leopold Senghor, politics in Africa is not the art of governing
the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations, but
that of the politician’s politics, the struggle of clans, the tendencies to place well
one’s self, one’s relations and one’s clients in the cursus honorum; that is the race
for preferments.88 Ensuring, therefore, that every part of the country shall occupy
the highest political position in the country in a pre- determined and predictable
arrangement will bring stability and peace to Nigeria. President Jonathan for
instance hails from a small community in Bayelsa, if not the smallest state in
Nigeria. He is of Ijaw ethnic group, a minority ethnic group in Nigeria. His
ascendency, therefore, proves that every part of the country has a “best” candidate
that can be presented for Nigeria’s leadership.
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Adebajo, Adekeye, ed. Africa’s Peacemakers: Nobel
Laureates of African Descent. Cape Town: Zed Books, 2014,
iii + 336 pp.
In fifteen chapters, Africa’s Peacemakers: Nobel Laureates of African Descent
describes the lives, careers, and Nobel significance of the thirteen Africans and
people of African descent who have won the Nobel Peace Prize. This unique and
creative volume features essays by luminaries in several fields, such as Adekeye
Adebajo and Ali Mazrui (introduction), Pearl T. Robinson, James O.C. Noah, and
Lee A. Daniels, Chris Saunders, Maureen Isaacson, Elleke Boehmer, and Gregory
F. Houston, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Morad Abou-Sabe , Janice Golding and
Gwendolyn Mikell, and Adekeye Adebajo and Rosaline Daniel. This author list is
comprised of researchers, colleagues of laureates, and other leaders in their fields.
Laureates are grouped into sections based upon nationality. The introductory
chapters tie Barack Obama to the legacy of other Peace Prize winners.
Adebajo and his authors strive to discuss Africa’s relationship with the
wider world through the lens of the lives profiled here. They discuss the laureates’
formation through historical forces and interpret each person’s role in further
directing future trends. Additionally, each author pays attention to the Peace
Prize’s ramifications related to relations between recipients’ countries and the
larger world, particularly with Western powers. The themes of each article vary,
with some placing more emphasis on pre-Nobel careers and others on the Peace
Prize’s effects on future work or giving a more general overview of laureates’
lives. This approach makes for a varied and diverse work.
Within their introductory chapters, Adebajo and Mazrui discuss the long
and strong connections between American civil rights and African liberation
movements, marking early the connection between anti- apartheid groups in
particular and Americans who drew inspiration from them. This relationship forms
the basis for the work’s initial chapters, honoring the three Americans and four
South Africans who have won the Peace Prize. Early on, Adebajo identifies the
wide range of life experiences and struggles that each laureate boasts. Importantly,
he also comments on the prevalent view of the Nobel Peace Prize as an endorsement
by Western powers, noting that recipients may find differing views amongst their
own countries’ citizens than they do from the non-African world at large.
Authors of subsequent chapters elaborate on this theme.
In addition to making connections between groups of laureates, Adebajo
also points out the commonalities between individuals, noting, for instance the
relationships between Ralph Bunche and Martin Luther King, Jr., who marched
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together during civil rights protests in the 1950s and 1960s, and Albert Luthuli
and Nelson Mandela, who worked together during those same decades. These
help to create a thread between some of the laureates and support another central
argument, that the Peace Prize committee has been keenly interested in issues
of racial reconciliation. It also helps to draw out the differences between other
recipients, such as Mohamed ElBaradei or Kofi Annan, who have worked in
different spheres.Additionally, the authors point out this study’s limitations in
assessing each laureate’s accomplishments in depth and espouse a commitment to
critical views that eschew hagiography.
Mazrui’s chapter discusses the importance of the Gandhian tradition in Peace
Prize awards and also features an extended discussion on African and diasporic
identity. Mazrui makes a distinction between laureates who are African by birth
and those who become African by adoption and notes that individual views of
and relationships with the continent vary amongst the highlighted Peace Prize
recipients. This is an important point as well, as the laureates themselves seem to
view their own relationships to the continent in vastly differing terms. In chapters
on the three Americans, the authors each spend time discussing tendencies toward
hawkishness versus peace-mongering in their subjects. Given Obama’s fairly recent
reception of the Peace Prize, this is a noteworthy conversation. This long historical
trajectory also, of course, lends itself to a variance in the essays’ examination of
lives fully lived and the one which continues to unfold. While it may be early to
accurately and completely assess Obama’s legacy, the authors have attempted to
add historical context to their discussion. Writing about the four South Africans who
have become Nobel laureates, the authors emphasized biography and relationships
to the larger liberation movement when discussing Luthuli, Tutu, and Mandela. De
Klerk, as the continent’s only white recipient and arguably its most controversial
receives a treatment that examines both his oft-peaceful rhetoric and relationship
with his own National Party as well as a discussion of the Third Force and other
covert operations of violence in his post-Nobel presidency.
Boutros-Ghali provides the most personal reminiscence in the book, with
his writing on Sadat contrasting greatly with Abou-Sabe’s on ElBaradei. These
two figures are far less linked than the Americans and South Africans in terms of
commonalities. Additionally, as the only two laureates who are their countries’ sole
representatives, Kofi Annan and Wangari Maathai combine into a section, with
much discussion of their strong Western ties and relationships to wealthy nations.
Finally, the last section discusses gender and class in the contrasting lives of Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee. Adebajo pays careful attention to critiques
of Sirleaf, including her arguable tendencies toward nepotism and corruption. As
in the case of Obama, it is more difficult to assess the legacies of these last two
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laureates given the fact that their careers remain far from incomplete.
This work does not include a concluding section, which is the only thing it
seems to lack. Overall, each author makes important connections between their
own laureate, other Peace Prize recipients, and the wider world. The lively and
engaging essays present a variety of perspectives and a plurality of different lenses
for examining their subjects. This makes each chapter very unique in both its scope,
tone, and contribution. Africa’s Peacemakers could likely be read as a whole or as
a contribution to work on any of the individuals discussed within.
Myra Ann Houser
Assistant Professor of History
Ouachita Baptist University
Arkadelphia, AR

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

76 | Book Reviews

Arsan, Andrew. Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese
Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014, xviii + 341 pp.
This important study of a modern and commercially-oriented diaspora beginning
in the late nineteenth century consists of eight chapters divided into three parts:
“Roots and Routes,” “Words and Laws,” and “Days, Thoughts and Things.”
“Roots and Routes” provides the eastern Mediterranean background to the
migration of Lebanese, a topic which has not been detailed extensively in previous
works on this diaspora community in Africa. It also provides the push and pull
factors that have motivated their migrations. For example, except for scholars and
other experts in the history of the region, the centrality of the silk industry to
the homeland areas of the migrants, and the effects of its decline is an important
factor that has contributed to this migration. Also of note are the events that led
many to settle in Afrique Occidentale Francaise or AOF, as France’s West African
possessions came to be known in the early twentieth century. The author looks at
the French responses to the Lebanese in AOF, also presenting the importance of the
Lebanese Mandate status following World War I and the quasi-protected status of
the Maronite Christian population to the free migration of the Lebanese throughout
the French colonies. Part Three, “Days, Thoughts and Things,” considers the daily
lives of the migrants (Chapter 6) and attempts to look at their political lives--both
in AOF and in the Lebanese homeland (Chapter 7).
Andrew Arsan, is a Lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of
Cambridge, and this, it would seem, makes Africa, despite the title of the work,
peripheral to his study. Arsan’s research concentrates on the first half of the
twentieth century, though parts of the introduction and the last chapter, termed
“Coda: The Making of Postcolonial Selves” give significant details about the
current situation of the Lebanese in the former AOF. Arsan bases his work entirely
on archival and published primary sources and a rich bibliography of secondary
sources. A note at the beginning of the study, “Of Names and Words” (xvii-xviii),
presents the thorny issues of transliteration and nomenclature for these residents in
French West Africa” on the margins of whiteness” (xvii).
The author presents his goals in the study as “reconstructing the social,
economic and political lives” of the migrants in order to better understand diasporic
experience and to “examine the fraught responses this unsettling presence [of the
Lebanese] prompted in French functionaries”(2). He
succeeds quite well in the second of his goals, with an in-depth examination
of the conclusions and misunderstandings of this group exemplified in various
colonial archive reports and contemporary newspaper articles in France,
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Lebanon, and West Africa. He also introduces much information on the roles
of the non-functionary French merchants in their frequently successful attempts
to direct colonial government responses to the Eastern Mediterranean migrant
community. As to the first goal, he has certainly attempted to flesh out the lives
of the migrants, dealing more extensively than previous studies on confessional
separations, specific village origins, and class differentials among the migrants.
The study concentrates throughout on the role of their places of origin in the
lives of these migrants, giving telling details in the last chapter on how their
lives in AOF brought change and wealth through large remittances back to the
homeland. But the study is curiously lacking in African content, because it is
curiously lacking in a consideration of the African peoples among whom these
migrants settled.
The index is quite brief (331-341) for such a richly detailed work. The
end notes (257-304) are detailed, for the most part, giving source citations only
and very little parenthetical rumination. The book definitely needs a glossary of
terms, particularly for the numerous non-English terms that are used frequently.
The bibliography is full (305-330), giving credit to the depth of research in
secondary and archival sources pursued by the author.
Throughout the work, however, I saw many instances where authorcollected oral sources would have added much to the familial details of this
diaspora. These are details that could have presented more on Afro- Lebanese
relations in everyday life, for instance, as well as highlighted the roles of
women. The author recognizes the lack of oral sources by stating this would
have “required another work, quite different to that I have undertaken” (2).
However, without considering the African people among whom these Eastern
Mediterranean migrants settled, how well can one fully discuss and understand
this diaspora in AOF? Though the author tries mightily to present the important
roles of Lebano-Syrian women in this diaspora, they still seem to be tropes,
rather than fully fleshed out actors. This, again, is due to the reliance on archival
and published sources.
Kathryn Green
Associate Professor of History
Mississippi Valley State University
Itta Bena, MS
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Boucher, Claude (Chisale). When Animals Sing and Spirits
Dance Gule Wamkulu: The Great Dance of the Chewa People
of Malawi. Mtakataka: Kungoni Centre of Culture and Art,
2012. xxviii + 276 pp.
Claude Boucher’s When Animals Sing and Spirits Dance Gule Wamkulu:
The Great Dance of the Chewa People of Malawi, with additional text from
Gary J. Morgan, Director of Museum Studies at Michigan State University,
and photographs by Arjen van de Merwe, offers a refreshing, insightful, and
brilliant interlink between what could be regarded as artistic compendium and
the fundamental spiritual cultural heritage of an African community, the Chewa
people of Malawi, in the dynamic context of everyday paradigms of holistic
life experiences. Through a drama-laced strategy, the book masterfully employs
symbolic characters depicted in masks and woven structures in an analytical
syringe of songs and dances to “play out” the realities of cultural philosophical
values and communal expectations of the Chewa people.
The crux of the book is revealed in two major sections. The first is the
introduction written by Gary Morgan. Here the reader is exposed to the historical
background of Malawi in general, the historical origin of gule wamkulu, and the
religion of the Chewa people. It also introduces the reader to the role, as well as
the form of gule wamkulu characters. The history of the origin of the symbolic
and ritual evolution and the eventual transition of the gule wamkulu characters are
also extensively discussed. With the introduction, the reader is prepared for the
subsequent intriguing and illuminating details to follow in the main section of the
book.
The second presents the kernel of the book in seven major themes as
“dramatized” through the performances of the gule wamkulu dancers. The themes
vividly capture the Chewa people’s worldview on moral codes. The holistic nature
of the themes is compelling. They strategically cover the existential instructions for
the citizens of the community, such as history and politics; community, authority and
ancestors; sexuality, fertility and marriage; childbirth and parenthood; health, food
and death; witchcraft and medicines; and personal attributes. The author brilliantly
portrays the interpretations and dramatic uses of these themes in ways that vividly
represent the authentic voices of the local people that may be impossible to achieve
in any other format. Perhaps more importantly, the Chewa people’s heritage of the
spiritual linkage to the ancestral world, in which the ancestors continue to impact
their living descendants as agents of societal moral standard, is substantially
highlighted. This without any doubt constitutes a significant representation of
the fundamental religious worldview of Africans on the circular nature of human
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existence and the “never ending” reciprocal obligations and privileges between the
living and the living dead, i.e. the earthly and the spiritual domains.
I find the intellectual and communicative strengths of this book enormous. It
is comprehensively researched and the author admirably subsumes his subjective
considerations of the themes discussed and allows the voices of the Chewa
people to be heard in their “undiluted” forms. The colorful illustration employed
throughout the book definitely enhances the reader’s imaginative and empirical
understanding. The images are compelling and make the reading of the book
engaging and less cumbersome. Also, both the mask name and the theme indexes
at the end of the book provide the much-needed information on the locations of
prominent words and ideas. In addition, the glossary of Chichewa terms and the
interpretations of the songs in Chichewa and English afford the reader, who may
not speak the Chichewa language, the basic understanding of the contents.
Surprisingly, with the author having a background as a Catholic priest, I did
not find an interfaith discourse that I believe would have positively linked the
moral codes of instructions of the Chewa thematic worldviews with the Christian
(Catholic) moral expectations in the inculturalization spirit of Vatican II. This I
believe would have raised the profile of the book as a doctrinal literature in the
promotion of African Christianity (perhaps I was looking for too much) given
the focus, objectives, and scope of the book. Notwithstanding this critique, the
book presents a formidable resource as a “hypothesis” ready for further scholarly
research for those interested in the rich African spiritual heritage in the context
of existential humanity. In this regard, the book attests to the 2005 UNESCO
description of gule wamkulu as “a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage
of humanity.” On the whole, Boucher deserves to be applauded for his scholarly
endeavor in writing this book.
Ibigbolade Aderibigbe
Associate Professor of Religion and African Studies
University of Georgia,
Athens, GA
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Carrier, Neil and Gernot Klantschnig. Africa and the War
on Drugs. London: Zed Books, 2012, i + 176 pp.
Neil Carrier and Gernot Klantschnig appraise Africa’s place in the global drug
trade. Their book comes at a time when numerous publications call attention to the
dangers of drug trafficking in Africa and its challenge to democratic and corruptfree governance, as well as sustained economic development. These works argue
that drug cartels have become interwoven with government institutions and engage
in sustained violence against rivals and law enforcement. They connect growing
terrorism in Africa to drug trafficking, arguing that the destabilization of the
continent by drug-related activities affects investment and poses a threat to longterm economic development in Africa. Africa and the War on Drugs challenges
these prevalent portrayals of Africa as being in jeopardy due to its new position as
a transshipment port for Europe-bound drugs. The authors question contemporary
Western views that treat drug use as a recent phenomenon in Africa and depict the
drug trade as detrimental to Africa’s economic development. They also criticize
Western approaches to drug control. Their categorization of drugs go beyond hard
substances such as heroin, cocaine, and cannabis to stimulants like kola nuts,
coffee, khat, tobacco, and alcohol.
The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter traces the history of
drug cultivation and use in Africa, and focuses on drugs – khat, cannabis - that have
been historically present in the continent. Chapter two assesses the link between
drugs and development in Africa, while chapter three examines the continent’s
emerging role as a drug entrepot, arguing that it had a long history of involvement
in the international drug trade. The final chapter criticizes current drug policies that
are propagated by international agencies and offers alternative approaches to the
fight against illicit drugs in Africa.
Carrier and Klantschnig argue that evidence of drug production in Africa
dates back to twelfth century Kenya, where El-Ghafeky, a Spanish doctor, recorded
the use of kola. Archaeological evidence and travelers’ accounts also show that
cannabis and khat existed in Ethiopia as early as the fifteenth century. However,
these drugs served social, cultural, and practical purposes, such as improving
stamina and alertness. In the West, they functioned more recreationally.
Following the rigorous policing of traditional drug-smuggling routes in the
1970s and 1980s, drug traders turned to Africa as an alternative course.
In the process, substances like heroin and cocaine became diverted to local
markets, leading to increased drug problems. As a result, the United Nations
embarked on a “drug war” in Africa, arguing that drugs posed a challenge to the
continent’s development. The UN also claimed that African states could descend
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to the status of narco-states, territories that are overrun completely by drug cartels,
devoid of any law enforcement. Carrier and Klantschnig, however, argue that
Africa held a substitutable place in the drug trade, dependent on the policing of
routes. The continent’s drug trafficking operated in a small-scale, profit-oriented,
and temporary structure that differed from the cartels and mafias portrayed in
official discourses. The continent did not count as a major consumer or producer of
heroin and cocaine, a fact that invalidated any fear of African nations’ degeneration
into narco-states.
Far from causing underdevelopment, the authors assert that the cultivation
of substances, such as the illegal cannabis and quasi-legal khat, offered revenue
to many farmers and states like Malawi, Swaziland, Somalia, and Mozambique.
Development problems arose instead from the repressive and prohibitive policies
enforced in Africa by international anti-drug agencies. These strategies concentrated
on strengthening weak African states in their enforcement of suppressive drug
laws, to the detriment of research-based, socio-economic, and health approaches
to drug control. The funds provided by these organizations, according to the
authors, strengthened corruption, state brutality, and human rights violations by
African governments. They conclude that Western funders dissociate Africa’s drug
problems from the global drug market, especially because of the high demand of
these substances abroad.
Carrier and Klantschnig dedicate a part of their book to the effects of drug
consumption in Africa – unemployment, HIV/AIDS, low productivity, drug
abuse by gangs and rebel groups, state destabilization by cartels – and provide
detailed examples of the impact of drugs on other societies, such as Afghanistan
and Colombia, where they pose grave challenges. However, they conclude that
drug consumption in Africa poses no threat to the continent’s development. One
wonders about their definition of development. Unless they view it as separate
from economic and social issues, their conclusion that drug use stands apart from
Africa’s development is contradictory to the very background that they provide on
the effects of drugs. Their statement that, “it must be emphasized that a detrimental
effect of drugs and development in Africa has nowhere been demonstrated through
sound research,” despite their examples of “real dangers and potential dangers” of
drug consumption in the continent, is even more disconcerting (56-57).
Though the authors make a strong argument regarding Western exaggerations
about the linkage of drugs to Africa’s growth, they underplay the real and potential
impact of drugs on the continent as well as the increasing complicity of political
actors in the drug trade. They gloss over the fact that drug habits in the continent
have since shifted. They scarcely acknowledge that youths in Africa employ
drugs recreationally as much as their counterparts in the rest of the world. In an
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effort to support their argument that drug production in Africa offers revenue to
African states, the authors either ignore or downplay the long-term effects that the
proliferation of illegal drugs would cause in African economies. Illicit drugs have
been connected to violence, lawlessness, and terrorism in Africa and elsewhere. Its
tolerance in Africa, as recommended by Carrier and Klantschnig, can only result
in further disruption, thereby impeding economic growth and investment. While
the roots of violence and state corruption in Africa may have minute connections
to the drug trade, drug consumption exacerbates an already bad situation. It also
potentially plunges the affected countries into a public health crisis.
The authors raise an important concern about the unreliability of
international agencies’ statistics on drug trafficking in Africa, which they portray
as estimates that lack current empirical research. However, it remains unclear
how their methodology differs in this regard or how they navigated the challenge.
One wonders to what extent their contemporary source materials – academic
dissertations, newspaper and media reports, and online statements – diverge from
the unreliable approximations that assail official documents generated by foreign
agencies and national governments.
Despite its shortcomings, Africa and the War on Drugs contains thought
provoking reflections on the campaign against drug trafficking in Africa. Carrier
and Klantschnig depart from Western interpretations of Africa’s drug issues
and offer historical and cultural insights into the continent’s drug habits. Their
recommendations include important alternatives in drug law enforcement, such
as the need to incorporate views from academic and health sectors in order to
implement rules that consider the safety and rehabilitation of drug users. They also
draw attention to current drug-related threats to Africa, namely, the proliferation
of fake drugs and the largely unregulated use of “legal drugs” like alcohol and
tobacco. Their work stands not only as an academic piece but also an informational
kit for international agencies and stakeholders in the anti-drug campaign.
Ogechukwu Ezekwem
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX
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Cheru, Fantu and Renu Modi, eds. Agricultural Development
and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian,
and Brazilian Investments. New York: Zed Books, 2013, xiii
+ 263 pp.
Due to factors like climate change, population growth, and decreasing availability
of fertile land and water, there has been a growing competition for land. These
adversities have led to increasing debates, media attention, and research surrounding
agricultural development, food security, and land use. The roles and actions of
emerging powers, like China, India, and Brazil in international development,
world economy, and influence in global governance are of particular interest. Thus,
the collection of work provided by editors Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi is a needed
and welcome addition to the growing research in this field.
Organized into twelve chapters and divided into four parts, Cheru and Modi
introduce the work pragmatically, committing to a balanced analysis based on
empirical evidence of the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Brazil, China,
and India in Africa’s development. This is partially an attempt to highlight the
complexity of FDI, but also to illustrate that the development process is not simply
a dichotomy split along the lines of Western Europe and the United States versus
agricultural development focusing on small-scale farming and environmentalism.
Cheru and Modi also emphasized that the work is an effort to prevent equating
FDI with neocolonialism and land grabbing. However, while the emphasis is on
FDI generally, the book does broadly examine investment, trade, and development
assistance from China, India, and Brazil to Africa. Parts II, III, and IV respectively
cover the experiences of India, Brazil, and China with African agriculture. Part II
focuses on India’s private and public sector involvement with African agriculture.
Brazil’s experience, including the Dialogue Forum with South Africa (IBSA), is
covered in Part III, and focuses on biofuel production. Finally, Part IV focuses
on China, highlighting its domestic successes in agricultural development and
poverty reduction based on strong government incentives and how this translates
into its foreign investments.
Cheru and Modi state that the goal of the book is to examine whether “private
and sovereign investments from China, India and Brazil create new opportunities
for the transfer of appropriate farm technology, build local capacity and knowhow, reverse the persistent productivity decline in agriculture, generate local
employment, improve local living standards and ensure food security” (xii). The
overview in Part I begins this examination with a discussion of the potential of
FDI from India, China, and Brazil and a historical perspective on the role of
FDI in Africa’s agricultural development. Sam Moyo’s chapter provides critical
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analysis and historical account of the risks of FDI and its tenuous record in
Africa. Ultimately, Cheru and Modi argue that FDI can be a successful vehicle for
development, social transformation, and poverty reduction if paired with a “strong
and effective development-oriented state” (2).
Cheru and Modi succeed in their commitment to a balanced analysis of
FDI from Brazil, China, and India, as there are a variety of perspectives given by
the chapter authors, ranging from the avid supporter of FDI, cautious supporter,
to the more critical perspective. This is best illustrated in Part II. For the most
part, the views closely align with the Indian government and private sector – that
India is committed to helping Africa overcome poverty and underdevelopment.
To illustrate, Gurjit Singh asserts that “India’s engagement with Africa in the
agricultural sector has largely met expectations” and that “Indian companies have
been good about meeting their corporate social responsibilities by creating local
employment, transferring technology and contributing to domestic and intraAfrican trade” (73-74). However, contributions from Dessalegn Rahmato and Rick
Rowden in Part II critically examine India’s commitment by examining largescale land acquisitions by Indian companies using a land rights framework. For
instance, Rahmato argues that there has been “hardly any technology transfer” to
the average Ethiopian farmer, and that these projects are often technologically “not
transferable to or affordable for smallholders” (105).
The editors also succeed in highlighting how each of the emerging countries’
own domestic agricultural development experiences relates to their respective
engagements in Africa. This is especially evident in the section on China,
particularly the chapter by Xiuli Xu and Xiaoyun Li, but can also be found
throughout the book in varying degrees. However, this brings to light the paradox
of the potential success of such emerging countries’ investments when there may
still be significant domestic struggles. For instance, how can India be considered
a success in food self- sufficiency when a large part of its own population goes
hungry? Or how does one reconcile China’s stance on civil liberties with that of a
“strong, effective development state” (8)? Further, this also raises larger issues of
transfer of success and whether it’s possible.
Despite Cheru and Modi’s claim to base the book on empirical evidence,
Rahmato’s work on Indian investments in Ethiopia is the only piece that does so.
However, this is tempered by their success in gathering diverse perspectives on this
topic and highlights a broader role and function of narrative, discourse, and social
construction in how the role of emerging countries’ involvement in international
development is perceived and defined. Thus, with the evidence based largely in
narrative form, Cheru and Modi offer the conclusion that “the overall impact of
Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments and technical assistance to African
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agriculture has been positive.” However, given the large reliance on narrative, such
conclusions fall short of rigorous evaluation.
Ultimately, this book advances the understanding of the subject of FDI
investments in Africa by emerging countries. It is particularly helpful as it pulls
together diverse accounts from Brazil, India, and China, and provides consideration
of each of the emerging countries development trajectories and what it may mean
for Africa. Finally, it offers a foundation upon which future work and evidence can
build to help explain and understand the role of emerging countries in FDI.
Jennifer Dye
Adjunct instructor, International Human Rights
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH
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Gallagher, Julia. Britain and Africa Under Blair: In Pursuit
of the Good State. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2011, viii + 166 pp.
While employed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during Tony Blair’s
prime ministership, Julia Gallagher found herself struck by the distinct rhetoric
about Africa that Blair and his cabinet expressed. In Britain and Africa Under Blair,
Gallagher seeks to understand this “new” moral, ethical discourse which differed
from that used to describe the rest of the world. Where Africa was concerned,
Blair’s government expressed an “ethical foreign policy,” which was “grounded in
utopian and cosmopolitan ideas and highly idealised… [as well as] offered a grand,
heroic identity for Britain” (4). The rhetoric, interestingly, was not restricted to the
New Labour party; politicians from all parties seemed to employ it. Africa was thus
set above party politics as the government undertook a moral crusade to “help” the
continent, claiming that it was supporting human rights and creating social justice,
all the while contributing to global stability and economic improvement.
Gallagher’s approach has a second, crucial façade. She argues that Africa
was a perfect “Other” where Britain could project its international efforts, which
contributed to domestic notions about the ideal British state. She derives her
argument from the realm of psychology by considering how individuals – and by
extension, the states they comprise, she argues somewhat controversially – can
solve internal traumas and maintain well being. In the case of the British state, this
was achieved in part through attempts to “‘repair’ external objects,” that is, trying
to fix the problems facing African peoples (69). This is an original argument that is
grounded on Gallagher’s conviction about the “importance to human wellbeing of
a connection to a sense of the good” (73). She provides the evidence for this thesis
in the second half of the book through contemporary case studies of recent British
engagement in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, though one wonders whether Kenya or
Zimbabwe might have provided more complex, richer examples.
Gallagher begins with a theoretical chapter that weighs the “good” a state
might wish to accomplish against its “political” considerations, and dips into the
history of the British Empire to begin explaining the intellectual background to
New Labour’s approach to Africa. The first half of the book, indeed, is really an
intellectual history of the idea of the “goodstate” in Britain since the late eighteenth
century. Gallagher’s approach reminds this author of Alice Conklin’s efforts in
writing the history of early colonial French West Africa. Like Conklin, Gallagher
believes in the importance of ideology in British efforts in Africa, and links later
Labour ideologies to the period of the Scramble for Africa and beyond.
For Gallagher, “doing good” was no simple veil covering economic and
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geo-political considerations, but an important aspect of British policy and
consciousness. The various strands of the “good” of British state policy from
the past through New Labour are clearly explored, though these sections leave a
sense of uneasiness about the omission of those slightly less “good” aspects. There
is also a problematic tendency to take statements from politicians like Joseph
Chamberlain or publications like the Times at face value without subjecting them
to critical analysis, something Gallagher acknowledges in the conclusion.
It is perhaps in the second half of this book that Gallagher makes her most
striking contribution. She evaluates interview testimony from a variety of contacts
she made during her years working in government. They range from Clare Short
to Malcolm Moss, and serve to justify her claims about the perceptions of Africa
among Britain’s high-ranking contemporary politicians. Politicians viewed Africa
idealistically; whereas British domestic politics was a murky maelstrom of chaos
and argument, Africa’s “massive problems appear[ed] to generate clear-cut
solutions,” and permitted the justified expression of British power abroad, despite
the fact that African issues were rarely vote-winners at home. The same ideals,
Gallagher continues to demonstrate, were mirrored by officials in the field who felt
genuine satisfaction in their work, and felt a deep responsibility to it. They spoke,
officials believed, for the common man and woman of Africa, and steered clear
of politics as much as possible. Here, in “empty” Africa, “British officials [could]
embody the good state” (122). After the Thatcher years in which Britain had failed
to sanction apartheid South Africa and its later inaction in the face of the Rwandan
genocide, the nation state came to hold little moral authority. New Labour “felt
itself to be inheriting a damaged state,” and international activity and the crusade
in Africa, undertaken with little ostensible self-interest for the government, served
as a venue for moral action in the new, globalized world (127).
To my mind, there is one major weakness in this work. Gallagher is convincing
in tracing the ideology of the “good state” until the beginning of the twentieth
century. But the remainder of the century yawns like a gaping hole between that
point and the Blair years: how did the ideology of the “good state” transform due
to the Second World War, for instance? And what about the golden age of colonial
development, in the 1940s and
1950s? These would seem like vital subjects for study and analysis of them
might permit the author to more directly link the periods together. Finally, and
perhaps this is a historian’s grouchiness, the author has the tendency to assert
rather than demonstrate; the actual evidence for many statements is sparse. This
could be, in part, a result of the author’s total familiarity with her topics, but it is
occasionally unsettling for the non-specialist reader.
This is a highly theoretical and erudite work. Hegel and Rousseau share the
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pages with Mbembe and Mudimbe, and Gallagher possesses the enviable skill of
being able to relate philosophy, intellectual history, and psychology directly to her
topics in a comprehensible manner, although these sections do limit the flow of
the prose in places. Overall, Gallagher’s argument is largely effective. While she
may not succeed in wholly convincing readers about her convictions, she certainly
provides an important perspective that will inspire scholars of the continent to heed
her insights and think more deeply about their own research.
Myles Osborne
Assistant Professor of History
University of Colorado Boulder
Boulder, CO
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Giles-Vernick, Tamara and James L.A. Webb Jr, eds. Global
Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control.
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, 1 + 246 pp.
Few will argue against the reality that Africa bears a heavy disease burden, yet little
scholarship exists that situates Africa’s struggles with disease in a broader global health
perspective. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb Jr. formulated a smart collected
volume that takes an interdisciplinary and multi-lateral approach toward understanding how
“health initiatives launched within Africa by actors based outside of the continent” have
addressed disease, chronic health problems, and complex conditions such as malnutrition
and injection drug use (3). At the heart of the text, Giles-Vernick and Webb are concerned
with presenting the long history of intervention, from the introduction of biomedicine during
the colonial era, through the developmentalist frames of early post-colonies, to the latetwentieth century focus on HIV transmission and drug culture. Weighted toward historical
accounts, the book is broken into three parts, with nine chapters plus the introduction.
Part one examines the historical picture of Africa’s experience with global health. The
first chapter, by William Schneider, examines the history of smallpox eradication, noting
that colonial efforts led to some successes and opened the door for later, comprehensive
vaccination work under the WHO from the 1960s to the 1970s. Schneider gives the only
full-scale success story, in a complicated history of intervention and retrenchment. In the
second chapter, Webb analyzes “large-scale use of insecticide” in Liberia to eradicate
malaria between 1945 and 1962 by the United States, followed by the WHO and UNICEF
(42). Webb’s chapter gives a cautionary tale of limited success offset by emergent problems
as vector resistance to DDT and Dieldrin (DLD) weakened the institutional commitment to
a program with expansive financial and logistical challenges (61).

The dual problems of economies of scale and lack of foresight to manage
shifting disease environments as an outside agent, prevents effective change,
no matter the scheme. Guillaume Lachenal’s chapter “proposes a genealogy of
treatment as prevention” in HIV/AIDS interventions by examining colonial efforts
to manage African health despite “indecision over what constituted (individual)
treatment and (collective) prevention” (72-73). Lachenal situates HIV/AIDS
programs at the nexus of smallpox, malaria, and “biomedical messianism” as a
warning against premature predictions of success (84). In chapter four, Jennifer
Tappan draws together the colonial and post-colonial to “evaluate the scientific and
medical rationale underlying the distribution of dried skimmed milk” by medical
officials in an effort to curb early childhood malnutrition (93). While officials
claimed the supplement was not meant to replace breast milk, Tappan shows that
the message received was to “make the powder into milk for their children to drink
and not one informant could recall being instructed to add the powdered milk to a
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child’s food” (102). Biomedical emphasis on technological treatments, foods, and
insecticides privileged specialized knowledge and marginalized the beneficiaries.
Part two takes on a more presentist set of health dilemmas through a historical
lens, with three chapters that incorporate history, anthropology, and biomedicine.
These chapters have the most to say about current health issues that Africans
must navigate in their daily lives. Giles- Vernick’s contribution, with Stephanie
Rupp, explores how “cross-species transmissions” became the most significant
factor in recent infectious disease outbreaks (117). Rather than privileging western
scientific explanations, the authors analyze African narratives of contestations and
interactions with great apes. The significance of socialized distance between humans
and apes suggests a complicated set of cultural practices to reduce exposure to a
dangerous disease ecology that holds everything from sleeping sickness to Ebola
(129). In chapter six, Anne Marie Moulin places Egypt’s recent plague of iatrogenic
Hepatitis C into a broader framing of Africa’s medical history that reveals how
treatment for schistosomiasis infected millions of people with the liver disease.
The violence of iatrogenesis also contributes to the historical memory of forced
vaccinations coupled with an intense mistrust of medical specialists who appear
corrupt and ineffective. While some may doubt Moulin’s assertion that iatrogenic
infection factored into the Arab Spring of 2011, the compounded social malaise
of political corruption and failed public health does suggest compelling grounds
for social protest (150). From a newly identified plague of Hepatitis C, Myron
Echenberg examines how Cholera went from one of the “most feared maladies
of the nineteenth century, [to]…a severe diarrheal disease,” which since the mid1970s threatens Africa on a regular basis (159). Echenberg provides several
statistical tables to show locations and rates of incidence, revealing that across the
major geographic regions several states exhibit a high frequency of cholera, which
suggests important indices for assessing risk. From here, Echenberg examines three
key risk factors: landscape or ecological changes; political instability or armed
conflict, which precipitate refugees; and water or sanitation as a consequence
of public health failures. The failure of appropriate measures to address disease
outbreaks, transmission, and sanitation points to further problems for disease
prevention as external pressures drive the agenda.
Part three moves into the complexities of where Africa’s public health
challenges require innovation before intervention. These last two chapters address
the dilemmas around HIV/AIDS transmission and control efforts that further alter
African bodies and material practices, based upon donor models about appropriate
efforts. Michel Garenne, Alain Giami, and Christophe Perrey examine the
emergent role of “medical male circumcision” (MMC) as a recommended practice
to reduce the spread of HIV since March 2007 (186). The authors examine the
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historical practice of male circumcision in a variety of African communities, from
the Nuba to Zulu, and its cultural significance for Africa’s monotheistic religions.
They also point toward the trauma and sanitary challenges of circumcision,
showing that despite the appearance of reduced HIV infection the statistics are not
significant enough to be clearly indicative. The last chapter, by Sheryl McCurdy
and Haruka Maruyama, on heroin use and HIV interventions in Africa shows how
global flows carried new practices in its currents: “a foreign-led, top-down drug
control approach, and a public health—and human rights-focused harm-reduction
approach” (212). Africa became a transit nexus for heroin, connecting production
sites in Pakistan and Afghanistan with markets in Europe and the United States.
East Africa became an important hub for heroin after 1999, which also transformed
heroin use in the region from something smoked or inhaled to an injectable drug.
The change to injecting heroin also increases the risk of transmitting various bloodborne diseases, such as HIV and Hepatitis C. As McCurdy and Maruyama note,
the top-down approach criminalizes users, while the harm reduction exemplifies
treatment and prevention methods that “enable drug users to make better choices
that will help them reduce their risk-related practices” to better “manage their drug
dependence and comorbidities” (224).
Giles-Vernick and Webb have assembled a valuable collection of perspectives
on the global health challenges African countries face today and their historical
roots. Each study is localized and rich in details, which will encourage discussions
and further analysis of the problems presented. The book has excellent utility for a
variety of course applications, from Global Public Health for medical and nursing
programs to Medical Anthropology or Histories of Science and Medicine to more
specific applications in a number of African Studies fields.
Chau Johnsen Kelly
Assistant Professor of History
University of North Florida
Jacksonville, FL
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Hammar, Amanda, ed. Displacement Economies in Africa:
Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity. London/New York: Zed
Books, 2014, vii + 260 pp.
Displacement Economies in Africa, an anthology edited by Amanda Hammar,
breaks new theoretical ground in its introduction as it examines the troubling
question of displacement economies that result from Africa’s vast and apocalyptic
range of upheavals, stemming from wars, misrule, ecological devastation, and
allied challenges that confront its nascent nation-states. Internal displacement, as
well as the more familiar variety of refugee export, receive close attention, and
the economic spaces vacated and created by these difficulties come under very
close analysis for the inevitably novel alternative socio-economic and political
relational configurations that they spawn. Major changes occur in both formal and
informal economic arrangements, and some players derive maximal benefits while
others lose out as inchoate forces at play shape new universes of opportunity and
disadvantage. The instrumental agency sometimes exercised by the displaced, yet
often ignored, comes in for close scrutiny, and the resourcefulness of the victim in
the midst of adversity becomes compelling terrain for heuristic review. This is a
bold and insightful introduction to the book.
Andrea Behrends discusses the Darfur-Chad borderlands, and, in charting
differential responses to displacement, she identifies scenarios ranging from
continuing, even if temporary, attachment to agricultural production, lives free
of assistance from aid agencies, partial dependence on aid-supports, through
to total reliance for social reproduction on the charity of the latter. Through
extensive discussion of the lives of the displaced, she demonstrates the choices
that individuals are forced to make in fashioning their peculiar survival strategies
in dire situations of conflict. These decisions were often influenced by conditions
of intense political volatility as rulers of Chad and Sudan warred with each other,
significantly constraining the choices of the displaced, heightening the appeal of
the aid agencies, and dimming for many the prospects of an eventual return to preconflict locations and lifestyles.
The war-torn Casamance region of Senegal is Martin Evans’ terrain of
analysis. He shows convincingly how the forces of secession in the area introduce
displacement but also discusses the possibilities of a “return” once some normalcy
begins to dawn. The returnee faces challenges of physical as well as relational
fracturing and deterioration, and economic opportunities have to be rebuilt even
as generational tensions emerge as the youth take on the elders in the muchcontested political stakes. New land tenurial arrangements become necessary, and
administrative re- alignments breed tensions and roil communal solidarity, with
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former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.re-alignments breed tensions and roil
communal solidarity, with former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.
Amanda Hammar’s chapter deals with the implosion of a Zimbabwe badly
governed by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU/PF in the period after 2000. She charts the
major problems of a failed state, Mugabe’s megalomania, the serial insecurities
of a majority population heavily dependent on the informal economy, and the reshaping of social class as white commercial farmers and their African workers
suffer exclusion while the working classes experience both internal and external
displacement. The well connected amass wealth, but their goal is the most primitive
and grotesque of accumulations, not re-investment to foster economic growth.
The middle class recomposed, with heavy dependence on the informal economy,
particularly with the crushing burdens of Structural Adjustment. The poor do
worse, even as new economic relations emerge in areas like Masvingo, where
“class, gender and generational differentiation” (90) threw up new initiatives that
sustained beleaguered households, especially in the area of livestock. Displaced
white farmers cooperated creatively with new black owners to their mutual benefit,
and ZANU/PF is too embarrassed to formally note this vital relationship. The
illicit trade in foreign currency has imbricated the social classes, bringing some
relief to the internally displaced, while raising fortunes for the apparatchiks. The
introduction of the American dollar has restored some sanity to the economy, but
not before much disruption of material conditions occurred across the board.
For Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues, the diamond-rich north- eastern Lundas
of Angola, in a season of crisis, is the field of exploration. Independence in 1975
brought no respite to a war-weary nation, and difficulties were compounded by
instability in the neighboring Congo. Illegal mining (garimpo) became the refuge
of many as population groups variously experienced displacement, involuntary
confinement to both safe and unsafe areas, forced mining labor at the command of
UNITA, and sundry material dislocations amidst an influx of competing Congolese
refugees. The end of the war generated yet more insecurity as the government
showed the flag, garimpo became more hazardous, and legal mining became more
dominant for the approved few. Non-mining jobs were now the new attraction, and
the hardy, and generally insecure, garimpeiro now easily fell foul of the law, and
were greatly harassed.
Nairobi’s Eastleigh Estate, home to many displaced Somali, is Hannah
Elliott’s purview in this anthology. She is particularly drawn to the trade in camel
milk, which became the com-mercial, social, and therapeutic refuge of a displaced
population that was much traumatized by civil war. The milk trade, run on a trust
system, drew visiting Somali from abroad, gener-ated income for real-estate
investment, cemented social ties, and elevated the urban “middle-woman,” the
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widow, and the spinster, who avail themselves of the indeterminacy of their clan
location to rival the patriarchs.
We continue with the Somali-displaced in Peter Hansen’s contribution,
but this time with an emphasis on the returnee, post-conflict. Few returned to
Somaliland permanently, but, from the Somali diaspora, many invested savings
and time in real estate, businesses, conjugal arrangements, and social networking.
The returnees found great comfort in belonging to an established network of
familial and social ties, transcending the anonymity that could never bring social
distinction to their efforts in the diaspora. Neither the fledgling “government” nor
family members encouraged their permanent return, for, as a floating population,
they offered Somaliland a whole lot more materially.
With Sarah Bracking, we return to Zimbabwe, this time to examine the
dynamics of asset-relocation in a period of economic hardship and displacement.
The wealthy, both those with ZANU/PF connections, and those without, sought
creative ways of spiriting their funds out of the besieged economy to safer havens
abroad. Many escaped state predation as taxes rose, and victimization came to
those out of favor with the government. Bank officials helped some to get their
funds out, and others found creative ways of evading detection. A lot of bribes
were paid in these spoils politics of the redomiciling of capital, and the elite
joined the poor in many acts of extraversion. The state took to manipulating
remittances sent to family members from Zimbabweans abroad, and creative
delays in completing transactions ensured good rents to state officials and the
well- connected. The business in foreign currency spawned a network of Chinese,
Angolan and Zimbabwean capitalists, and, at a time of great immiseration for the
majority, significant fortunes were made by the wealthy.
Morten Boas and Ingunn Bjorkhaug probe northern Uganda in their chapter,
examining the psychological trauma of confinement, in which displacement is of
a short distance, and the displaced can see their original homes, and yet cannot
live there. This circumstance bred poverty and utter hopelessness. The Acholi
communities, traumatized by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and
other bandits, lived in a “prison-like economy” of the internally-displaced, in camps
that offered little agency, operating under curfew, with only a few opportunities
for trade, limited cultivation, or military service. In perpetual fear of terror, and
encompassed in mythical, preternatural beliefs of Kony’s occult powers, these
populations languished in abject dependence on charity.
Jeremy Jones reviews the Zimbabwean crisis of the 2000s, and highlights
the misery, but also the resourcefulness, of those who were “stuck” in their
original locations while being traumatized by a collapsed formal economy. He
traces Mugabe’s slide into extravagant financial commitment to war veterans, state
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corruption, urban opposition to ZANU/ PF (and the reprisals this drew), and the
ultimate collapse of the formal economy. People of all social classes took to illegal
means for survival, with the poorly educated youth being the biggest victims, their
lives completely unhinged from the tenuous material moorings they once knew.
The final essay comes from Timothy Raemaekers, and it deals with the
displacement of the youth in an eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
ravaged by war. Few Congolese ever made it to the aid camps, many pursuing
solace in neighboring countries. A number found shelter in forest environments,
with a large majority being hosted by more cohesive families that could offer some
protection. Aid agencies were rigid in their munificence, and only those directly
under their wing could expect their sustained charity. Being mostly unarmed, the
youth had to devise a means to survive. They were at the mercy of the G8, that
“closed group of transnational traders who dominate[d] almost every aspect of
urban economic life,” (236) a virtual government in the eastern Congo. The vibrant
informal economy in the towns supplied some temporary jobs, but one’s ethnic
roots often determined what was available to these youthful “strangers.” Periods
of peace improved work chances, but host families exacted a high material price,
and were generally cold comfort in harsh economic times.
This is a well-packaged, and insightful anthology, and it richly fulfills the
claims of the introduction in covering displacement, especially the internallydisplaced, from a very rich field of empirical investigations. While noting that
a map or two would have provided greater context for the unfamiliar reader’s
understanding of the complex sequences and locations, this collection is a task
well accomplished.
Mac Dixon-Fyle
Professor of History
DePauw University
Greencastle, IN
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Heaton, Matthew M. Black Skin, White Coats: Nigerian
Psychiatrists, Decolonization and the Globalization of
Psychiatry. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, x + 249 pp.
In recent years, the study of Africa’s transition from colonialism to independence
has proven to be a particularly fruitful avenue of historical inquiry, as scholars
have documented both the opportunities and challenges Africans faced as they
struggled to define the boundaries of nationhood and identity while articulating
new understandings of modernity. With his recent work on the history of Nigerian
psychiatry in the decades surrounding national independence, Matthew Heaton has
contributed an important chapter to this unfolding narrative, inserting the perspective
of Nigerian psychiatrists into larger debates over the process of decolonization and
the appropriation of Western knowledge within African landscapes.
The book’s title, a play on the classic 1952 text by Frantz Fanon, signifies a point
of departure rather than arrival, as Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists of
the 1950s and 1960s were able to reject the Manichaean logic of Fanon in favor
of a pluralistic approach to medicine that adapted Western psychiatry to the
Nigerian landscape while simultaneously redefining their field in light of local
perspectives. In this way, Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists challenged the
binary distinctions between colonizer and colonized that have often defined the
study of modern medicine in the non- Western world. Heaton’s book thus offers an
important corrective to other studies of African psychiatry that have emphasized the
dislocations and miscommunications of the colonial encounter, in which Western
doctors all too often pathologized and dehumanized colonial subjects exposed to
the Western medical gaze.
By contrast, the heroes of Heaton’s narrative are the first generation of Nigerian
psychiatrists trained in the West, men like Thomas Adeoye Lambo and Tolani
Asuni, who challenged the assumptions of the racist ethnopsychiatry that had
dominated the field of colonial mental health for much of the twentieth century. That
movement had argued for the existence of an “African mind” that was impulsive,
emotional and allegedly less prone to mental illness than the supposedly more
logical Western subject. In the book’s most important chapter, Heaton shows how
Lambo’s work in the
1950s and 1960s shifted the field towards the new paradigm of transcultural
psychiatry, defined by the premise that mental illness was a product of what Heaton
calls “universal similarities of human psychological processes that transcended
perceived boundaries between races and cultures” (4-5). Thus, a subsequent
chapter on the mental illnesses of Nigerians living in the United Kingdom shows
how Lambo and other Nigerian psychiatrists resisted racial and essentialist
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explanations for the prevalence of mental illness among migrant populations.
Likewise, Heaton shows how Nigerian doctors worked to reformulate so-called
“brain fag” syndrome, an illness once thought to be unique to Nigerian culture, by
placing it within the spectrum of universally acknowledged mental illnesses.
Though the above examples suggest a process whereby Nigerian psychiatrists
redefined African illnesses according to the accepted terminology of Western
medicine, Heaton does a fine job of showing how Nigerian medical personnel also
worked to redefine the field of international psychiatry through an engagement with
local practices. In this regard the most important effort at integrating international
and local medicine was made through the establishment of the Aro Mental Hospital,
founded by Lambo near his home of Abeokuta in the 1950s. Here Lambo and other
Nigerian doctors offered an approach to healing that combined Western techniques,
such as psychopharmaceutical treatment and electroconvulsive therapy, with
traditional African healing practices that were more holistic than those found in
Western medical institutions. In fact, as Heaton shows, Lambo not only worked
with traditional medical practitioners at Aro, he also spent much of his career
insisting on the value of indigenous healers to achieving successful therapeutic
outcomes. Yet the incorporation of non-Western medicine into the practice of
Nigerian psychiatrists was also clearly elitist in orientation, as Nigerian doctors
situated themselves as intermediaries, or as Heaton refers to them, “gatekeepers
of the mind” who were “the only ones with the appropriate balance of culturally
specific knowledge and scientifically universal knowledge” (152).
Heaton’s narrative is written in a clear and effective—if at times repetitive—
prose, and his argument about the importance of transcultural psychiatry to the
decolonization process is well-made. However, Heaton’s analysis would also
have benefited from a deeper engagement with the theoretical implications of
his main contentions. Heaton is surely right to position figures like Lambo as
“gatekeepers,” yet this term also raises important questions about the cultural and
national agendas of this newly educated elite, as well as their desire for social
control. Nowhere is this more clearly apparent than in the doctors’ concerns about
the emergence of recreational drug use by young urban men in post-independence
Nigeria. As Heaton shows, Asuni believed that widespread cannabis use hurt
family stability and constituted “disruptive and irresponsible behavior” (170)
that threatened the health and productivity of the nation. Yet the author never
weighs in on whether these fears were rational or simply a manifestation of an
undefined social and cultural agenda. Given the importance Heaton ascribes to
these seminal psychiatric figures, a deeper exploration of their own perspective on
the meaning of nationhood and independence would have helped to contextualize
their interventions in local and international medical debates, while also raising
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the question of whether, as intermediaries, these doctors’ efforts at social control
constituted a neo- colonial continuation of colonial-era priorities. Relatedly, the
book’s focus on elite perspectives seems to preclude a deeper discussion or analysis
of how other participants in the field of Nigerian mental health, such as traditional
healers and patients, navigated the post-colonial landscape being constructed by
men like Lambo and Asuni.
That Heaton’s book raises these questions is surely a credit to the author’s
exhaustive research into the medical debates of the independence period and his
clear presentation of his argument. For these reasons alone, Black Skin, White Coats
will become essential reading for scholars of the history of African psychiatry and
African medicine, as well as for specialists of modern Nigeria. It will also surely
open new fields of inquiry into the study of contemporary African encounters with
Western science and philosophy.
David Crawford Jones
Senior Lecturer of African American and African Studies
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
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Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri. Women and the Informal Economy
in Urban Africa: from the Margins to the Centre. London:
Zed Books, 2014, x + 140 pp.
Setting out a critique of Western urban planning models as applied to African cities,
while recognizing not only the positive contributions of economic informality
but also articulating its indigenous characteristics, and at the same time asserting
women’s agency and dynamism as a basis for new models in advancing urban growth
is ambitious for such a slim volume, yet is precisely what Mary Njeri Kinyanjui’s
incisive observation and analysis achieves in this concise, groundbreaking work.
The subtitle of the book, “From the Margins to the Centre,” captures the
essence of Kinyanjui’s enterprise. Through an in depth case study of Nairobi,
Kinyanjui sets out to reposition the African city as a unique, coherent entity as
opposed to an inexplicable aberration on the margins of urban planning theories. At
the same time, she re-conceptualizes economic informality from a site on the edges
of survival to a site of dynamism and sustainable solidarity built on indigenous
concepts. She embodies all of this in the movement of women, spatially and
entrepreneurially, from the edges of the city to its center, in a rejuvenation of the
central business district through ingenious new uses of retail space by small scale
women traders.
The book, in Kinyanjui’s own words, “urges the need to investigate the
diversity and creativity within the African city in terms of the African indigenous
market concept, solidarity entrepreneurialism, inclusion of women in urban panning
and collective organization as a method of organizing business, … [and] including
gender in the construction of urban theory” (5). The author’s emphasis on the
dynamism and promise of innovations stemming from economic informality and
particularly from women in this sector, stands in contrast to much urban planning
theory and development literature.
Although not formally divided, the book may be said to fall into three
sections. The first and last chapters articulate Kinyanjui’s position in relation to
other development and urban planning theorists. In chapters two through four,
Kinyanjui delves into historical and archival records to trace the development of
the city from its colonial inception, through independence and successive postindependence administrations. Aspects addressed include spatial segregation,
men and women’s place in the city over time, as well as the changing relationship
between government officials and street hawkers. Throughout, Kinyanjui stresses
the continuity in the development of the informal economic sector, including its
roots in indigenous market concepts, which are explicitly elucidated. In this way,
Kinyanjui’s treatise brings the postcolonial school of thought to the field of urban
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planning, insisting that the social and historical context of a city’s development
be considered in any evaluation or development of future plans. This also forms a
basis for Kinyanjui’s unabashed critique of the inadequacy of Western theories of
urban planning for Africa’s context, and her call for the innovations employed in
economic informality to be recognized for their contribution to the development of
the city’s human capital and studied for new urban development paradigms.
Kinyanjui shifts to an analysis of empirical data, gathered from surveys and
interviews of Nairobi women in economic informality, in chapters five through
eight. This analysis is thematically organized, including chapters on “women’s
mobility,” the “characteristics of women in economic informality,” “women’s
search for spatial justice,” and “women’s collective organizations,” respectively.
Kinyanjui is conscious about allowing “subaltern” women’s voices to come
through in her work. In this section she also formulates a critique of the women’s
movement of the 1980s and 1990s in Kenya, by highlighting the intersection of
class and culture, and alleging “modernist” formulation of the women’s movement
failed to engage the majority of Kenyan women coming from less middle class
or Western-influenced backgrounds. She suggests that women in the informal
economic sector are forming a new movement, which has not yet been recognized
in academic discourse; an intriguing position that merits further study.
Kinyanjui’s data on women in economic informality brings to light a
significantly different picture of the sector than that found in other studies in terms
of demographics and sustainability. Significantly, she asserts: “The movement
[toward women’s economic accumulation] is not haphazard, as envisioned in the
literature on the impact of informality in the city; it is discussed and coordinated”
(110). Kinyanjui’s analysis of women’s collective organizations gives rise to
several exciting possibilities: from the potential for solidarity entrepreneurialism
and existing women’s groups to form a basis for addressing participation and
spatial justice in the city, to a view of collective entrepreneurial organization as
a challenge to individualistic, concentrated capitalism. Kinyanjui, suggested that
rather than being mainly conceptualized in relation to land reform, one must focus
on recognition of emergent social alliances.
A slight tendency to essentialize women operating in economic informality
in some sections of the book is overcome when the empirical data and extensive
quotes from women themselves are shared in later chapters. One might have wished
for enhanced editing to avoid occasional repetition in the manuscript, but overall,
Women and the Informal Economy in Africa makes important contributions to
theories of urban planning, spatial justice, indigenous entrepreneurialism, and
gender studies; accordingly, it will appeal to scholars and practitioners in a range
of fields.
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Doctoral Candidate
Department of Comparative & International Development Education
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN
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Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans: John F.
Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012, xxi + 333 pp.
In Betting on the Africans, Muehlenbeck focuses on President John F. Kennedy’s
relationships with a number of prominent African leaders to analyze his efforts to
improve US-Africa relations during his presidency (January 20, 1961 - November
22, 1963). From the outset, Muehlenbeck contrasts “Kennedy’s policies of courting
Third World nationalism” to the subsequent abandonment of these efforts in a larger
shift towards an agenda focused on “Cold War concerns of anticommunism” that
dominated other administrations (xiv). This is significant because, as Muehlenberg
asserts, the shift away from Kennedy’s policies and ideologies relating to Africa
and the developing world facilitated a considerable growth in anti- Americanism
in subsequent presidencies (xiv).
Muehlenbeck carefully navigates the historiography of mid-twentieth
century US-Africa relations by squarely situating this work as an effort to balance
“modernization theory with personal diplomacy” (xv). As a result, Muehlenbeck
seeks to consider Kennedy as a deeply strategic, yet highly personable figure in
the construction of bonds between the US and Africa. Perhaps most importantly,
Muehlenbeck perceives decolonization as “the most important historical force
of the twentieth century,” thus, in gaining African leaders as allies, Kennedy had
the ability to gain great respect from Africans while strengthening foreign policy
(xvi). Ultimately, it is Muehlenbeck’s approach to Kennedy’s efforts in US-Africa
relations through personal diplomacy that is very striking because it emphasizes a
very different kind of diplomatic history that is underrepresented, especially within
the histories of Africa, the Cold War, and US relations with Africa and Africans.
While the book could have easily devolved into a series of disconnected
case studies in Cold War history, Muehlenbeck carefully crafts a framework for
considering the strengths and weaknesses of JFK’s personal diplomacy by first
beginning with a discussion of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Muehlenbeck
then shifts to the Kennedy administration and his approach to African nationalism
and US policy. After this somewhat prolonged introduction, Muehlenbeck delves
into Kennedy’s relationships with individual African leaders like Sékou Touré
of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. After
examining these spaces, Muehlenbeck transitions to a discussion that focuses on
the impact of Kennedy’s policies towards Africa and African nationalists, and how
these exchanges bled into other areas of domestic and foreign policy. For example,
Muehlenbeck gives considerable attention to the precarious nature of Kennedy’s
stance towards minority rule in South Africa.
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While Muehlenbeck attempts to center his dialogue on personal diplomacy,
there are critical issues with this approach. For example, Muehlenbeck makes
great effort to emphasize Kennedy’s early support for African nationalism,
especially during his years in Congress and the 1960 presidential campaign. Yet,
he essentially explains away the Congo Crisis, which is simply discussed through
the lens of how it influenced Kennedy’s relationships with other African leaders.
This is problematic because Muehlenbeck goes to great lengths to differentiate
Kennedy’s policies from other Cold War-era leaders, yet actions in the Congo or
(in)action in South Africa are not simply aberrations as Muehlenbeck asserts on
page xvi, they are indicative of an approach to diplomacy that was deeply personal
in some cases, but also very telling in the continuation of pro-Western policies that
sought to maintain stability and control in the midst of the Cold War.
While the bulk of Muehlenbeck’s limited discussion of the Congo Crisis
centers on Lumumba and his death in 1961, it seems as if there is a careful forgetting
of the fact that this conflict did not end after the death of Lumumba. There is no
sustained or meaningful engagement in an effort to make sense of the extreme
limitations of “personal diplomacy” in the case of the longer process of the Congo
Crisis. This is troubling because one cannot simply ignore the immense diplomatic
implications of the Congo Crisis because it was one of the most important conflicts
in the continent of Africa in the years immediately following independence.
Designating Kennedy’s stance in the Congo Crisis as an anomaly is problematic
because it downplays the significance of this horrific event in African history
within US policy. While Muehlenbeck provides an engaging and multi- faceted
approach to the various ways in which Kennedy practiced personal diplomacy, it is
difficult to label this as his dominant method of approaching African politics when
some of the most influential and troubling parts of US-Africa diplomacy existed
outside of this realm during the Kennedy presidency.
Nevertheless, Muehlenbeck’s work is very successful in a number of other
areas. Muehlenbeck’s chapter on the rivalry between Kennedy and De Gaulle
in Africa is especially noteworthy, as it carefully outlines the shifting nature of
US-French relations with the (re)construction of spheres of influence during the
early 1960s. As Muehlenbeck astutely assesses, De Gaulle “[envisioned] himself
as a protective shield from superpower hegemony and Kennedy [saw] himself as
a protective shield from French neocolonialism” (163). Thus, in continuation of
this theme, Muehlenbeck outlines subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to extend,
consolidate, or challenge influences in Africa from both the US and France.
While Muehlenbeck’s brief introduction to Francophone Africa’s affinity with
De Gaulle was a bit superficial, the chapter was very successful at capturing the
nuanced rivalry between the two leaders by carefully demarcating strategic spaces
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in Africa, analyzing motivations, exploring personalities, and assessing policies.
Additionally, Muehlenbeck’s discussion of US- France tensions that influenced
Peace Corps volunteers on the ground in Francophone Africa emphasized ways in
which international politics intersected with daily life in a very tangible manner.
Muehlenbeck’s chapter on Kennedy’s relationship with Sékou Touré was
intriguing because it emphasized the complex transformation of US-Guinea
relationships, as evidenced by the fact that Eisenhower previously dismissed the
Guinean leader as a communist (58). Thus, gaining a relationship with Guinea
was a bit more complex than using Kennedy’s charm to secure the allegiance of
a nation that was already friendly with the US. Yet, through the engaging and
well-researched chapter, Muehlenbeck presents the argument that Kennedy “was
able to not only influence Guinea back to a position of neutrality but by the end of
Kennedy’s life the Guinean leader had even become slightly pro-Western” (58). In
order to demonstrate this argument, Muehlenbeck chronicles debates over US aid
to Guinea, both from US and Guinean perspectives, Touré’s visit to Washington
in 1962, and the US Civil Rights related, and fabricated, controversy at the OAU
conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. By examining these episodes, Muehlenbeck
argues for the transformation of US-Guinea relations, which would ultimately
facilitate “Guinea’s support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis,
the Congo crisis, and the outbreak of racial violence in the American south, and
they could judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did-but also what he said” (72).
This chapter is important because it is the first of five case studies of Kennedy’s
personal diplomacy with some African nations. Yet, as the chapter on Kennedy
and Touré reveals, Kennedy’s relationships with these leaders varied greatly and
provided a range of political opportunities for all actors.
Overall, Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans is an intriguing and
important work that emphasizes the significance of personal diplomacy during
Kennedy’s presidency. While there are obvious issues with Muehlenbeck’s limited
discussions of the aforementioned aberrations, the book is largely successful in
its efforts to shift towards a different type of Cold War politics, namely, one that
focused on Kennedy’s personal diplomacy. While there are many books on Africa
and the Cold War, I am confident that this monograph will be an important source
of information for scholars and students interested in international diplomacy,
Africa, and the Cold War.
Danielle Porter Sanchez
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX
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O’Sullivan, Kevin. Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire:
Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-75. Manchester,
UK: Manchester University Press, 2012, x + 230 pp.
The diplomatic history of small to medium-size states during the post- World War
Two era is an emerging historiographical topic that complicates the study of the
Cold War era and provides an important corrective to the overwhelming focus on
how great powers interacted with and on Africa. In the process of forging a strong
international identity, the emergence of newly independent African states created
the perfect opportunity for a variety of states with limited resources to engage
with a new group of countries. Africans could be invited to study or train, foreign
advisors could be sent to the continent, or foreign aid and diplomatic support could
be provided. Irish diplomats chose mostly the last option. Kevin O’Sullivan’s
Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire offers a needed, well-researched, and
engaging intervention into the relationships between smaller European states
and newly independent African countries. In this diplomatic-focused history,
O’Sullivan demonstrates the complicated narrative of the Irish relationship with
Africa through an examination of the Katanga Crisis, Biafran War, and debates
over minority rule in southern Africa. This engagement provided Ireland the space
to emerge diplomatically and increase its importance on the international scene.
O’Sullivan helps change the focus of diplomatic history during the 1960s and
1970s from one on agendas driven by the Cold War to smaller states with their
own plans to shape the African continent.
With the experience of being colonized and having to struggle for
independence, Ireland is able to forge strong connections with the developing
world. O’Sullivan makes a strong case in highlighting the considerable influence
Ireland enjoyed in Africa considering its size and lack of experience in the realm of
diplomacy. However, as O’Sullivan demonstrates throughout his work, this special
link was a fragile balancing act with the Cold War looming in the background. Irish
diplomats needed to consider their complicated relationship with Great Britain,
their desire to obtain membership in the European Community, and ties with the
Nordic “fire brigade” countries (198).
Additionally, in the process of showing Ireland’s delicate balancing act,
O’Sullivan highlights a number of additional complicating factors, including
the Irish need for trade with southern Africa, meager resources to devote to the
cause, and a public with widely varying interests in Africa. By concentrating
their diplomatic efforts on Africa, Ireland proves itself to be a “global citizen”
and responsible member of the European Community (198). Shifting their support
from political considerations in the immediate post-war era to foreign aid by the
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1970s, Ireland evolves from being a devotee of United Nations policies to an active
member of the “fire brigade” involved in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement to an
important player in African affairs moderated through the European Community.
O’Sullivan is at his strongest when examining specific case studies as
illustration of Ireland’s unique relationship with particular areas of Africa. He
demonstrates a mastery of these complicated events and is able to provide a new
and interesting perspective, especially regarding Ireland’s role in the Katanga
Crisis. To my knowledge, Ireland’s role in the Katanga Crisis has been largely
unexamined, even though the country played an important role in dealing with the
crisis, provided military support, and learned from their engagement, to the extent
that it shaped Ireland’s response to future African issues. O’Sullivan also provides
insight into how Ireland dealt with the Biafra crisis and demonstrates the dilemma
the country faced in balancing its desire to recognize the Biafra government against
the need to rescue missionaries and protect future relationships with the Nigerian
state. He shows how Ireland’s involvement in Biafra allowed the country to foster
an independent foreign policy and increase the public’s concern over Africa. This
engagement possessed important consequences, as the public began advocating for
a more transparent approach to foreign policy initiatives.
The source material O’Sullivan engages with is impressive. In addition to
using traditional newspaper accounts and mining archival sources, he seamlessly
incorporates his own interviews with and published memoirs of a variety of Irish
diplomats and leaders involved in the events. Another strength of the book is the
use of non-governmental organization archival material, as it moves the narrative
outside of formal diplomatic channels. By successfully using an impressive
quantity of non-state material, O’Sullivan highlights the evolution of early NGOs,
complicates our understanding of Ireland’s ties to the continent, and shows the
degree of the Irish’s public interest in Africa.
While the book provides an excellent overview of Ireland’s long and varied
relationship with the continent, several small issues need mentioning. O’Sullivan
makes a strong case about the importance of small states in international diplomacy
and shows the struggle of developing and maintaining an independent diplomatic
relationship. Yet, he could have elaborated the importance of this case study with
regard to the end of the British Empire. Readers remain unsure how Ireland’s
diplomacy complicates our understanding of the decolonization process, and the
demise of the British Empire requires a more explicit and developed response.
A large body of literature exists on this topic, and although O’Sullivan cites this
literature in the bibliography, he could have engaged with it to a higher degree in
order to provide a more forceful interjection in the historiography. Additionally,
African voices would have been beneficial, especially when dealing with the
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fascinating example of rescuing Irish missionaries on the ground during the Biafra
conflict. Here, we see an important group caught between two opposing forces,
which served to complicate the Irish response. The inclusion of such material
could easily support the idea that Africans were certainly using their emerging
connection with Ireland for their own agendas, just as Ireland needed Africans, and
thus were more active participants in this evolving relationship.
The study of Ireland’s engagement with Africa that O’Sullivan provides
is an important intervention in diplomatic history. While diplomatic historians
will benefit the most and appreciate the backdoor diplomatic maneuvering and
intrigues, those interested in the Biafra crisis will also be satisfied. Overall,
O’Sullivan provides an important contribution to diplomatic, Irish, Cold War, and
African history as Ireland sought to carve out its own particular place and forge its
own diplomatic relationships. Now, a sequel is needed that looks at Irish responses
in a more neoliberal world and how HIV/AIDS responses mobilized the Irish
population and elicited new diplomatic and aid-driven responses.
Timothy Nicholson
Assistant Professor of History
SUNY Delhi
Delhi, NY
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Resnick, Danielle and Nicholas van de Walle, eds. Democratic
Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, x+310 pp.
Over the last few years, scholarship on foreign aid in Africa has increasingly
focused on three related qualitative paths: intentions, forms or types of aid, and
their variable impacts. Where for too long the focus seemed limited to “how much
is required?” or testing assumptions via economic regression about aid’s impact
on macroeconomic growth, increased consideration for the types of and intentions
behind aid, and its uneven economic and political impact, is a welcome trend. This
edited volume, completed under the auspices of the United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UN-WIDER), attempts to
parse out the impact of aid on African democracy, both in terms of transitions and
consolidations. The collection comprises three broadly comparative chapters, seven
case study chapters—covering Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia,
Benin, and Ghana— and a final “Conclusions and Policy Recommendations”
chapter. Those seven case studies were carefully selected as part of a comparative
research design: they all transitioned to multi-party democracy in the 1990s and
have held at least four presidential and parliamentary elections since the transition.
By narrowing these parameters for the selection of African cases, which still
display considerable variation in terms of development status, aid flows, and
democracy indicators, the impact of aid on democratic consolidation (compared
to more authoritarian polities) can be better assessed. A wide range of figures and
tables provide excellent illustrative support for both quantitative and qualitative
approaches employed by the contributors.
The book opens with a straightforward research question that is hardly
simple to answer: “When, why, and how has foreign aid facilitated, or hindered,
democratic transitions and consolidation in recipient countries?” (1). Because
aid directed at easier-to-measure economic and social outcomes may undermine
democratic processes, and aid focused on supporting nascent democratic trends
may become implicated in and overly influence local political processes, much
care has to be taken to gauge aid’s impact. The editors thus rightly adopt a nuanced,
multi-method approach where comparative quantitative and qualitative methods
are combined with in-depth country case studies. This study partly builds on
insights from van de Walle’s earlier seminal work.1 There, van de Walle identified
how the foreign aid regime evolved from the independence era, institutionalizing
a range of norms and practices that impacted not only development-related
1
Nicholas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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inputs and outputs but also the evolution of the post-colonial African state and
the neopatrimonial politics operating within it. His initial (2001) assessment
of the 1990s democratization wave on the seemingly permanent economic and
governance crisis suggested minimal direct influence on state capacity to deliver
public goods and to constrain executive power and neopatrimonial politics. While
this assessment came right before the NEPAD and “China in Africa” era which
transformed to some degree the international development regime and improved
terms of trade for a growing number of African commodity exporters, van de Walle
also hinted that “There are reasons to believe that in the long-term, democratization
may well improve economic management by increasing the accountability and
transparency of governments” (276). Thus, if democratization may gradually
improve economic management but decades of foreign aid may have undermined
economic development, understanding varying and perhaps competing objectives
within a complex aid regime becomes exceedingly important.
This edited collection seeks to “disaggregate” democratization and
consolidation processes as well as different types of aid over time to better
understand the “conflicts and complementarities between development and
democracy aid” (3). All the core definitions—democratic transitions and
consolidation, development and democracy assistance—are provided early on to
ground the comparative and case study chapters, and Table 2.1 (30) delineates
different components of the democratization continuum. While not wholly distinct,
targeted democracy assistance—only 6-8% of total aid flows (7)—is dwarfed by
development assistance and generally exhibits less donor agency coordination.
Qualitative differences are critical, however; there is usually short-term tension
between promoting democratic change and economic stability. This may include
trying to build up horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms rather than
simply working within existing executive structures. What this study does well is
demarcate the more obvious forms of democratic assistance that support transitions
to multi-party elections versus the more complex ways aid may be intended to
sustain consolidation processes.
While every chapter makes a significant contribution to the collection,
the quantitative comparative chapter three by Dietrich and Wright illustrates
the complexities of addressing the core research question. The authors create
new datasets that capture qualitative variables for democratic transitions and
consolidation over time, not solely relying on measures offered by existing
databases. They examine how different types of aid influence transitions to multiparty regimes, multi-party failure, electoral fairness failure, incumbent turnover,
and term-limit failure. Overall, Dietrich and Wright admit their findings are
weak or inconclusive: they find “some evidence consistent with the proposition
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that economic aid increases prospects of multi-party transitions in [Sub-Saharan
Africa]. . . . However, we find little support for the contention that democracy
assistance is correlated with other aspects of democratic development” (83).
Despite their inconclusive results, Dietrich and Wright offer important insights
into methodological challenges including endogeneity bias intrinsic to foreign aid
flows, and lay the groundwork for the in-depth country case studies that follow. Each
country case study is an important contribution—theoretically and empirically—to
the general foreign aid and democracy literature as well as to understanding the
political economy of development and democratization in each country. A few
short policy recommendations designed to improve both democracy assistance and
direct budgetary support close out the book.
Ultimately, the book supports the contention that development aid can play
a positive role in the promotion of democratic transitions, specifically to multipartyism. However, the real conundrum remains aid’s role in consolidation
processes. Democracy assistance can improve vertical accountability mechanisms
especially around elections and to support civil society groups, but could do more
between election cycles to strengthen electoral and party institutionalization. Two
issues are not specifically addressed in the volume: first, the possible effects of
patronage networks and the informal realities undermining consolidation, and
second, there is no consideration of the influence of the designed formal political
institutions, that is, the constitution(s) after democratic transitions. Perhaps
democracy assistance and donor leverage can never overcome badly designed
constitutional frameworks, from powers invested in the executive branch to
weak amendment formulas. Thus, if the informal networks are powerful and the
constitution itself does not enable adequate prospects for constraints (horizontal
accountability mechanisms or the rule of law), then no amount of democracy
assistance will help. That notwithstanding, this collection stands as an ambitious
and highly valuable study that tackles the complexities of aid’s impact on one
desired outcome for assistance, the promotion and entrenchment of democracy. For
anyone interested in foreign aid in Africa and the interaction of aid and democracy,
this collection represents a leading-edge contribution.
Chris W. J. Roberts
Doctoral Candidate and Instructor
Department of Political Science, University of Alberta
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary
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Spiers, Edward. The Victorian Soldier in Africa: Studies
in Imperialism. Manchester and New York: Manchester
University Press, 2013, v + 212 pp.
The “human experiences” of the Victorian soldiers who fought in Africa to expand
the British Empire at the turn of the twentieth century have received little scholarly
attention. Yet, as Edward Spiers presents in The Victorian Soldier in Africa, recently
released in paperback, letters “from the front” by soldiers to acquaintances and
weekly newspapers at home reveal their combat experiences and their close
connections with the army and the civilian community in Britain. Often composed
by soldiers enduring extremely demanding terrains and climatic conditions, the
letters convey views of imperial wars rarely expressed in the official dispatches,
corroborate the testimony of contentious issues, provide fresh insight about the
men’s experiences in various aspects of the same campaign, and supply a greater
range of perspectives from soldiers in different regiments (2). Significantly, the
letters also soften the image of the army in Britain during the period when men
hardly considered careers in the military and “few families had a positive image of
the army as a career” (12).
The value and significance of these letters cannot be overstated. But Spiers
cautions against taking them at face value, because of what he has identified as
their “shortcomings.” He cautions that some authors “were profoundly shocked by
the experience and were not always lucid in their recollections; others embellished
their accounts” (40). Soldiers without a clue about the casualty figures provided
imagined estimates, made factual errors, and downplayed the enemy’s resilience,
essentially authoring letters that are “limited in perspective” (28). Creating further
complications, these communications passed through the hands of military censors
and local newspapers editors who likely tinkered with their tone and meaning.
Notwithstanding, the letters convey eyewitness accounts of the Victorian army in
action and reveal the hardships the soldiers encountered in Africa.
Structurally, the nine chapters of the book follow chronological order, covering
twenty-eight years of Victorian wars in Africa (1874–1902). Spiers begins by
discussing the British military success in West Africa against the Asante people of
modern Ghana, a victory ascribed to the soldiers’ valor and the superior firepower
of breech-loading Snider. In the second chapter, the author examines similar
imperial campaigns and victories in the Ninth Cape Frontier War and the AngloZulu War in South Africa. In both campaigns, however, the Victorian soldiers
encountered “a succession of assaults,” especially from the Zulu warriors who sent
them to “eternity” (49, 50), before reinforcements began to arrive. Spiers’s third
chapter, also on South Africa, highlights the British campaign in battling the Boers
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in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881. Over the next three chapters, which
consider the war in northeastern Africa, Spiers focuses on British intervention in
Egypt, the fight against the Mahdists, and the Gordon relief expedition. While the
seventh chapter brings back the discussion to southern Africa, in Bechuanaland
(modern Botswana), the penultimate chapter takes the reader back up north—to
the war in Sudan, whose purpose was to reconquer the region after the essentially
failed Gordon relief expedition. Spiers concludes by “re-engaging the Boers” in
the Second Anglo-Boer War in southern Africa (1899–1902).
The book’s strength resides in its significant use of substantial primary
materials in the form of personal letters and diaries that convey the soldiers’ “human
experience” in their own voices. To the benefit of scholarship on the subject, Spiers
allows the men to speak for themselves, adding commentary on their views and
assessing key actors, such as native auxiliaries in Africa and politicians in London.
For these reasons, Spiers’s book is a valuable contribution to the scholarship.
But the book is not without fault. One wishes that Spiers would have
discussed at much greater length the social relationships between the soldiers
and non-combatants, especially women—a topic he covers very briefly in two
paragraphs, one in chapter six and the other in the epilogue section. The book’s
cursory treatment of the soldiers’ social interactions produces the unsettling and,
indeed, cliché, image of an impassive Victorian man completely lacking human
connections. As the book has it, the men seem to have cared about more victories,
the possibilities of earning promotions and medals, and increased self-esteem (93,
180) than they did about native bearers, laborers, and traders, whom they often
subjected to physical punishment whenever they felt that they had been cheated
(185).
Nonetheless, this book fits squarely within the literature of imperial, colonial
Africa, and military histories, as well as in the capacious field of Victorian studies.
College instructors in these disciplines who wish to use the book as a classroom
text will surely find this paperback edition affordable and useful. Although fairly
short, its chapters convey deep meanings about British wars in pre-colonial Africa.
Undergraduate students should find the chapters easy to read and comprehend. The
book carries visual images in general maps—eight in all—simplifying the work of
readers seeking to identify the major theatres of the wars. Unfortunately, the lack
of other visual elements (e.g., photographs and charts) may limit the ability of the
uninitiated to contextualize the conflicts.
Viewed narrowly, The Victorian Soldier in Africa captures imperial war
stories in Africa, accentuates the hyper-masculinity of British soldiers, and hints
at the aggressive nature of the British Army. Speaking broadly, however, the book
challenges our perception of the meaning of nineteenth and twentieth century
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Book Reviews | 113
imperial expansion in Africa, encouraging its readers to think critically about a
transformative period that in many ways determined the fate of the continent for
many generations to come.
Samson Kaunga Ndanyi
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
Indiana University, Bloomington
Bloomington, IN
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Takougang, Joseph. Cameroonian Immigrants in the United
States: Between the Homeland and the Diaspora. Maryland:
Lexington Books, 2014, xxi + 143 pp.
Between the census of 2000 and 2010, the African immigrant population in the
United States nearly doubled in size from 881,300 to almost 1.6 million. As
recent census numbers continue to show, African immigration to the United States
remains dynamic and fast changing. While East and West Africa remain dominant
as points of origin for African immigrants in the United States, other regions of
Africa, in particular Central Africa, are gaining ground, increasing in a very
short period their presence and precipitating a need to broaden the conversation
around African immigration in the United States. In Cameroonian Immigrants in
the United States, Joseph Takougang provides an important guide to understanding
the unique development of the Cameroonian Diaspora in the United States. He
analyzes Cameroonian immigration and the circumstances that have shaped it as
one of the most recent and fastest growing immigration waves from the African
continent.
Divided into five chapters, the first chapter of this well-timed book addresses
the post-colonial immigration efforts of Africans to the United States. Here
Takougang acknowledges the important role of African students during the colonial
and the immediate post-colonial periods as progenitors of African immigration. He
also underscores the failure of African leaders in the post-independence period to
live up to their promises of political and economic prosperity. In one country after
another, the devastating failure after independence of the neo-colonial experiment
in governance prompted many in the early 1980s and, most noticeably, in the
1990s to flee abroad to among other destinations, the United States. Cameroon,
however, as Takougang shows in Chapter 2, for a short period, would prove the
exception to the pattern of socio-economic and political strife and conflict that
wracked the African continent. Contrary to the popular image widely publicized
in the early 1980s of the failing African state, Cameroon enjoyed both political
and economic stability well into the late 1980s, a fact attributable, as the author
notes, to “the economic pragmatism and liberal policies of the government, the
dynamism of its private class and the nation’s remarkable political stability” (17).
The boons of this period, however, would be temporary, as they were influenced
by a decline in export products, increasing corruption, as well as stringent reform
policies mandated by Structural Adjustment Programs. Cameroonians began to
look abroad, first to former colonial metropoles in Britain and France, but with the
passage of restrictive immigration policies in these countries, the United States
became the destination of choice.
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In the last three chapters of his book, Takougang addresses the adjustment
of Cameroonian immigrants in the United States, supplementing his analysis with
first-hand accounts about their experiences. Many will appreciate the inclusion of
these stories as the stories of Cameroonian students, who arrived in the immediate
post-colonial period (up to 1990), echo the hardships suffered and sacrifices made
often described in the narratives of other African students during this period. As
Takougang undoubtedly intended, the further addition of the stories of Cameroonian
immigrants of the post-1990 population wave allows for important comparisons
between these two generations of Cameroonian immigrants. Here Takougang
shows that whereas the early generation of immigrants was fairly consistently
students, male, and from the English-speaking region of the country, there is more
gender, regional, and ethnic diversity among the post-1990 generation. There is
also less of an adjustment period for this generation due to established networks of
friends and family already living and settled in the United States.
The last two chapters explore the struggles and challenges Cameroonian
immigrants face in their efforts to make “home” and “community” in the United
States while maintaining important ties and bonds with their homeland. Takougang
documents the evolution of community organizations in helping to build
community, beginning with the establishment in the 1970s of student organizations
like the Cameroon Students Association (CAMSA), which would influence the
establishment of future national as well as ethnic and alumni organizations,
all focused on helping to preserve social, political, and economic bonds and
relationships with Cameroon. These bonds are further reinforced, as Takougang
shows, with the mutually dependent relationships that remittances exemplify for
Cameroonians. The money sent home helps to alleviate the strain for many of a
persistent struggle to access even the most basic necessities, while providing those
abroad with a sense of responsibility as well as prestige and “celebrity status” that
can be accessed on return visits back home.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

116 | Book Reviews
No work is without limitations, and this work is no exception. It certainly
could have benefited from a more rigorous accounting of sources, particularly the
interviews utilized, and a more detailed explanation of the push factors that helped
to spur the post-1990s immigration wave of Cameroonian immigrants. These few
issues, however, should not at all detract from the significance of this book as
one of the first comprehensive efforts to analyze Cameroonian immigrants in the
United States. It will stand, I hope, as a foundational cornerstone of scholarship
on both the Cameroonian and African immigrant Diasporas in the United States.
Olanipekun Laosebikan
Lecturer, College of Education
Chicago State University
Chicago, IL
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Terretta, Meredith. Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence:
Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in
Cameroon. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014. vii + 367
pp.
Over the past years, many African nations have commemorated forty and fifty
year independence anniversaries from European colonialism. Recently, scholars
have devoted attention to the contexts and legacies of African liberation struggles
that were hallmarks of the era famous for ubiquitous Afro-optimism and panAfricanism. In this book, Meredith Terretta offers a critical analysis of “the history
of the practice and discourse of Cameroonian nationalism, spearheaded by the
Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), as it unfolded in intersecting local,
territorial, and global political arenas in the 1950s and 1960s ” (2). By examining
the various local and international contexts that informed the UPC’s efforts to oust
France from Cameroon, Terretta convincingly argues that the UPC demonstrated
broad organizational pragmatism in pursuit of legitimacy. In this extensive analysis
of French Cameroonian nationalism, Terretta also cites how the UPC made use of
“two political concepts indigenous to the Grassfields region – lepue and gung - as
the terms used to translate ‘independence’ and ‘nation’,” (13) respectively, in order
to situate the liberation struggle in a culturally-relevant, discursive framework of
“global” politics (4).
One of the strengths of this book is Terretta’s detailed ethnographic analysis
of the formation of Bamileke identities over time. Critical to this endeavor, Terretta
highlights how the meanings of lepue and gung were interpreted and reformulated
by UPC supporters to gain support from Cameroonians throughout the liberation
struggle. From the mid to late 1950s, the UPC sought to develop grassroots support
at the local level. Bamileke identity was not only shaped by existing ethnic and
kinship affiliations in central Cameroon, it was also influenced by the cosmopolitan
and burgeoning nationalism of young Cameroonian women and men who, in the
early 1950s, migrated to the Bamileke and Mungo regions looking for work.
Critical to understanding the politicization of these youth, Terretta contends that
the meanings of both lepue and gung were frequently interpreted, appropriated,
and altered by UPC cadres to legitimize the liberation movement’s existence in the
eyes of both local Cameroonians and international agencies. In addition to its local
organizing efforts, the UPC also drew the attention of the international community
at the United Nations by submitting thousands of Cameroonian signatures on
petitions in support of liberation.
Although the UPC’s local and international efforts were critical strategies
meant to augment and legitimate the UPC as a liberation movement, Terretta also
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explores the divisions that shaped these strategies. She concludes that, although
the UPC sought to fashion itself as a unified front, the organization was also
affected by generational divides and gendered expectations. With the enactment of
the French loi-cadre, colonial officials sought to empower loyalist chiefs and youth
who would support France’s intention to remain a colonial presence in Cameroon.
The power struggle between the UPC and French colonial policies often resulted
in protests and violent clashes among Cameroonians within the Mungo and
Bamileke regions. With different Cameroonian actors jockeying for either full or
mediated independence from France, new opportunities emerged for young men
and women to challenge existing cultural and social norms. Many youth joined
the UPC against their elders’ wishes and became part of the nationalist cause. ProUPC Cameroonians also pursued nationalist strategies that highlighted customary
practices of local political succession, especially when they advocated for the
ascendency of pro-independence “chiefs” like Fo Pierre Kamdem Ninyim. Since
Fo Ninyem was sympathetic to the UPC cause, he was subsequently detained
by French officials since his status as a “chief” was supported by many in the UPC.
In this example of Fo Ninyim, Terretta demonstrates how colonial authorities
actively infringed upon local cultural practices in order to thwart nationalists’
ambitious.
Terretta also explores the international strategies of
UPC
members.
Similar to other nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere, the UPC
“fashioned their independence-era political repertoire out of a combination of
public discourse, print culture, symbols, political cartoons, clothing, religiosity,
and the political symbolism of the UN in an international arena” (116). Critical
to the UPC’s quest for legitimacy, both in French Cameroon and abroad, was
the liberation movement’s petitioning efforts among a broad spectrum of
Cameroonians. As Terretta shows, the signatures of Cameroonians were sent to the
UN to pressure the French to leave the “Trust Territory.” Given the sheer volume
of petitions sent to the UN Trusteeship Council between 1946 and 1960, however,
a fundamental weakness is the author’s inability to analyze the rich primary
sources now available. It would have been interesting to learn about the processes,
methods, and challenges that must have faced UPC members while collecting, or
soliciting, signatures. For example, were petition signatures peacefully solicited or
coercively obtained, were they independently verified in anyway and, if so, what
evidence did the UPC (or UN) use to validate the authenticity of the petitions?
Moreover, in the years leading up to independence, the UPC sent roughly “fifty
thousand petitions to the Trusteeship Council” advocating for independence from
France, but in what concrete ways did these petitions play a role in generating
legitimacy for the UPC at the local and international levels (113)? These minor
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quibbles aside, Terretta highlights how the petitions themselves connected UPC
organizers to the local Cameroonian population and helped to galvanize support
for liberation. The UPC’s petitioning efforts brought peoples’ grievances about
French colonialism in Cameroon to the attention of the international community.
Despite both the UPC’s grassroots and international success in challenging
lingering French colonialism in Cameroon, Terretta also underscores the fact that
French officials and their Cameroonian sympathizers infiltrated UPC networks,
exploited cultural practices, and made use of African loyalists in order to thwart
the liberation movement. After banning the UPC and propping up the regime
of Ahmadou Ahidjo, violence engulfed French Cameroon. Terretta contends
“that Bamileke chiefs, guided by their own political concerns, those of their
chieftaincies, and those of their emigrant populations, understood what was at
stake as they chose to side with one trend or another in the territorial political
arena of 1956” (173). Thus, Terretta reveals the complex intersections between
Cameroonian nationalism and French colonial machinations as various actors
sought opportunities for political and economic power in the waning days of
French colonialism in Cameroon.
Given the variety of rich primary sources and level of analysis in this book,
Terretta makes a significant contribution to the liberation history of Cameroon
and, more broadly, to analyses of African liberation history. By emphasizing how
“global” issues, contexts, and cultural practices overlapped to inform the legitimacy
and strategies of the UPC, Terretta’s book offers scholars interested in nationalist
struggles a thorough example of the complexities of African liberation.
Michael G. Panzer
Adjunct Professor
Mount Saint Mary College
Newburg, NY
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Wendland, Claire L. A Heart for the Work: Journeys through
an African Medical School. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2010, xiv + 330 pp.
In A Heart for the Work, obstetrician and anthropologist Claire L. Wendland writes
about medical student training in Malawi’s first medical school. In contrast to
Western medical school ethnographies, this work does not find students becoming
increasingly detached from their patients as they study sick bodies and the science
of medicine. Instead, empathetic connections to the afflicted are strengthened.
Wendland’s research demonstrates that although medical curricular are increasingly
harmonized around the world, the processes and influence of medical education
are not. As elsewhere on the globe, doctors are held in high regard in Malawi
and medical school is hard to enter and challenging to complete. But Malawian
medical students have no assurance of an upper-middle class wage or state-ofthe- art clinics at graduation. Many are “called” to medicine, others choose it for
the prestige, and some study it because they have shadowed relatives in health
care or practiced as clinical officers themselves. Chapter Three details students’
socioeconomic enablers and motivations for pursuing a medical career. Although
there are multiple paths to medical school, and Wendland is careful to include the
many exceptions in her ethnography, the journey to Malawi’s College of Medicine
is most easily navigated by upper-class, male, Christian students.
Matriculation is only the first of many challenges to receiving and perfecting
scientific training in this resource-limited setting. As the author observes (and titles
the very rich sixth chapter), “resource is a verb” in Malawi and “resourcing” is a
skill honed in medical school. Resourceful doctors procure tests and medicines
despite shortages, and improvise creatively, when essential tools are impossible to
obtain. Exceptional physical diagnosis skills stand in the gap in the absence of hightech diagnostics. Students and faculty are unworried by personal and professional
risks associated with diverting resources, which are overshadowed by avoidable
adverse outcomes that arise from the dearth of the materials of health care.
Very early in their education, students at the College of Medicine and its
associated Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital become nominally supervised
clinicians. As trainees, they have close and extended work with terminal
patients and a very small community of classmates with which to share difficult
experiences. Irrespective of previous preparation (some students have worked
as clinical officers), all the students struggle emotionally to work through the
suffering and poverty of their patients to deliver care. Working with too few tools
and personnel, students and interns recognize that they cannot but draw upon the
expertise and experience of nurses and clinical officers. As Wendland observes,
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with the exception of female students, who are often mistaken for nurses, Malawian
medical students are immediately and continuously accorded the very high respect
reserved for medical doctors. This might have prevented the authoritarianism and
power struggles that have been documented for Western medical students.
The possible trajectories for graduates of the new College of Medicine
could only be projected at the time of writing. The book does this by layering
student aspirations and newly-graduated intern experiences on to available data
and interviews with Malawian physicians. In spite of an often-stated desire to
migrate, and the belief that this is the most popular path of their predecessors,
Wendland speculates that most of the medical school’s graduates will become
general practitioners in Malawi. Data from a recent study suggests that this is
where most recent graduates are and Wendland finds most of those she followed
through medical school in domestic posts soon after graduation. However, the
author does not project very far, but perhaps an ethnography should not. As the
alumni population builds, the least objectionable posts in Malawi are filled and
the school gains reputation, even as the motivations and means to migrate could
actually increase. This is certainly the experience of African countries with older
medical schools;101 but as Wendland mentions, doctors who migrate may still
contribute to health care in Malawi in some way or form.
A Heart for the Work does identify important systemic problems that promote
emigration from Malawi. A two tiered pay structure for faculty members at the
medical school, which gives expatriates much cushier wages and benefits than
Malawians, stands in the way of “Malawianizing” the Medical school and is a
principal factor that could drive brain drain. While financials are enumerated as
disincentives to stay in Malawi – Malawian government doctors not only earn less
than their contemporaries abroad, they are more poorly paid than other professionals
like lawyers and accountants – the students cite the dearth of tools needed for
optimal clinical care and the risk of contracting life-threatening disease on the job
as principal inducements to emigrate. Wendland observes that although pay and
work conditions in the public health system are poor, they can be supplemented
with social capital, with part-time private practice and with what Valéry Ridde has
referred to as “perdiemitis,” income supplements obtained by attending externallyfunded training workshops that are replete across Africa. As Ridde has observed,
the opportunity to make a living from perdiems solves some problems but is its
own disease.
A Malawian health practitioner is a doctor or nurse all the time and everywhere.
Most are compelled to work round the clock from home as well as the hospital, and
C. Ihekweazu., I. Anya, and E. Anosike, “Nigerian Medical Graduates: Where Are They Now?”
Lancet 365 (2005):1847-8.
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for little pay. A couple of months can, on occasion, be skipped from the payroll
due to “computer problems” and back pay may be difficult or impossible to secure.
These disincentives occur alongside an almost complete absence of regulatory,
professional or public oversight of clinical practice. As a result, Malawian doctors
are viewed by their students as either exceptional or “saint like” in their practice
and commitment to their patients, or working, or failing to work, with “clinical
impunity.” Almost no doctors did “a decently competent job for eight or ten hours
and then [went] home” (171). The Malawian medical students aspired to practice
with “Heart”, an unusual “empathetic responsibility” (177), which Wendland’s
book captures very well. The students hoped not to “become so absorbed in the
trauma that [they would] miss the gift” (173). Western Medical school ethnographies
inevitably record that the stresses of medical school result manifests in derision
and even dislike of patients.102 Wendland observes similar stresses and frustrations
among Malawian medical students but remarkably finds no ill-will towards
patients. Instead, the students direct their anger at their government, whose failure
to properly resource the health system is held accountable for the failures and
stresses that come with practicing medicine. And in contrast to Western medical
trainees who become increasingly detached from politics, Malawian students
become more politically aware activists in the course of their training. Rather than
becoming disgusted at their patients, they work to mobilize them to demand better
health care from their government.
Scholars and students of African medical practice need to read this richly
illustrated picture of medical students, teachers, and other health practitioners
in Malawi. Many recent studies of post-colonial medicine focus on external aid
and its impact on the African clinic. By contrast, Wendland’s eye is remarkably
trained on the African medical establishment and thus provides valuable context
for other studies. A Heart for the Work will also be valuable to health policy
makers and medical educators as well s pre-medical and medical students in Africa
and elsewhere. The author’s personal experience working as an obstetrician as
she engaged in her ethnographic research could be perceived as a confounding.
However, the dearth of clinicians means that neither she nor “Queen’s” hospital
could afford to have her work only as an anthropologist. Her dual practices there,
as well as her extensive experiences in medical education and clinical practice in
the United States, come through in many unusual and positive ways.
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Youngstedt, Scott M. Surviving with Dignity: Hausa
Communities of Niamey, Niger. United Kingdom: Lexington
Books, 2013, xv + 226 pp.
Hausa scholarship has developed primarily around communities in Northern
Nigeria and Eastern Niger. In Surviving With Dignity, anthropologist Scott M.
Youngstedt shifts the focus to long-standing Hausa communities in Niamey.
This book is the result of over twenty years of research in Niger, and Youngstedt
effectively draws from his own friendships with Hausa men to inform his larger
work. Bringing together personal Hausa narratives and proverbs with global
economic policies, Youngstedt situates Niamey at the center of larger conversations
on globalization and modernity.
The first half of Youngstedt’s book frames Niamey within a global context.
In his introduction, Youngstedt establishes the two concepts of suffering and
dignity as essential to understanding how Hausa communities interact with
shifting social and economic dynamics in Niamey. He links suffering to poverty
and global structural violence, whereas dignity is found at the individual level
and intimately tied to Hausa ideologies. After a brief history of Niamey’s growth
from an eighteenth century Zarma town to a present day cosmopolis, Youngstedt
then analyzes how international organizations have had devastating effects on
the Nigerien economy. In particular he points to the five Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s.
The consequent lack of economic opportunity in Niger leads to Youngstedt’s next
topic, Niamey’s global diaspora. Youngstedt contributes an interesting perspective
in his analysis of internal migrations in which he places Niamey as a stepping-stone
for Hausa men moving from rural to international destinations. He also examines
how technological developments such as money transfers, internet usage, and cell
phones help maintain global Hausa networks connected to their symbolic home in
Niamey.
In the second half of his book, Youngstedt delves into his local case studies.
His fourth chapter looks at how hira, Hausa men’s conversation groups, serve as a
grassroots institution in which Hausa communities negotiate local meaning amidst
global societal changes. In his fifth chapter he considers three overlapping spheres
through which Hausa experience modernity; Africanist-traditionalist, MuslimIslamist, and Francophonist- globalist. Here he focuses primarily on modernity
from an economic perspective, and the tension between local understandings of
globalization and growing economic inequality. His sixth chapter, briefer than
earlier ones, focuses on the economic struggles of male youth in Niamey with
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examples highlighting the financial difficulties of marriage and the role of hip hop
as a means of expression.
One of Youngstedt’s strongest contributions in this book is his use of hira
in the fourth chapter. His analysis focuses on both the structure of these groups
and the role they serve in Hausa communities in Niamey. He looks at structural
variances between unofficial hira and the more recently developed formal groups,
fada. Ultimately it is the function of hira that fits very well into Youngstedt’s
framework. It is here that the encounter of suffering and dignity meet within a
local cultural context; these conversation groups allow for an active negotiation
of what modernity and globalization mean within the Hausa community. This is
also where Youngstedt’s own language skills and long-term friendships align most
strongly with his methodological approach.
The limitations of this book are self-addressed by the author. Youngstedt notes
that within Niamey there is ethnic flexibility, yet his work relies on Hausa as an
exclusive category. His personal experiences add dimension throughout the book,
but lead to one major limitation, the lack of Hausa women’s voices. Youngstedt
addresses this by highlighting the existing scholarship on Hausa women, but leaves
room for the role of women and foyande, women’s conversation groups, to be
further explored. In addition, throughout the book Youngstedt’s local case studies
play a supporting role to an analysis that is often shaped around quantitative data
from international organizations and surveys. The exception to this is his strongest
chapter on hira, which highlights a point in the book where the author is able to
use local understandings of modernity to shape his own analysis. The result is
a glimpse of a more complex understanding of these concepts within a Hausa
epistemological framework and an approach that Youngstedt could have developed
further.
The strengths of Youngstedt’s work outweigh these limitations. He
successfully places Niamey at the forefront of the conversation on globalization,
and highlights the growing work of Hausa scholarship in Niger. He does so
in both an informative and compassionate way by offering the reader a history of
Niamey, the global policies that have impacted its growth, and a glimpse into the
lives of the Hausa men who are negotiating on a daily basis with living in a modern
world that has created severe economic inequalities. Most importantly, Youngstedt
points scholars to many promising directions, such as the roles of gender and ethnic
flexibility, to continue the worthy scholarly hira he has initiated.
Lori De Lucia
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